Problems of COMMUNISM

EAST GERMANY / RECORD OF FAILURE
Terence Prittie

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East Germany: Record of Failure

By Terence Prittie

WALTER ULBRICHT, political dictator of the Communist-ruled German Democratic Republic (GDR), was asked at a press conference on June 16, 1961, if the creation of a neutralized, demilitarized "free city" of West Berlin, as demanded by Khrushchev on behalf of the whole Communist bloc, would mean the erection of a "state frontier" at the Brandenburg Gate. Ulbricht replied:

I take your question to mean that there are people in West Germany who would like us to mobilize the building workers of the capital of the German Democratic Republic in order to erect a wall. The building workers of our city are primarily engaged in housing construction, and their energies are fully taken up by that. Nobody has any intention of building a wall.[1]

Eight weeks later, on Ulbricht's orders, the so-called "Chinese Wall" was being built through the heart of Berlin.

This, of course, was not the first time that Ulbricht had made a promise and failed to keep it. There was a time he kept promising—roughly once a year, in fact—to abolish food rationing in the GDR. It took him four years to fulfill this promise; and, even so, a haphazard system of food rationing has had to be reintroduced this year. More than two years ago he promised the East Germans that they would have more food and more consumer goods per head, by the end of 1961, than the people of the Federal Republic. That particular promise has been put into cold storage without the slightest chance of being fulfilled. He has promised still more recently that the standard of living in the GDR will overtake that of West Germany before the completion of the current East German Seven-Year Plan in 1965. No importance need be attached to this promise either; it no doubt will simply be forgotten when the time comes.

Still, Ulbricht's promises have not generally been violated quite so quickly as that of June 16. The building of the "Chinese Wall" on August 13 was surprising on that account, and it also was surprising for quite a different reason. Khrushchev had already promised the GDR a separate peace treaty in the autumn, involving the handing over of control of all communications between Berlin and the Federal Republic (that is, wherever control can be exercised) to the East German authorities. With the conclusion of the treaty, East Germans are to replace the Soviet army personnel now manning checkpoints at either end of the autobahn between West Berlin and West Germany proper in order to control Allied military traffic. (The movement of German and other civilian traffic on the autobahn is already controlled by the East Germans.). The same thing will happen on railways used by Allied military personnel, and an East German will also replace the Soviet representative now stationed in the Berlin Air Safety Center, which keeps track of all flights between Berlin and the West.

In view of Khrushchev's pledge, it was confidently supposed on the Western side last summer that any Communist measures in or around Berlin would be deferred until the signing of the separate Soviet-East

[1] Quoted in *Die Politische Meinung*, September 1961, p. 4.

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German peace treaty. This was the chief reason why the events of August 13 came as such a shock to the Western powers and the West Germans, although it must be acknowledged that the shock could have been avoided with more efficient Allied intelligence. For the fact is that Ulbricht had plenty of reasons for his action. And these reasons, both political and economic, are at the same time pointers to the failure of his regime.

Failures in the Economy

The economic reasons can be dealt with first, for they are the more important. They fall under four headings. In the first place, the East German plans for industrial expansion have not been fulfilled. This is a comparatively minor shortcoming; the failure in agricultural production resulting from stepped-up collectivization has had more serious effects. Next, the GDR has continued to produce too few consumer goods, which has had a very depressing effect on morale. Finally, various factors have produced East Germany's biggest economic headache—the increasing shortage of manpower.

Not too much need be written about the non-fulfillment of East German plans for industrial expansion. In 1958 Ulbricht laid down the basic requirements and targets for the current East German Seven-Year Plan. The targets, inevitably, were set a little high. The essence of Communist economic dictatorship lies in the ability to issue continual reminders of failure to reach targets, and the Ulbricht regime is no exception. Without ever saying too much, the East German authorities have been reasonably forthright about their industrial failures in the first half of 1961. Targets for durable consumer goods have not been reached: output of refrigerators was 12 percent less than planned; of television sets, nearly 30 percent; and of agricultural implements, around 10 percent. While production of chemicals has moved ahead, outputs of lignite (East Germany is very dependent on this brown coal, as it has practically no anthracite of its own) and of steel have just barely kept up to the 1960 figures. It is too soon to say what the final picture for 1961 will be, but a safe guess is that over-all industrial production will have risen by under 3 percent, as against the 8-10 percent increase essential for fulfilling the Seven-Year Plan by 1965.

Follies in Agriculture

Difficulties in agriculture have been far more disturbing to the Ulbricht regime. "Total" collectivization of the land was carried out between January and April of 1960. One by one, the administrative districts of the GDR announced the fulfillment of total collectivization during that period. Theoretically, all East German farmers lost their land and entered state collectives as mere members. This climaxed a campaign in which the regime pushed "persuasion" to the point of violence. The farmers were persuaded by trained Communist "agitators" (the Ulbricht regime actually uses this word, evidently in the belief that it connotes genuine, revolutionary action). Peasants were distracted from work, lectured, and threatened, and—if they still failed to respond—intimidated by gangs of Communist agents or by loudspeaker vans which stopped outside their farmhouses, trained searchlights on them at night, and regaled the whole village with the story of that particular farmer's lack of patriotism.

Thousands of East German farmers fled to West Germany at the beginning of 1960. This simplified the actual collectivization of the land, but it did not simplify administrative problems nor help productivity. Wretched harvests will be gathered this year, and the reasons are clear. Of the 300,000 farmers who have been forced into the collectives, many are working only the statutory eight-hour day and are refusing to work extra "socialist" shifts. An eight-hour day for an independent farmer would be in the nature of a jest—he will work 12 or 14 hours a day on land which is his very own, and will drive his tractor by moonlight.

Every sort of state-imposed lunacy has invaded the life of the formerly independent farmer. Today, as a member of a collective, he must down his tools whenever ordered to do so and listen to a lecture on "People's Socialism" by a paid hack of the regime. With complete indifference to seasonal requirements, the regime organizes sightseeing tours to the former Buchenwald concentration camp or to model farms in the midst of vital operations to clear the fields or carry out spring-sowing. (It does not, however, do this sort of thing during harvesting, for then the stark shortage of labor is recognized.)

WHAT POSSIBLE INTEREST can the East German member of a state collective farm have in the work he has to undertake? It took a great deal of time and "persuasion" to convince the miserably poor Russian peasant that his future lay in collectivization. But East German farmers, apart from the uneconomic class of small farmers created by government policies in the first five years after the war, were happy on their own land, and reasonably prosperous. Now, under a system of collectivization imposed by an alien Communist

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tyranny, they have no incentive whatever. Last summer the East German government issued some revealing criticisms of the farming community: the districts of Rostock, Frankfurt and Schwerin were said to be hopelessly backward in the production of meat for the market, while the districts of Rostock, Schwerin, Neu-Brandenburg, Leipzig, Potsdam and Chemnitz (Karl-Marx Stadt) were blamed for failing to reach the milk production targets assigned to them by a wide margin.[2]

Ulbricht has thought of only one way to counter the mood of dismal apathy which exists on East German collective farms. It is not by raising the wages of the members of the collectives, or producing better machinery, or trying to reinstill in the individual farmer a personal interest in the land he cultivates. It is by "informing the farm worker of the true state of world politics, of the relative strengths of the capitalist West and the peace-loving democracies, and of the need to raise the universal standard of living in the latter." This propagandistic approach has failed. Indications as of mid-September are that the 1961 grain and root-crop harvests will be very poor, and may even be catastrophic. Much will therefore depend on the ability and readiness of the Soviet Union to supply East Germany with adequate basic foodstuffs, or to allow East German industrial products to be marketed outside the Communist bloc in return for grain, meat, eggs, butter, milk, and the whole range of canned foodstuffs which the East Germans do not produce.

It should be noted that, like so many of the measures imposed by Communist regimes, the East German collectivization program has not been anywhere near fully effective. Chicken farmers and market gardeners have in many cases managed to retain their independence. Smallholders have taken other jobs in order to avoid registering as farmers and so hold on to their few acres. A great many farmers have only formally registered as members of collectives; in practice they are still farming their own land, but in an unenthusiastic frame of mind and with the threat of real collectivization hanging over their heads.

Plight of the Consumer

The third economic failure in the GDR has been the chronic shortage of consumer goods. In spite of its considerable effect on morale, this should not be overrated. For a Communist state characteristically exists on what might be called a "shortage economy." The Soviet Union needs certain things from the GDR: machinery and chemicals, precision instruments, uranium ores (which are mined by 110,000 East Germans and bought at cut rates by the Soviet Union under the terms of a secret agreement which has never been published). Through the over-all machinery of Comecon, which serves to some extent as an East European Common Market, these products are paid for at fixed prices. But these prices do not allow a condition of affluence—unusual in any case among members of the Communist bloc—to be built up in East Germany. Moreover, the fact that the GDR does not produce enough food to feed itself makes things easier from the standpoint of Soviet planning. The East Germans can be kept just that bit short of food which will make them work that bit harder in the Soviet interest.

In 1961 the GDR has had to reintroduce food rationing despite the fact that it should surely be producing enough industrially to be able to pay for needed food imports. This summer butter, meat, eggs, milk, and even flour were being rationed under a "local" system. Families had to register with certain shops, and if they bought rationed items elsewhere, this contravention of the local regulations was sure to be discovered by the army of state inspectors (estimated at 47,000 and tending to increase). The actual market supply of vegetables has been pitiful this year—no choice, a complete lack of quality, and an even more striking lack of interest on the part of sellers. Butcher shops have often been sold out of meat by 11 o'clock in the morning, and in some towns the authorities imposed two "meatless" days per week.

A large mass of cheap food imports—Bulgarian canned fish and meat, for instance— had to be destroyed because of bad quality. Imports of more expensive foodstuffs have been drastically curtailed and also "rationed by price" (visitors to "Baltic Week" at Rostock in July were amazed to find pineapples costing 30 marks, or $7.50 each).

Lack of good-quality food is only one aspect of the over-all lack of goods for the consumer. Only a third as many households own a refrigerator or washing-machine in East as in West Germany. Possession of a car is almost invariably conditional on some official connection with the regime, or on being an active supporter of it. The GDR produces 30,000 automobiles a year, the Federal Republic over 1.5 million. In addition, East German imports of cars are kept down to a minimum. It is significant that in spite of the shortage of consumer goods in the GDR, the 1961 Soviet-GDR

[2] The criticisms were made by Erich Honecker, a member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party, at a two-day session of the party Central Committee, July 3-4, 1961.

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trade agreement provided for a 45-percent increase in East German exports of durable consumer goods to the Soviet Union.

The Manpower Crisis

A grey, unhopeful existence, the certainty of continuing economic regimentation, and the chronic shortages of consumer goods all contributed to what had become—before August 13—by far the most serious economic problem facing East Germany. This was the alarming and growing shortage of manpower. By early July the Ulbricht regime was admitting a shortage of 100,000 workers, three quarters of them male. This was in a working population of only around 8 million, and it was probably far short of the true figure. In addition, a specially appointed government committee studying manpower problems had found that the number of East Germans of working age would decline by 700,000 during the next five years, even without taking into account the flight of refugees to West Germany. Already this year the number of regular workers in agriculture alone was 300,000 less than in 1956.

A few more notes on the shortage of manpower may help to bring the problem into clearer focus. Since 1949 the population of the GDR has declined from 18.9 to 17.2 million. The birth rate is static. Between the end of 1959 and the end of 1960 alone, the total population dropped by 97,000, with 10,574 of the drop in East Berlin alone. During this same period the over-all number of employed persons went down by 82,000. Industry lost 23,000, handicrafts 31,000, and agriculture 80,000, while the only increases were registered by the state services, chiefly the railways, government offices, and the police. More important, since 1950 the actual number of people in the age group of highest gainful employment (between 21 and 44) declined by 14 percent. One person out of five in the GDR today is an old-age pensioner.

On top of the dwindling of the labor supply from "natural" causes came the exodus of East German refugees to West Berlin and the Federal Republic. This has amounted to 1,331,000 in the last six years, or an average of 222,000 a year. The outflow during the first half of 1961 was at a rate slightly below the six-year average, although higher than the rate in 1959 and 1960. From January to the end of June, 103,000 East Germans fled their homes. But the exodus during July was over 20,000, and in early August as many as 3,000 and even 4,000 East Germans were fleeing daily. As of the end of August the figure for the year stood at an estimated 181,000 and, had the "Chinese Wall" not been built on August 13, would probably have exceeded 300,000 by the end of 1961. This would have been the biggest annual efflux since 1953.

This drain of manpower was something which the East German regime simply could not afford. In an attempt to alleviate it, women have been fully mobilized: with 3.6 million employed, they constitute around 47 percent of the total labor force. An experiment in organizing "housewives brigades" for occasional work has been largely unsuccessful; at the beginning of September there were around 4,000 of these brigades, with less than 30,000 members. Appeals to old-age pensioners to come out of retirement voluntarily have met with little response, and the regime has so far refrained from legal action to defer the pensionable age for men from 65 to 70, and for women, from 60 to 65. Such action may be taken now that the bolt-hole to West Berlin has been stopped, but it would only be a temporary expedient.

Ulbricht clamped down on the main escape route to West Berlin on August 13 because, according to his reckoning, he could not afford to wait any longer. The exodus of manpower—and half of those who fled were under 25 years old—was bleeding the East German economy to death. The regime's Seven-Year Plan was becoming a chimera. To Ulbricht the prospect of a downward revision of the plan spelled all sorts of things —open failure in the face of West German's blooming economy, unpopularity in the Kremlin, and an added sense of uncertainty in the government ghetto which has been built outside East Berlin.

Political Bankruptcy

Economic considerations almost certainly weigh more than political with the Ulbricht regime. This is because the emphasis in over-all Communist planning is on overtaking the West in the economic field. Khrushchev, moreover, reserves the formulation and implementation of political tactics for the whole Communist bloc to himself. Politically—apart from the occasional sop to Polish nationalism—the entire bloc is directed exclusively in the interests of the Kremlin. But this does not mean that political considerations are altogether unimportant to a satellite regime like that of the GDR. And in some ways Ulbricht's political failures are as significant as his economic ones.

For one thing, he has failed to give the average East German worker any feeling of confidence in his government. This is not just because of the chronic shortages of food and consumer goods, or because less than 60,000 new homes are built each year, or because the

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incidence of sickness has mounted drastically (the average daily number of absentees from work because of illness is now 321,000). It is primarily because East German workers know that the screw of "work-norms" can be ruthlessly turned at any time. From now on, Ulbricht intends to get more work out of the population, and one reason for the sealing-off of West Berlin was that he knew that severe measures would increase the exodus from East German farms and factories to the West.

Since August 13, factory employees have been forced to pass resolutions such as "We shall raise production 24 percent by the end of 1961" or "We shall support the production campaign, on which we shall found our peace treaty as well as our prosperity." "Output competitions" have been instituted under the slogan, "The whole Republic expects a proper and speedy answer from the factories." Wages remain pegged, but the workers, deprived of the right to strike, have to promise whatever is demanded of them. Thus, the employees of the "Schwarze Pumpe" lignite combine have undertaken to produce an extra 65,000 tons of brown coal brickets by the end of the year. The workers of the Hennigsdorf and Riesa steel combines have subscribed to similar resolutions. One agricultural collective in Mecklenburg has promised to bring in the potato harvest by October 7 and the sugar-beet harvest by November 10, and also to clear the fields for winter sowing by December 1.

It was the raising of work-norms that provoked the June 1953 rising against the regime. But the rising took place, it must be remembered, after the new Soviet High Commissioner, Semeonov, had announced a "soft line" in all political matters. Perhaps with that lesson in mind, the Ulbricht regime has made it clear since the beginning of August that it will be brutally tough with all critics and opponents. After having promised for years to introduce a five-day work-week, the regime blandly announced that "work will continue to be spread over six days." It announced, too, that "work discipline" would be tightened—especially in sectors like the building industry, where workers had got into the habit of leaving their places of work fot home—often a long way off—on Friday evening and only reporting back late on Monday morning.

Tactics of Terror

A tone of extraordinary brutality has been adopted by the East German press towards workers. There were gleeful reports, for instance, that workers in the Buna rubber plant at Schopkau had been beaten up for indiscipline—"Es hat Schule gemacht" (This has set an example), the East German papers declared. Other reports were published about reluctant farmers who refused to work on their collectivized land being kicked across the frontier into West Germany. On August 18, *Neues Deutschland,* the main organ of the ruling Socialist Unity Party, published the following report from the Revaler railway repair yard in East Berlin:

Our comrades are on watch to see that peace and order prevail at the border. We ourselves see to it that there is peace and order at our works. On Wednesday we had an encounter with a mischief-maker. He had formerly worked in West Berlin. We shall not treat these people like lepers, but when they get cheeky we shall not wait until a policeman comes along. In our works one of these people wanted to dawdle around. We showed him what was what. A comrade took him by the collar. Before he knew where he was, he had landed in the street. Now when he seeks employment elsewhere, he will know that he's got to behave himself.

There have been dozens of reports of similar treatment being meted out to former East German "Grenzgaenger" who used to cross over to work in West Berlin but, since August 13, have had to take jobs on their home territory. The East German press invariably takes a gloating tone towards them. But not only the "Grenzgaenger" have suffered, nor has the suffering been limited to mere manhandling. One agricultural laborer was sentenced to three months in prison for absenting himself from work on a collective farm, another to eight months for saying that the GDR was "a prison behind barbed wire." In Preuslitz a worker received a six months' sentence for saying that he always tied a towel or coat around his head whenever the official East German news bulletin came on the radio. Eighteen and nineteen year-olds have been sentenced to as much as one year's imprisonment merely for saying that the August 13 measures were unnecessary. One worker went to prison for three years for stamping on a People's Policeman's hat. Altogether, between August 13 and September 13, at least one thousand people are reported to have been jailed for "political crimes," [3] and the actual number was probably much larger. Prison sentences are even handed down on Sundays, as in the case of a 46-year-old worker at Eilenburg who was sentenced one Sunday morning to the sound of church bells.

NOT ONLY HAS this terror campaign failed to stop grumbling, but it has even shown up weaknesses within the Socialist Unity Party and other Communist organi-

[3] Estimate of the West German Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs, Bonn.

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zations. At a meeting in Markkleeberg on July 26, Ulbricht stated—with horror in his voice—that party officials were showing a distressing tendency to regard themselves as "neutral" in the regime's struggle to shore up the economy and enforce conformity of thought. Ulbricht's Press Chief, Albert Norden, assuming a deeply aggrieved air, has publicly complained of the same tendency. On August 5, the Political Bureau of the Socialist Unity Party issued instructions to all party branches and offices warning against "weakness and reticence in the face of our class enemies," against an attitude of "cowardly evasion towards Western hate campaigns," "lack of initiative and combative argumentation," and "an opportunist approach to RIAS [Radio in the American Sector of Berlin] broadcasts."

the language is veiled—
—but the meaning is clear

There were a few members of the intelligentsia who did not always have the necessary understanding for the difficulty of our struggle for the peaceful future of the German nation. In fact, we were approached with ultimate demands. In that respect, we have acted with patience up to a bearable limit. The 13th of August [the day the wall went up in Berlin—*Ed.*] has also eliminated a situation where extortion was possible.

We have written quite frankly about it. Yet, this does not mean that a severe and strict course is now being taken in policies toward the intelligentsia. Quite the contrary, our relations with you are to improve, become more comradely, become even stronger. However, this will not be achieved through shoulder patting, which we have never done. It can be achieved only if clarity is established on fundamental problems. . . .

The 13th of August does not allow anyone to cultivate sectarianism which is still being practiced here and there. Exaggerations of that nature and illegal actions will be most severely combatted. The 13th of August actually introduced the correct and overall implementation of the State Council declaration. Once again I stress that we will not launch a vindictive action against anyone for his past. However, every intellectual must, of course, review his own standpoint and draw the necessary conclusion from that review to obtain the correct relationship with the problems of our era.

—From a speech to Leipzig cultural workers by Paul Frolich, Politburo candidate of the SED, Leipziger Volkszeitung, Sept. 30, 1961.

The Ulbricht regime has been particularly incensed over what it regards as the base ingratitude of privileged sections of the community. In June and July, desertions to the West by members of the People's Police became increasingly frequent—altogether more than 11,000 policemen and members of the armed forces have fled in the last seven years. Well-paid members of the "intellectual professions"—playwrights and authors, opera stars and theater managers, doctors and the like—who lived in West Berlin but used to work in the Communist zone, have simply stopped working in East Berlin. There has been trouble in the East German universities, even among members of the privileged Free German Youth. Around 40 students of Humboldt University in East Berlin—many of them Free German Youth members—were expelled on September 9 for not volunteering to serve with the East German armed forces. A smaller batch was expelled from Leipzig University for the same reason. Some students at the Technical College in Dresden were expelled for expressing doubts about the regime's claim that Western "agents" had acted as white-slavers in "luring" East Germans into West Berlin, and others for criticizing the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear bomb tests. These expulsions have generally been accompanied by wild insults. A Dresden student was told, "You are morally a swine and the worst kind of revisionist. Now get out!" [4]

THERE IS ANOTHER source of weakness for the Ulbricht regime which deserves particular mention—namely, the steadfastness of the Christian churches in maintaining their unity. Persecution of the churches is a tap which Ulbricht has turned on innumerable times during the last ten years, always in the hope of destroying their unity and always failing to do so. This year, for instance, the regime prevented the holding of part of the Evangelical Church conference in East Berlin. It also has ejected the chairman of the Evangelical Church Council, Praeses Scharf, from his home in East Berlin and refused him permission ever to cross back over the sector boundary again. It has, by contrast, penned the Roman Catholic Bishop of Berlin, Cardinal Bengsch, in East Berlin and will not let him visit his flock in West Berlin. It has for years past prevented the Evangelical Bishop of Berlin and Brandenburg, Dr. Dibelius, from going outside the borders of Greater Berlin; now, he may not even preach in his "parish church," East Berlin's Marienkirche.

[4] Reported by Tarantel Press, September 30, 1961.

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The Ulbricht regime has persecuted individual churchmen all over the GDR, has interfered with the holding of church services, and has closed down Sunday schools and church-maintained charitable institutions. It has made spasmodic efforts to organize an Evangelical "State Church," which would sign an agreement with the state and do its bidding (80 percent of the East Germans are or used to be Evangelicals, and only 15 percent Roman Catholics). But these efforts have failed to attract the interest of any but a tiny minority of East German churchmen led by Pastor Kleinschmidt. The unyielding solidarity of the churches is extremely annoying to the Ulbricht regime, for they are the last solid and dependable links with West Germany, the last bridge over the chasm which now divides the two Germanies, and also the most effective barrier to the development of East German nationalism and the consolidation of the GDR.

Why the Regime Survives

Its inability to reduce the Christian churches to servitude represents yet another of the many failures of the Ulbricht regime. It is arguable that all these failures would have made the measures of August 13 inevitable sooner or later. How then does the regime manage to survive in a community where about 70 percent of the people dislike it?

It survives because it is not totally inefficient and because its economic planners, despite their failures, have nevertheless succeeded in raising over-all production by around 60 percent in the last eight years. It survives because of the virtual impossibility of open opposition, and because of the total lack of truthful news. It survives by virtue of its security forces, including more than 100,000 People's Police and smaller numbers of frontier, transport, and security police, as well as hundreds of thousands of frequently unwilling armed factory guards and members of the para-military "Societies for Sports and Technics."

Most of all, the East German regime survives because of the might and undeviating purpose of the Soviet Union. The June 1953 rising proved that the Soviet Army, with 22 divisions stationed in a country of only 17 million inhabitants, was ready to intervene whenever necessary to restore order. The strength of USSR forces in the GDR has not been reduced since 1953. This was the primary reason why—save among a few intellectuals—there was no sympathetic East German response to the Hungarian revolution of 1956. It also is the biggest reason why the East German people have refrained from any new attempt at direct action against their regime. Besides, until August 13, the grumblers—and there have been a great many—always knew that they could at least escape to West Germany if conditions became unbearable. Now their main avenue of escape through West Berlin has been stopped, but this does not make popular resistance to the regime within East Germany any more likely.

At the Belgrade Conference of neutral nations at the beginning of September, the view was generally accepted that there are today two separate German states. A large section of British public opinion believes that this is so, and that *de facto* recognition of the East German regime is bound to come eventually. It may well be that there is no practicable way of bringing together the East German police state and the free democracy which has grown up in West Germany. Today they are virtually two different countries. The sealing-off of West Berlin may shore up the detested Ulbricht regime at home, but only by discouraging the hopes of the many East Germans who are still not converted to communism, and by forcibly suggesting to them that they should reconcile themselves to a bleak and gray future.

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Communism in Africa

EDITORS' NOTE: The following two articles represent the fourth installment of a series heretofore appearing under the heading of "Russia, China, and the World" (see first three issues of current volume), and the first of a two-part series on Soviet and Communist activities in Africa. The next issue of this journal will carry two articles on current Soviet scholarship on Africa. The reader is also referred to the article by Mr. Burg on p. 50 of this issue, which deals with Friendship University in Moscow, and particularly with the tensions between the Soviet authorities and African students.

Moscow's First Steps

By David L. Morison

THE APPEARANCE of the Soviet Union on the African political scene must arouse as many questions in Africa as it does in the West. How wholehearted and disinterested are Moscow's expressions of sympathy with African advancement; will the Soviets in fact be content to see the African peoples develop along lines of their own choosing; what political returns does the USSR expect from her support of the anti-colonial movement in Africa; is Russia's basic interest the replacement of Western by Soviet influence? In the present article some of these problems will be explored.

It is clear that ever since the end of the Second World War the Soviets have cherished hopes of gaining a foothold in Africa. At more than one postwar conference they pressed for a trusteeship over Tripolitania. Basically the same motive of gaining a new sphere of influence —although by less direct methods—underlies Soviet African policy today. In the view of the Soviet leaders it is not merely a question of the USSR sharing with the rest of the world the right of access to the African continent; by their aggressive hostility to Western dealings with Africa, they have made it evident that they would like to secure for themselves and their Communist allies an exclusive field of political, economic and cultural action in those African countries which are now free to choose their own international alignment.

Role of the "National Bourgeoisie"

During the immediate postwar period, the Soviet Union viewed Africa as part of "the rear of the capitalist system." [1] The freedom movements of the colonial peoples were seen, firstly, as an embarrassment to the capitalist West, and, secondly, as an opportunity for Communist infiltration, particularly under cover of the various Communist front organizations. The Soviet attitude towards Africa at this time was so permeated by anti-Western animus and so inhibited by the ideological

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[1] See A. Zhdanov's speech at the inaugural session of the Cominform in September 1947.

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reservations of the Stalinist era as to be almost wholly negative and destructive. The treatment of African independence movements was cautious: their central importance was recognized, but the Kremlin was then unwilling to declare Soviet ideological solidarity with them. The educated African middle class (the "national bourgeoisie" and "national intelligentsia"), which led the independence movements, was suspect in Soviet eyes, owing to its supposed "class allegiances"; and yet the "anti-imperialist" character of its political aims seemed to demand Soviet sympathy and support.[2] Africa, in short, had not yet acquired in the official Soviet view an individuality of its own. To encourage Soviet public interest in Africa [3] and to develop African studies in academic circles was one thing; but Stalinist ideology, with its uncompromising hostility to "bourgeois" movements, was an impediment to Soviet appreciation and effective exploitation of political realities in Africa. Nevertheless, the latent interest was there.

The Bandung Conference of April 1955 provided a sharp lesson which was taken to heart by Soviet Communists. If it was to retain any authority, Moscow's anti-colonialism had to come to terms with the new and vital anti-colonialist movement of independent—mostly non-Communist—Asian and African states. It was fairly easy for Soviet theoreticians to make out that the "Five Principles" adopted at Bandung accorded with, and even developed from, Leninist doctrine; [4] but the question of Soviet ideological solidarity with Asian and African independence movements, in their existing form, presented a more complex problem. An article on the conference by Ye. Zhukov expressed Soviet misgivings:

The contemporary anti-imperialist, anti-colonial movement in Asia and Africa is not a uniform movement of revolutionary-minded masses. People who are opposed to revolutionary measures are also taking part in it.[5]

YET THE FACT remained that African countries were advancing to independence by non-revolutionary methods under the leadership of a "national bourgeoisie"; and at least one Soviet observer was prepared openly to admit the fact. I. I. Potekhin, the foremost Soviet Africanist, affirmed in an article published in June 1955, that the establishment of national governments in the Gold Coast, Nigeria and the Sudan, while not amounting to true independence, represented "concessions by the colonialists" which must not be underestimated.[6] Some nine months later, reviewing the general political situation in Africa, he acclaimed the emergence of new states in the Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco as genuine victories for the "all-national" independence movements of these countries, and noted successes achieved by independence movements elsewhere on the continent.[7] It is significant that in this article Potekhin made particular mention of the question of the African middle class. The colonial powers, he said, were trying to encourage and win the favor of the African middle class as a "stabilizing element"; but in fact the political aims of the national bourgeoisie had made it an anti-imperialist force. In this way the stage was already set for an accommodation between Soviet communism and African, non-Communist, nationalism.

The 20th CPSU Congress of February 1956 is generally regarded as the turning point in the Soviet attitude toward "bourgeois nationalism," but it should be remembered not only that a modification of the Soviet attitude had been in progress for some time before this, but also that any notion of a *radical* break in the party line was discounted in subsequent expositions of the problem. Thus one official Soviet statement insisted that it was not "the diplomacy of the bourgeois leaders" which had wrung concessions from the colonialists, but "the pressure of the masses of the people." [8] This was a reminder that, whatever temporary recognition might be given to the anti-colonialist "liberating" role of the "national-bourgeois" leaders, the Soviet Union and its Communist Party still regarded the proletariat as the ultimate political force. Nevertheless, in relation to Africa, the ground had been cleared for Soviet exploitation of political opportunities; and, while a Soviet African policy began to take shape, a general reappraisal of all important political forces in Africa was initiated. The resulting discussion is still in progress, and a study of it reveals a whole pattern of Soviet anxieties and preoccupations. Above all it is clear

[2] The dilemma is well shown in I. I. Potekhin's "Stalinskaia teoriia kolonialnoi revolutsii i natsionalnoosvoboditelnoe dvizhenie v tropicheskoi i yuzhnoi Afrike" (The Stalinist Theory of Colonial Revolution and the National Liberation Movement in Tropical and Southern Africa), *Sovetskaia etnografiia,* No. 1, 1960.

[3] For a bibliography of books on Africa published in the Soviet Union during this period, see *Narody Afriki* (The Peoples of Africa), Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1954, p. 665.

[4] Prof. V. Durdenevskiy, "The Five Principles," *International Affairs,* No. 3, 1956, pp. 45-50.

[5] "The Bandung Conference of African and Asian Countries," *International Affairs,* No. 5, 1955, p. 32.

[6] "Antiimperialisticheskoe dvizhenie v kolonii Zolotoi Bereg" (The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the Gold Coast Colony), *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie,* No. 2, 1955, p. 62.

[7] I. I. Potekhin, "Politicheskoe polozhenie v stranakh Afriki" (The Political Situation in the African Countries), *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie,* No. 1, 1956, p. 36.

[8] Editorial article, *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie,* No. 1, 1956, p. 9.

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that, whatever superficial "softening" of the Soviet attitude has taken place in response to the demands of the situation, no major or permanent concessions can be expected from Soviet ideology as applied to Africa.

African Unity and Nationalism

Soviet pronouncements on Africa seldom fail to call for the unity of all the African peoples against colonialism; but, while unity of action is urged, action towards territorial unification is not expressly called for; indeed, certain reservations are expressed on this subject. Any union, it is insisted, must be a "voluntary grouping of peoples," and must not be undertaken in a hurry. Soviet experience with unification movements in the Arab countries has evidently provided a lesson, and a warning by Khrushchev about premature and forced unions (he was referring to Nasser's ambition to annex Iraq) has been prominently quoted in relation to Africa.[9] Obviously, union in itself would not serve any particular Soviet purpose, and might even mean that a country of promising political orientation would come within the sphere of another less amenable to Soviet influence.

Pan-Africanism as an ideal and as a movement has received little Soviet recognition. It had begun, it may be recalled, as a pan-Negro movement, and these American antecedents do not endear it to the Russians. Indeed, Moscow now insists that the fight against colonialism in Africa demands the unity of all races in Africa, and not only of the negroid race. Africa, in the Soviet view, has every right to assert its own "African personality," but this must not lead to a form of African racialism and African rejection of Western culture. It is pointed out that the African peoples have always had the support of the working class and Communist parties of the whole world. The unexpressed thought here evidently is that African hostility to everything European could seriously damage the chances for Communist influence in Africa. Pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism and pan-Arabism, as ideologies which engender exclusive racial or religious loyalties and exclude outside political allegiances, have all earned Soviet condemnation; it is probably only a matter of time before pan-Africanism gets similar treatment.

The idea that Africa is intrinsically different from the rest of the world and requires a political ideology of its own making is utterly rejected in the Soviet Union. African nationalism, African socialism and Nasser's "cooperative democratic Socialism" are subjected to Marxist-Leninist analysis and are all, in varying degrees, found wanting. African nationalism, in the Soviet view, is "democratic and progressive" in so far as it awakens the masses to struggle against colonialism and backwardness; but it can easily assume the form of "national egoism and national exclusiveness," leaving no room for the assertion of the rights of the masses.[10] Soviet spokesmen recognize that in Africa the Communist movement has a long way to go—Africa's "backwardness" in Soviet eyes is above all a backwardness in "class consciousness"—and they cannot but view the entrenchment of "bourgeois" nationalism at this early stage with serious misgivings.

The Leninist Pattern for Africa

It is hardly surprising then that a powerful Soviet broadside has been directed against African socialists who maintain that classes do not exist in Africa and that Africa can develop its own form of socialism on the basis of the peasant commune.[11] Arguing on the analogy of Soviet experience, Potekhin maintains that these views are erroneous and that Marxist-Leninist "scientific socialism" offers the correct road for the African peoples to follow. Classes, Soviet writers continue to emphasize, are inherent in African society; Africa cannot turn its back on Marxism-Leninism. It might once have been thought that the Soviet attitude would become one of complacent approval of the "anti-imperialist" direction of African nationalism and that the complicating issue of class antagonisms would not be thrust forward. But it is evidently Soviet policy in this matter to look ahead and to make it clear that, in the Soviet scheme, the development of class consciousness is at least as important as the development of national consciousness.

In this pattern of Soviet reserve towards African-bred ideologies, Guinea perhaps constitutes an exception. It is noted that, in Sékou Touré's words, "Guinea's experiment is a typically African experiment which has not been copied from either the European or Asian countries," and Soviet observers write with uniform approval of the social and economic policy of the Guinean Democratic Party. They do stress, however, that in many re-

[9] I. I. Potekhin, *Afrika smotrit v budushchee* (Africa Looks to the Future), Publishing House for Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1960, p. 61. This work is the main source for subsequent references to the Soviet view on African issues. For a more detailed analysis of the Soviet publications mentioned in this article, and also for information on current trends in Soviet writing on Africa, the reader is referred to *The Mizan Newsletter,* published by the Central Asian Research Centre, 66 King's Road, London, S.W. 3.

[10] A. M. Sivolobov, *Natsionalno osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie v Afrike,* Znaniie Publishing House, Moscow, 1961. p. 38.

[11] I.I. Potekhin, *op. cit.* pp. 5-29.

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spects conditions in Guinea are of a special kind and that the Guinean system is not to be considered a model to which the rest of Africa should conform.

There is an air of unreality about one whole large aspect of Russia's attitude to Africa. Do the Soviet leaders really expect African peoples to adopt such Communist-formulated concepts as that of "national democracy"—the system recommended to emergent countries by the 1960 Moscow conference of world Communist parties? [12] Having rejected Africa's own ideas on the development of African society, they seem bent on presenting their own as the only alternative.

IN THE SOVIET VIEW, the working class and the peasantry of former colonial countries are becoming an increasingly important political force. Even in countries of "progressive" orientation they are seen as forces to the left of the government, exercising pressure on it, as for example in Guinea.[13] The political affiliations of African trade unions seem to be a permanent Soviet preoccupation, and the outcome of the All-African Trade Union Conference in Casablanca has been presented as a victory of "the international trade union movement," in the Soviet sense of the phrase, even though by objective standards this victory was anything but clearcut. The charter of the new All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) obliges members to disaffiliate from other international trade union bodies, including both the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Federation of Trade Unions. Soviet commentators, applauding the rejection of affiliation with the democratic ICFTU, disregard the like rejection of the Communist-controlled WFTU.

As regards the African peasants, Soviet writers admit that their political consciousness leaves much to be desired, but they insist on the basic necessity of a worker-peasant alliance for the successful conclusion of "the national, anti-imperialist, democratic revolution." Agrarian reform is a basic point in the program of a "national democracy." Like the workers, the peasants are regarded as well to the left of the nationalists; A. M. Sivolobov, for example, observes that when a peasants' rising broke out in the Lake Province of Tanganyika in January 1959 "the leadership of the Tanganyika African National Union condemned these revolutionary activities of the peasants." [14]

[12] *New Times,* No. 50, 1960, supplement pp. 10-12.

[13] G. Usov, "Rabochii klass Afriki v borbe protiv imperializma" (The African Working Class in the Struggle Against Imperialism), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,* No. 6, 1961, p. 129.

[14] A. M. Sivolobov, *op. cit.,* p. 10.

In short, the idea of the African working class as a revolutionary force seems to have a powerful attraction for the Soviet mind. At the state level, sympathy for nationalist leadership may be the only view publicly expressed; but Soviet ideologists are already looking ahead to the eventual dominance of "proletarian" movements.

Economic Penetration

The conclusion of economic agreements with the USSR and other Communist countries is regarded by Moscow as one of the touchstones of a country's international respectability. Some of the new African states have passed this test; others have not, and in Soviet eyes these are virtually beyond the pale—preserves of "the Western monopolies." All Soviet accounts emphasize the economic dependence of African countries on the West; Soviet aid and trade are therefore presented as a "liberating" factor. At the same time the expression "economic offensive," as applied to Soviet economic initiatives in Africa, is indignantly repudiated, but the polemical tone of Soviet literature on the subject seems to make the term particularly appropriate.

It is obviously in the political field that one must look for the motives of Soviet aid, and this is virtually admitted by at least one Soviet writer:

In its relations with the capitalist countries the Soviet Union utilizes economic contacts principally as an important lever for strengthening peaceful relations and establishing the desired confidence between states with different social systems.[15]

Soviet aid is indeed one of the most important arms of Soviet policy in Africa. What is more, Soviet publicity for it—it is now stated that the USSR is assisting in the construction of over 100 industrial and other undertakings in African countries [16]—is calculated to give a false impression of its scale.

It should be borne in mind that in such statements as the above Soviet aid to Egypt is included. While it is not proposed to examine here this aid in the African context, it may be noted that the Aswan High Dam project is presented as the showpiece of Soviet aid not only for the Arab countries but also for Africa. It is of course the Soviet aim to obtain the maximum propaganda value from this enterprise, so there was naturally a sharp reaction from the Soviet side when a party of Soviet journalists who recently visited the High Dam

[15] B. Pichugin, *International Affairs,* No. 10, 1959, p. 70.

[16] "Torgovo-ekonomicheskie sviazy SSSR so stranamy Afriki" (The USSR's Trade and Economic Links with African Countries), *Vneshniaia torgovlia,* No. 4, 1961, p. 20.

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site were told by a UAR press department official that there was still "nothing to write" about the project, since there were "not yet any results." [17]

As regards Soviet aid to the sub-Saharan African countries, the figures at first sight look impressive. The combined total of Soviet loans to five African countries—Ethiopia, Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Somalia—in the period July 1959-July 1961 was 787 million rubles, or close to 197 million dollars. But, it should be remembered that, in the first place, these loans have to be repaid, unlike the non-repayable grants which predominate in aid given by Western countries. (Loans extended by the Western countries, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and other UN agencies to the less developed countries south of the Sahara during the period July 1, 1957, to June 30, 1959 totalled 114.7 million dollars; non-repayable Western grants amounted to 296.3 million dollars for the same period.) [18] Furthermore, whereas Western aid figures indicate funds *actually provided* for African countries, no information is obtainable about the rate at which the Soviet loans are actually disbursed to the countries concerned; presumably these 12-year or other long-term credits are made available as the projects for which they were assigned are paid for. If a statistical comparison between Soviet and Western aid were to be made, perhaps the only realistic measure would be the respective values of projects actually completed in Africa by the Soviet Union and the Western countries in any given period.

ETHIOPIA WAS the first sub-Saharan African country to receive a large measure of Soviet aid. An agreement on a 400 million ruble loan and Soviet aid in the development of Ethiopia's economy was signed in July 1959. The USSR is to conduct mineral prospecting in Ethiopia and build an oil refinery; it is also considering the feasibility of constructing a metallurgical works.[19] The Soviet press gives much publicity to the technical school for 1,000 pupils being built at Bahar Dar as a gift to Ethiopia from the Soviet Union. But it is remarkable—in view of the scale of the Soviet loan to Ethiopia—how little the Soviet press has had to report on the progress of other Soviet projects.

In August 1959 the Soviet Union agreed to grant Guinea a 12-year loan of 140 million rubles at 2.5 percent interest, together with technical assistance in industrial construction, road building and the development of agriculture. Under a protocol of March 1, 1960, the USSR promised to build during 1960-63 a cement factory, railway sleeper works, a footwear factory, a fruit and vegetable cannery, a refrigeration plant, a polytechnic institute for 1,500 students and a stadium for Conakry to seat 25,000; conduct prospecting operations for diamonds and gold, and provide mining equipment; organize a state rice farm and dairy farms, and provide machinery; reconstruct the Conakry airport and the Conakry-Mamu section of the railway, and provide equipment for the mechanization of the port of Conakry.[20] As a free gift (a common feature of Soviet aid to favored African countries) Guinea will receive machinery for the state rice farm, and also equipment for the Conakry radio station. At the time of Sékou Touré's second visit to Moscow, in September 1960, the Soviet Government also agreed to take part in the construction of hydro-electric projects on the river Konkoure.

Ghana signed in August 1960 an agreement for a 160 million ruble loan and for Soviet economic and technical cooperation.[21] At Bui, on the upper Volta river, Soviet engineers are to construct a dam and a hydro-electric station which, according to Soviet accounts, will have a capacity equal to twice the present output of all power stations in Ghana. Under an agreement signed in February 1961 Soviet organizations will construct an atomic reactor in Ghana.

Mali concluded an economic and technical cooperation agreement with the USSR in March 1961; a loan of 40 million rubles will be used for mineral prospecting, improving navigation on the Niger, planning a railway, building a stadium in Bamako and establishing a technical training center.[22]

Somalia, under an agreement of June 1961, will receive a Soviet loan of 40 million rubles, a five-year trade credit of 7 million rubles, and free assistance in the construction of two hospitals, a secondary school, a printing plant and a radio station. The Soviet Government at its own expense will send to the Somali Republic a group of Soviet doctors and teachers, and will assist in the training of Somali medical personnel in the USSR.[23] Apart from the agreements with the countries mentioned, the USSR also has trade agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan and Togo.

[17] *Pravda* and *Izvestia,* September 14, 1961.
[18] Total compiled from *International Economic Assistance to the Less Developed Countries,* Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1961.
[19] *Vneshniaia torgovlia,* No. 9, 1959, p. 46.
[20] *Ibid.,* No. 10, 1959, p. 42.
[21] *Izvestia,* August 30, 1960; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta,* No. 30 (1065), June 27, 1961.
[22] *Vneshniaia torgovlia,* No. 4, 1961, p. 22.
[23] *Ibid.,* No. 7, 1961, Supplement, pp. 8-10.

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All this, in the Soviet view, is only a beginning. Speaking at the third session of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, held in Addis Ababa in February 1961, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov said that, if expenditure on armaments could be diverted to the development of Africa, "Africa could in a short time catch up with Europe." By 1965, he said, the USSR and the other socialist countries would account for half the world's industrial production, and, as "Khrushchev has pointed out, . . . with the development of our economy we shall expand more and more our cooperation with the countries of Africa." In the economic as in the ideological field, Russia's African policy looks to the future.

Political and Cultural Relations

Friendly political relations are in most cases a corollary of economic association; this much is shown by the personal contacts between the heads of state of the countries receiving Soviet economic aid and the Soviet leaders. Of the new English-speaking African states, Nigeria is still rather out of the Soviet picture; the delay in establishing Soviet-Nigerian diplomatic representation has been remarked on in the Soviet press as a matter in which the Nigerian leaders should "heed the voice of the masses." [24] Nevertheless, after a visit to Moscow by a Nigerian economic mission in June 1961 it was stated that Soviet-Nigerian trade and cultural agreements would be concluded shortly.

In North Africa the Soviet Union confronts strongly-based nationalist movements which hold the Communists at arm's length. In the case of Morocco, the suppression of the Moroccan Communist Party has proved no apparent obstacle to the development of Soviet-Moroccan friendship on the international level. But such friendly relations do not deter Soviet writers from championing the cause of Moroccan workers, "whose situation has noticeably deteriorated since independence." [25] Tunisian overtures to the Soviet Union, following the Bizerta conflict, have not so far led to any fundamental Soviet reassessment of the character of President Bourguiba's regime.

As regards Algeria, the Soviet Government has accorded de facto recognition to the rebel Provisional Government, which has rejected a "national front" alliance with the Communists; yet the policy statements of both the Algerian and the French Communist parties are given publicity in the Soviet Union. Solidarity with these various bodies, and also with the Arab and other governments which support the rebel cause, would seem to leave Soviet policy with little room to maneuver on the Algerian question; indeed, it is probably a matter of Soviet concern that this solidarity should be maintained on as broad a basis as possible and should not be prejudiced by too precise a definition of individual aims at the present stage. In short, as elements in an African front against colonialism, the Maghreb countries earn Soviet approval; as part of the Arab world, in which nationalism and communism are competing ideologies, they are gauged by a different yardstick.

THE COUNTRIES OF French-speaking Africa south of the Sahara are increasingly regarded in the Soviet Union as lost to the "anti-imperialist" cause. A Soviet government delegation, for example, attended Senegal's Independence Day celebrations in April 1961 and no doubt proffered suitable expressions of Soviet friendship for Senegal, but *Izvestia's* correspondent who covered the celebrations wrote upon his return that Senegal was independent in name only and that its government was reactionary and anti-democratic.[26] In the Soviet press the "Brazzaville group" of African states has been condemned as "puppets" of the West, while the "'Casablanca group" has been praised as truly expressing the aspirations of African peoples. Apparently, the Soviet Union considers it worthwhile to forfeit the friendship of the former group so long as it remains the solid ally of the other in a common "anti-imperialist" program; but in such an alliance it has two grave handicaps. In the first place, although in the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity the USSR often assumes the identity of an Asian country (Central Asian Muslims are much to the fore in this movement), its standing with the African Peoples' Conference movement is now much diminished: a delegation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee attended the second of these conferences in Tunis in 1960, but no Soviet delegates were present at the 1961 Cairo meeting. Secondly, the growing movement in African countries (and among non-aligned states elsewhere) for dissociation from the cold war must increasingly exclude the Soviet Union from their counsels. The stiff reserve with which the Soviet press first greeted the organization by Yugoslavia and the UAR of the recently held Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries (in which, it should be noted, the representation of Africa was very high), reflected Moscow's displeasure with this show of independence by the new nations.

[24] *Pravda,* November 16, 1960.
[25] *Trud,* July 15 and 19, 1961.
[26] S. Zykov, *Izvestia,* May 24, 1961.

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The Congo crisis, which brought about a polarization in the political attitudes of the various African states, afforded a disquieting demonstration of Soviet policy in action. From the first the Soviet Union saw the Congo crisis, and the return of Belgian forces to the Congo, as an opportunity to rally all Africa to militant anti-Western solidarity under its own leadership. Instead of supporting the United Nations force in a difficult task, the Soviet government thought that more was to be gained by calling for action outside the UN and even threatening action on its own account:

If the aggression against the Congo continues, the Soviet government, taking into consideration the dangerous consequences for the cause of general peace, will not hesitate to take decisive measures aimed at repelling the aggressors, who are acting, as has now become abundantly clear, virtually with the encouragement of all the colonial powers of NATO.[27]

However, it became clear at an early stage in the crisis that the majority of the African states supported the UN, and in its frustration the Soviet Union responded by venting its wrath on the UN force and, above all, on the UN Secretary-General. Mr. Khrushchev had overplayed his hand in a contest whose most interested spectators were the African peoples themselves. Not for the first time since the war was the Soviet Union obliged to refrain from direct intervention in an apparently promising area.

IF SOVIET POLITICAL action has received a setback, Soviet cultural penetration proceeds apace. Many of the African states with economic ties to the USSR have also concluded cultural agreements with Moscow, which establish the basic framework for ideological influence. The economic agreements themselves in many cases provide for the training of African technicians in the USSR. Moreover, with or without the sponsorship of their governments, African students have been enrolling at Soviet universities and there have been some spectacular disclosures about the degree of Communist indoctrination to which they are subjected in the USSR. This, however, is a new and long-term Soviet initiative, and it is still too early to judge what benefits or otherwise the African trainees and students may derive from their Russian experiences.[28]

Other features of the Soviet cultural drive are the frequent visits of African trade union, women's and other delegations to the USSR. In the African countries themselves the African public is offered Soviet books and publications, film shows and exhibitions. Books recently translated into English, French and Arabic include works on the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism; translations of Soviet books into African languages will no doubt follow. Soviet broadcasts to Africa have been enormously expanded. In April 1960 Moscow radio began daily broadcasts of 15 minutes each in English and French for Africa; in April 1961 Moscow was broadcasting to Africa 2¾ hours a day in both English and French, one hour in Swahili and half an hour in Amharic. Since then a half-hour transmission in Portuguese has been added, and other new transmissions are now foreshadowed.

Shortcomings of the Soviet Approach

The Soviet Union's attitude to Africa has three prominent characteristics which will not necessarily win it the favor of the African public. In the first place, it is aggressively anti-Western in content. While this hostile stance may make for solidarity with African movements on certain specific issues, the newly independent African states, wishing generally to remain on friendly terms with the West, resist pressure to keep them in a permanently anti-Western posture. Opening the All-African Peoples' Conference in Tunis on January 25, 1960, President Bourguiba contrasted the attitude of the West and the Eastern bloc countries towards Africa:

For the East, Africa is an immense reservoir of forces to support, to harness, to win over, a good card to play in the cold war. For the West it is still an effort and an anxiety.[29]

The realization is undoubtedly growing in Africa that the Soviet Union regards African issues as, above all, an opportunity to be exploited for its cold war purposes.

Secondly, there is the element of Russian national self-glorification. In Soviet pronouncements directed to Africa this may be implicit only; but in material for the home audience it is explicit and, sometimes, strident. Thus the record of Russian exploration in Africa,[30] and particularly of Russian 19th century ventures in Ethiopia,[31] has now been revived for the Soviet public. The tone of Soviet accounts of achievements on the Aswan High Dam site and elsewhere in Africa is one of in-

[27] Soviet government statement of July 31, 1960, *Pravda*, August 1, 1960.

[28] See article by D. Burg elsewhere in this issue.

[29] Tunis radio, January 25, 1960.

[30] M. R. Zabrodskaia, *Russkie puteshestvenniki po Afrike* (Russian Travellers in Africa), Geografizdat, Moscow, 1957.

[31] M. V. Rait, "Russkie ekspeditsii v Efiopii v seredine XIX-nachale XX v." (Russian Expeditions in Ethiopia in the Mid 19th and Early 20th Centuries), *Afrikanskii etnographicheskii sbornik*, Vol. I, Academy of Sciences Publishing House, Moscow, 1956.

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tense national self-congratulation. It is evident that Russians are being encouraged to feel a sense of national mission in Africa. A recent novel about the Sahara claims that the Russian explorer A. V. Yeliseyev "understood the desert nomads so well" because "the soul of the Russian sees more deeply into nature and has richer feelings than the soul of other Europeans." [32] There is almost a 19th century ring about such claims and they strongly suggest that the Russians themselves are not immune from the failings which they attribute exclusively to the "Western colonialists."

Thirdly, the Soviet view of Africa and of Africa's future proceeds from Communist ideological premises, and such publications as Dr. Potekhin's *Africa Looks to the Future* [33] serve to remind everyone that, as far as Moscow is concerned, the fundamentals of Soviet doctrine are as applicable in Africa as in the Soviet Union itself. It has also become apparent that the Soviets are becoming increasingly aggressive in taking up a protective position towards the interests of the Communist movement in Asia and Africa.[34] Such an attitude is unlikely to win African opinion for communism.

The recent ideological dispute between the Soviet Union and the UAR, and indeed the whole preceding debacle of Soviet attempts at solidarity with Arab nationalism, shows that such movements are not susceptible of Communist manipulation and, moreover, can themselves easily become actively anti-Communist. In African nationalism, at least in its present form, Russia has no reliable ally. As for the future, the Soviets may have a plan, but Africans have their own ideas and these cannot be readily recast in an alien mold.

[32] I. Efremov, "Afaneor, the Daughter of Akharkellen," *Nera*, January 1960; see *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1961, p. 28.
[33] I. I. Potekhin, *op cit.*

[34] Khrushchev's speech of May 3, 1961, to a UAR parliamentary delegation, as reported by Cairo radio: "We are Communists and you are not connected with this word. But history will teach you." *Summary of World Broadcasts*, BBC, IV, No. 661.

The West African Scene

By Walter Kolarz

PARADOX IS A common feature of the African scene today; it is equally characteristic of the present state of the Communist movement there. On the one hand there is the growing record of political intrigue by members of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the various international Communist organizations; on the other is the remarkable fact that there are very few Communist parties in Africa and none in tropical Africa. Communism in the rigidly organized form of a party subservient to Moscow or Peking exists only in the Arab countries and on the southern periphery of the continent, in Madagascar, Réunion and in the Union of South Africa. In the rest of Africa, in the gigantic area stretching from the Sahara down to the borders of the Union of South Africa, communism has not yet found any final shape. One cannot even say for certain who its actual and potential allies are. In other words, sub-Saharan communism, if one can talk at all about such a thing, seems as embryonic and unfixed, as so many other political phenomena of Africa.

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Early Communist Attitude

Africa's political and social problems have so far proved too subtle and too complicated for the Communists' schematic and stereotyped methods of political warfare. Until World War II, lack of knowledge of African problems and difficulties of physical access kept the Communists out of the continent altogether. For a long time they simply approached Africa as part of a general Negro problem and propagated the idea of

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a "World Negro Movement" comprising all Negro toilers living in the Americas and in Africa. Several Comintern congresses set up Negro commissions on which Black Africa was not even represented. The Negro Commission of 32, appointed in 1928 by the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, included five Negroes from the United States, while the only representative of Africa was the white South African Communist Bunting, soon to be expelled from his party for "white chauvinism." [1] The effort of the Comintern was paralleled by the Profintern, the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU), which had a special Negro Trade Union Committee. The utter failure of this body was recognized by the Profintern itself when its journal admitted that the Committee had been unable to make Africa the center of gravity of its work and to begin actual organizational activity on the continent.[2]

The Communist concept of the unity of the Negro world was based neither on scholarly analysis nor on deep emotions such as later gave rise to the idea of "negritude," stressing the cultural links between Negroes on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The approach of the Communists was entirely opportunistic and at the same time utopian. It was inspired by the hope that the Communist Party of the United States and the Communist Party of South Africa, as well as the Young Communist League of both countries, would be able to send whole teams of Communist emissaries to the countries of tropical Africa. Such a hope was expressed, for instance, from the rostrum of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Youth International in Moscow. That the Young Communist League of the United States had only 12 to 15 Negroes among its members at the time seemed to discourage nobody.

Other Communist plans for Africa between the two world wars proved as unsuccessful as the project with the Communist Negro "missionaries." A World Negro Congress which was to be summoned at Moscow never materialized. The League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression, founded by Moscow with the express purpose of facilitating Communist penetration into all colonial territories, made no impact on Africa. Its two congresses, in Brussels (1927) and in Frankfurt (1929), proceeded virtually without African participation, and its publications never betrayed the slightest knowledge about conditions south of the Sahara. The League, it is true, claimed that it had contacts with the Central Kikuyu Association in Kenya and with a peasant organization in Basutoland and that it actively supported a strike in Gambia. These claims, however, were so vague that they could hardly be given any serious credence. Another effort to approach the Africans was made in 1930 in Hamburg where a Congress of Negro Workers, including several representatives from the Gold Coast, Gambia and Sierra Leone, met under the auspices of the Profintern; but that too was an insignificant, ephemeral event and not the starting point of systematic Communist penetration into Africa. Only in the Union of South Africa did a certain amount of Communist activity take place, particularly in various front organizations such as Friends of the Soviet Union, Committees of the Unemployed, and Jewish Workers' Clubs, but there again the party supporters were very largely white.

Nor did the Communists make much impact on the African workers in the European metropolitan countries. When the French Communists spoke of colonies in the 1920's and 1930's they meant Indochina and to a lesser extent North Africa and Syria. Black Africa and Africans were hardly in their field of vision. The Negro League which they organized in the major ports of France was an insignificant organization that did little more than propagate general Communist "causes" such as the "fight against the war danger" and the "defense of the Soviet Union." [3] As to the British Communists, they too had "not taken the first steps in beginning some actual work amongst these colonials," [4] *i.e.*, both the Negro workers working in Britain and the populations of Africa and the West Indies. The British party at that time seemed to identify the colonial question with the problem of India.

AFTER WORLD WAR II the Communists' attitude towards Africa underwent a radical change and their ideas about the continent assumed a clearer shape. In large part this was the result of increased Communist contacts with Africa. The Soviet Union obtained a say in the destiny of several African territories—the former Italian colonies and the old mandated territories of the League of Nations, which had become trust territories supervised by the United Nations Organization. Furthermore, as a result of the official disbandment of the Comintern in 1943, the direction of Communist political activity in Africa became primarily the responsibility of the metropolitan Communist organizations, *i.e.*, the Communist parties of Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Portugal. This too opened

[1] See Theodore Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia*, Viking Press, New York, 1960, pp. 327, 345.
[2] *RILU Magazine*, February 15, 1932, p. 213.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 211.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 213.

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the way to a more realistic assessment by the Communists of African political conditions.

However, only one of the European Communist parties was able to discharge its new formidable task on a large scale—the Communist Party of France. The Italian Communists scored a local success in Somalia, where they organized small but influential groups of Somali Communists working in the trade unions and student bodies. The Belgian Communists had hardly any access to the Congolese people prior to 1958. Nor was the British CP able to make any major impact on the African situation. No African was present at the Conference of the Communist Parties of the British Empire which was held in February 1947 in Beaver Hall in the City of London; in line with international Communist tactics of that period, the topics and countries standing in the forefront of interest at this conference were India, Malaya, Burma and Palestine.

Rassemblement Démocratique Africain

The French Communists, on the other hand, did obtain influence in Africa and, to a limited extent, power by the simple fact that in the aftermath of World War II they had become an important force in the French government. The close and positive association between the French CP and the Fourth French Republic in 1946 goes far to explain the seemingly pro-Communist tendencies exhibited by the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), French West Africa's largest political party, at the beginning of its eventful history. Founded in September 1946, this movement grew into a powerful force in what until then was politically an almost completely inarticulate part of the African continent. Most politicians of former French West Africa feel to this day that the African independence cause owes a great deal to the RDA, and they treasure these initials even though the traditions of the Rassemblement no longer find the same interpretation in the various successor states of the French Empire in Africa. Europeans, on the other hand, almost immediately suspected the RDA as an organization of pro-Communists and fellow-travellers; its president, Félix Houphouet-Boigny, was even nicknamed the "African Stalin." This misjudgement may serve as a warning of how careful one must be in interpreting African conditions and the political coloring of African personalities.

Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why in the late 1940's not only political commentators but even governments decried the RDA as "Communist." In the only pamphlet which the RDA published in French—*Le Rassemblement démocratique africain dans la lutte anti-impérialiste* (Paris, 1948)—one can find ample cause for labelling the organization as crypto-Communist. Above all, the pamphlet championed the Communist idea of the "alliance of the French proletariat and the dependent peoples," an alliance which was implemented politically by the close association (*apparentement*) between the RDA deputies to the French National Assembly and a pro-Communist parliamentary group in the immediate postwar period. French communism appeared patriotic to many in view of the party's wartime resistance record, and also respectable because of its participation in the government. Since at that time many Europeans were prepared to give the French Communists the benefit of the doubt, one can hardly reproach the politicians of distant Africa for having looked upon the French CP as just one French left-wing party among several others.

The French Communists themselves were hoping not only to retain, but to extend power in the center and thus, as it were, to capture the colonies via Paris. Therefore, they discouraged separatist and revolutionary tendencies in Africa, advocated a liberal program of evolution, and told the colonial peoples that "the French Union is the most favorable framework for the realization of their aspirations." [5] This was also the view and the program of the RDA. It tied its fortunes to those of the French Communists simply because the latter seemed more prepared to promote the economic, social and political advancement of Africa than their competitors, the MRP and the Socialists. Moreover, at one moment it appeared as if the Communists had much better chances to become the leading power in France than any of their rivals. This seemed particularly plausible to people in the Ivory Coast who were ruled by a Communist Governor, M. Letville, assisted by a Communist *Secrétaire générale,* M. Lambert. It was these two French officials who much encouraged the building up of the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, which became the nucleus of the RDA.

It may seem strange that the Ivory Coast, at present the strong bulwark of conservative African nationalism, was considered in the late 1940's as the most revolutionary French territory in tropical Africa. Some even feared that it might become a "black Communist state," while French Guinea seemed the model of tranquility and moderation.[6] Subsequent events showed, however, that the attraction of the leaders of the RDA towards the Communists was much less serious than the Com-

[5] Étienne Fajon, *L'Avenir de l'Union française,* Paris, 1947, p. 20.

[6] Emmanuel Mounier, *L'Éveil de l'Afrique noire,* Paris, 1948, pp. 133 and 142.

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munists had hoped and their opponents feared. What is more, the association with the Communists—officially with the fellow-travelling "progressist" group, Union Républicaine et Résistante—had never been approved by all the prominent RDA figures. In fact, there had been continuous rebellions in the RDA and the rebels usually joined some anti-Communist group in the French parliament.

THE DEPARTURE of the French Communist Party from the government in May 1947 greatly reduced the usefulness of the nationalist-Communist alliance from the RDA point of view. With the adoption by Maurice Thorez and his associates of an intransigent sectarian position, the RDA's disenchantment with the Communists deepened even further; a patriotic left-wing French party could be a useful ally, but a Soviet fifth column was a liability to the African nationalists. In October 1950 the entire RDA leadership abandoned the *apparentement* with the Communists and soon afterwards established a similar relationship with one of the smaller left-of-center French parties—the Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance (UDSR) led by François Mitterand who at that time was Minister of Overseas France. In the Communist view this defection was an act of treason and most of the RDA leaders were henceforward denounced as "renegades."

Seen retrospectively, the original RDA was a Popular Front *à l'Africaine* comprising devout Catholics, democratic socialists and African tribal leaders who cannot be described in Western political terms. The Marxist element within the RDA was too weak to assume the direction of the movement. Whatever Marxist leadership there was could only be exercised from the outside by the French Communist Party, and this not always directly and hardly ever very consistently. Such a system of political guidance was obviously too complicated to last, especially since it was unsatisfactory from the African point of view.

All this does not mean, however, that the fellow-travelling period of the RDA is devoid of historical importance. During those few postwar years the gates to West Africa were opened to the Communists and as a result Marxist theories and Communist political and organizational ideas spread. That experience even determined to some extent what happened in a number of the French-speaking African countries after independence, for several territorial organizations of the RDA preserved the left-wing spirit which animated the Rassemblement in the years following its foundation. Today, the principal successor organizations of this left wing of the RDA are the Democratic Party of Guinea, the Union Soudanaise of Mali and the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC).

Naturally, it would be quite wrong to attribute the left orientation of these three parties to their fidelity to the original RDA platform alone. Other influences played their part, especially those of the French Communist trade union organization, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), with which such left-wing African nationalists as Sékou Touré, Ousman Ba, now Mali Minister of Labor, and Abdoulaye Diallo, now Guinean Minister Resident in Ghana, were associated. The Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), of which the CGT is one of the most important members, has also played its part. It has always shown a major interest in Africa and of all the Communist front organizations working in the Black Continent—the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the International Union of Students (IUS) and the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) among others—it has probably been the most effective.

In this connection it should also be said that there is no real evidence that Moscow at any time barred the French Communist Party from work in Africa, as Franz Ansprenger suggests in his otherwise outstanding work.[7] Even the international front organizations very largely use French officials in their contacts with Africa. When Guinea and Mali became independent, French Communists continued to act as advisers, experts and agents, despite the availability of foreign diplomatic Communist personnel in Conakry and Bamako. Similarly, close contacts between the Democratic Party of Guinea and the French CP have been carried on, and in May 1961 a representative Guinean delegation attended the 16th French Communist Party Congress. Raymond Guyot, the French Politburo's expert on Africa, expressed the role of the CPF in Africa succinctly:

The dissemination of Communist ideas in the African countries is at once the duty and the task of our party . . . we should aid the Marxist groups springing up in Africa, help in their educational work and, when the conditions arise, in forming parties there which would conduct their activities in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.[8]

A Crypto-Communist Party

Of the three components of the RDA left wing mentioned earlier, two are in power, whilst one—the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), or rather the

[7] *Politik im Schwarzen Afrika,* Köln and Opladen, 1961, p. 82.
[8] *World Marxist Review,* November 1960, p. 75.

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revolutionary illegal wing of that organization—is conducting a subversive struggle against the national government of its own country. The fight which the illegal UPC has been waging has made it a desperate terrorist organization and quite different in political orientation from the Democratic Party of Guinea and the Union Soudanaise of Mali. The UPC has little use for Soviet theories about parliamentary roads to socialism, or rather to power, for socialism does not figure in the party's official program. If Khrushchev really gave the advice to Félix Moumié, the late UPC leader, that he should take the government by legal means through elections, as has been asserted, such advice was evidently not heeded.

The illegal branch of the UPC (the legal UPC has its representatives in the parliament at Yaoundé) has lost the character of a national independence movement ever since January 1, 1960, when the Camerounian Republic was officially proclaimed. Since then the UPC has been reduced to an ideological party which is trying to impose on the people of Cameroun a certain pattern of thinking and above all a certain orientation in foreign policy. More important than its general platitudes about a future economic policy is its militantly anti-French and anti-Western attitude. The party aligns itself simultaneously with Guinea, the UAR, and the Sino-Soviet bloc, with stress on the "Sino." Very logically, the UPC leaders have shown much greater interest in the Chinese and Vietnamese examples than in the precepts propounded by Moscow. They believe that they will conquer the country by the same methods which Mao Tse-tung adopted in conquering China. The late leader of the UPC, Félix-Roland Moumié, who died mysteriously on November 4, 1960, made no secret of the fact that he considered himself Mao's disciple, particularly with regard to the latter's strategical teachings.[9] During his visit to Peking in October 1959, Moumié stated that China was "the hope of all the oppressed people."[10] Moumié's lieutenant, Ernest Ouandié, has likewise had intimate connections with Peking, where he visited on at least three occasions in 1954, 1958 and 1959.

While the program of the UPC is not Communist, strictly speaking, it is in accord with the Moscow statement of the 81 Communist parties of December 6, 1960, which, addressing itself to the newly emerging nations, called for a "united front fighting for the victory of a revolution aimed at achieving genuine national independence and democracy, which create conditions for passing on to the tasks of socialist revolution." Indeed, the program of the UPC says expressly: "The aim of our revolution is not to oppose capitalism, but imperialism and its allies."[11]

If one studies carefully the rather extensive English and French UPC literature, one cannot help feeling that the party rightly deserves to be called crypto-Communist. The use of such terms as "fascists," "American imperialists," and "new democracy" points clearly to Communist inspiration. Nevertheless, here and there Africa breaks through. The UPC program, for example, uses the sweeping phrase "all Africans are brothers," which in itself is a denial of the idea of class struggle from which, according to Communist doctrine, the new African nations are not to be exempt. Also, the question arises as to who is to lead the next, socialist, phase of the revolution once the national phase is accomplished. The UPC would hardly be able to fill this role. A possible candidate could be the Confédération Générale Kamerounaise du Travail (CGKT), the Camerounian left-wing trade union body which is one of the few African trade union centers still maintaining their affiliation with the WFTU. However, there are as many as five competing trade union organizations in the Cameroun, and this greatly reduces any chances of the CGKT imposing its will on the "proletariat" of the country.

The Democratic Party of Guinea

Because of its illegal and revolutionary character, the UPC is given to an extremism which has hardly any parallel anywhere else in Africa, at least not in the successor states of the French Empire. By comparison, the Guinean Democratic Party, for which the UPC feels a great affinity and which has offered sanctuary to UPC leaders in Conakry, almost seems a model of moderation. To speak of crypto-communism in the case of the Guinean Democratic Party would be utterly misleading. A great deal has been written on the Guinean situation and on Guinea's links with the Communist world, and much of what has been said about that country in both the West and the East sounds factual and plausible. But a few facts alone are not sufficient to explain the complicated African reality of today. A recent Dutch visitor to Guinea, van Broekhuizen, said very rightly that Europeans speak of hard, unchangeable facts which are independent of the human will, and the Africans speak of emotions, friendship, dignity

[9] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 13, 1961.
[10] NCNA, October 20, 1959.
[11] *Objectives, Significance and Repercussions of the Kamerunian Revolution on the Continent of Africa*, London, 1960, p. 41.

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and recognition of their personality.[12] In the sphere of facts, indeed, one might see a great many affinities between Guinea and the Communist world, but in the field of emotions there is an abyss between the two which cannot easily be bridged.

The African national leaders of Guinea not only have emotions which are different from those of the orthodox Marxists, but their political actions are also motivated in a way which is completely alien to Marxist thinking. Democratic Party policy and the many speeches and statements by Sékou Touré reveal that the real motto of the Republic of Guinea is not the famous injunction of Karl Marx, "Workers of the world, unite!" but the dictum of the right-wing nationalist French philosopher Charles Maurras: "The greatest human happiness is the independence of the homeland."

THE HOMELAND that dominates the thinking of Sékou Touré is not so much Guinea as the whole of Africa. The Democratic Party of Guinea puts Africa first and everything else second. All political movements and forces outside Africa are judged by one criterion only, namely whether they promote or harm the interests of Africa and Guinea. National dignity for Sékou Touré is not a mere slogan but something tremendously real, important and worthy of every sacrifice. He does not think of the party as an instrument of an ideological dictatorship. Its task is to unite the people of the Republic of Guinea and make a nation of the different tribes inhabiting it. (Article One of the Party Statute). The party is the people and not an elite of the people as in the Communist countries, a difference of which Sékou Touré himself is keenly aware. Ideology, in his view, is something that only developed nations can afford while underdeveloped or undeveloped countries must concentrate on social, economic, and cultural construction and not be deflected by ideological problems.

However, when Sékou Touré speaks of ideology, he has Marxism in mind, not pan-Africanism. According to the Guinean view—which incidently is shared by the like-minded leaders of Mali—ideology is only harmful if it divides the nation. Orthodox Marxism would certainly do this and therefore it cannot be accepted as state ideology either in Guinea or in Mali. This does not prevent individual Marxists from being admitted into the Democratic Party of Guinea and the Union Soudanaise of Mali, but Marxism must remain their private affair. How long this attitude will prevail nobody can tell, but it may continue for a considerable time.

The main factor barring orthodox Marxism from full acceptance in Guinea and Mali is its anti-religious element. Sékou Touré himself said that everyone was religious in Guinea, and that even those who proclaimed themselves atheist were in reality believers. Similar statements can be heard in Mali from the immediate entourage of President Modibo Keita.

On the other hand, certain superficial features of the Communist system and certain practical steps taken by the Communist countries of Europe and Asia have been imitated by Guinea and, to a lesser extent, by Mali. Yet it is arguable whether economic planning is really more attractive to Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita than to Ahmed ben Salah, Tunisia's Minister of Planning, or to Mamadou Diah, the Prime Minister of Senegal, who are both inspired by Mounier's personalist philosophy. And while the Guinean project of building up a system of collective farming by gradually transforming cooperative into collective farms owes a great deal to Communist inspiration, it is always explained that the plan is in keeping with the age-old solidarist and communal structure of the African village. Sékou Touré's slogan is "Long live African communocracy!" and not "Long live collectivization!" [13]

In its present form, with its pragmatist policy and its mass membership, Guinea's Democratic Party could not convert itself into a Communist party even if this were intended by the Guinean leaders. There is, furthermore, no indication that they are preparing such a manoeuvre of deceit. Nobody, one can be sure, is as aware of the enormous difference between the Democratic Party and a real Communist party as the representatives of the international Communist movement who have made a study of Guinean conditions. They must know that the Democratic Party cannot be captured until and unless the present leaders are replaced by a new team of persons who would be dedicated to Moscow or Peking and for whom ideology would take precedence over the needs and aspirations of their own people. The Sino-Soviet bloc is certainly making an attempt to create in Guinea such an intransigent Marxist group. It is to be drawn from the young Guineans who are currently learning their Marxism in Paris or

[12] Jacques van Broekhuizen, "Point de vue sur la Guinée," *Est et Ouest*, Paris, No. 262, p. 3.

[13] For Sékou Touré's political views see in particular the following official Guinean publications: Sékou Touré, *La Lutte du Parti démocratique de Guinée pour l'émancipation africaine*, Vol. IV, Conakry 1959; *L'Action politique du Parti démocratique de Guinée—La Planification économique*, Conakry, 1960; and *Texte des interviews accordées aux représentants de la presse par le Président Sékou Touré*, Conakry, 1959.

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studying (now in large numbers) behind the Iron Curtain, especially in the Soviet Union and Eastern Germany. The organizations where Guinean Marxists can already be found established are the trade unions (Union Générale des Travailleurs de l'Afrique Noire —UGTAN) and the youth league (Jeunesse du Rassemblement Démocratique African—JRDA).

Should there ever be a sufficiently compact and numerous group of Marxist-Leninists in Guinea, it could attempt either to capture the Democratic Party through a *putsch* or to establish a separate Communist party and then compel the Democratic Party to amalgamate with it. Both possibilities seem remote at present, but they are probably being actively considered by the planners of Communist world strategy. Similar methods had been tried out in underdeveloped areas within and at the periphery of the Soviet Union before. Thus the left-wing nationalist parties of the Mongolian and Tuvinian Peoples' Republics, which had once been directed by religious-minded national leaders, were transformed into Communist parties because Moscow succeeded in playing off the young Marxist-trained people against the older generation. Similarly, in the People's Republic of Bokhara the nationalist Young Bokhara Party was swept away in 1920 by a merger with the Communist Party, although less than ten percent of the original membership was taken over into the new united party.

Groups of "Like-Minded Marxists"

The formation of solid nuclei of Marxists in Guinea and elsewhere in the underdeveloped world is part of the international Communist program formulated in the December 1960 statement of the 81 Communist parties. There we find the following short but highly significant sentence: "Like-minded Marxists are rallying in the countries which have shaken off colonial tyranny and taken the path of independent development." No further elaboration is made on this important subject in the document. The sentence is part of the same short paragraph which boasts of the existence of 87 Communist parties totalling 36 million members all over the globe, and its purpose is evidently to stress that in countries where there are no Communist parties "like-minded Marxists" have gathered to think and act in common. As there are Communist parties (legal or illegal) in every country of Europe and Latin America and almost everywhere in Asia (with such few exceptions as Afghanistan and the Arabian Peninsula) and in North Africa (with the exception of Libya), the reference to "like-minded Marxists" can only relate to tropical Africa and the British and Dutch West Indies.

Only very few of these groups have come into the limelight, but one may suspect with some justification that they exist in almost every West African country. Seen from a long-term point of view they are a much more important weapon of world communism than any of the left-wing African mass parties (the UPC, the Democratic Party of Guinea and, further afield, the Parti du Congrès de l'Indépendence Malgache in Madagascar). The Marxist groups have an intellectual character and as a rule cannot be considered instruments of an African working-class movement. An important breeding-ground of ambitious and loud young Marxists is the large organization of African students in France, the Fédération des Étudiants de l'Afrique Noire en France (FEANF), whose public statements are notorious for their extremist and pro-Communist tenor.

In Africa itself the Marxist group par excellence is the Parti Africain de l'Indépendence (PAI). It was founded in September 1952 in Dakar, and whilst it remained virtually confined to Senegal, it did make some attempts to branch out to other territories, especially to the Sudan (now the Mali Republic) and to Niger and Chad. The party expressly adopted "scientific socialism" as its ideological basis, and, inspired by the Marxist-Leninist idea about the leading role of the working class, it has tried to enlist the support of the urban proletariat of Dakar, St. Louis and other West African cities. This attempt has failed and the party fully deserves its nickname "proletarian party without proletarians." Its leaders are students, teachers, chemists, dentists and other non-working-class elements.

Between September 1957 and August 1, 1960, when it was banned, the PAI engaged in Marxist-Leninist propaganda through two irregularly published periodicals, *La Lutte* (Battle) and *Momsarev* (Independence). The bookshop Librairie de la Renaissance Africaine served the same purpose and stocked Marxist literature from both sides of the Iron Curtain. (Marxist bookshops are among the principal media of Communist propaganda in West Africa and serve also as ideal meeting and contact places of "like-minded Marxists." They can be found in both Conakry and Bamako.) Several leaders of the PAI have been to Moscow and Peking and the party as a whole enjoys the moral support of the Communist world. The secretary-general of the PAI, M. Mahjemout Diop, was the only African to contribute in March 1959 to a special Africa issue of the Soviet journal *Sovremennyi vostok* (Contemporary East).[14]

[14] No. 3, 1959, pp. 22-24.

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The banning of the party by Senegalese authorities in 1957 resulted from election day riots in St. Louis, during which PAI members attacked polling stations and set fire to motor cars. In Bamako, where a group of the PAI existed for several months, the party disbanded voluntarily in 1959 and its members joined the Union Soudanaise. In other territories the activities of the PAI, if any, were on a minute scale.

WHETHER ONE LIKES it or not, Marxism is one of the phenomena through which European influence makes itself felt in the African continent. It is thus not fortuitous that the PAI has its strongest roots in the cities of Senegal, which have had longer contact with Europe than most other parts of Africa. In fact, these close ties with Europe have produced not one, but two extreme left-wing groups in Senegal, for the PAI has a competitor in a party called PRA-Senegal (Parti du Regroupement Africain), led by a former Senegalese Minister of Production, Abdoulaye Ly. This party was founded in 1958 with the express purpose of opposing the new de Gaulle constitution. It called upon the Senegalese to vote "no" in the referendum of September 28, 1958, (as the Guineans have done) and therefore for independence. The PRA-Senegal is not represented in the Senegalese parliament, but it is larger than the PAI and has some support in St. Louis, perhaps the most European town in all of former French Africa, as well as in the Casamance region which borders on Portuguese Guinea.

There is no indication how the international Communist movement stands in relation to this party. The leaders of the ruling party of Senegal, the Union Progressiste Senegalaise, consider it as "more Communist" and "more dangerous" than the PAI. A professor of Dakar University, well-versed in Senegalese politics, described Abdoulaye Ly as a "Stalinist," but a PAI leader called him an "anarcho-Trotskyite anti-Leninist." The French Communists look upon PRA-Senegal as a more serious factor than the PAI. The leading French Communist expert on West Africa, Professor Jean Suret-Canale, has termed the PRA-Senegal a party of workers and progressively inclined civil servants; of the PAI he has said that it is supported by intellectuals and a section of the working class.[15] Suret-Canale's view of the PRA-Senegal as a predominantly working-class party is supported by the connections Abdoulaye Ly has had with certain left-wing Senegalese trade union elements, whose Mecca is Conakry.

There are some other groups in various ex-French territories where "like-minded Marxists" have gathered, though it is not possible to say for certain how much support they command and how seriously they must be taken. Only one of these groups describes itself openly as "socialist," namely the Parti de la Révolution Socialiste du Benin, which unites extremists of both Togo and Dahomey, two countries lying within the Bight of Benin. The party was established in Cotonou on July 28, 1959, and a communiqué signed then by Max Mensah Aithson for the Togolanders and Theophile Behanzin for the Dahomeyans stated that the party subscribed to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and promoted the creation of a Socialist United States of Africa. The Togolese signatory of the statement represented the extremist wing of the Juvento, a cultural youth organization founded in 1951 by the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT), the large representative Togolese nationalist party of Sylvanus Olympio. The small Marxist-Leninist wing of Juvento separated itself in 1954 from the bulk of the youth group.[16]

Yet another embryonic African Marxist party is the Parti de L'Unité Gabonaise (PUNGA), led by René-Paul Suzatte. It has the support of a considerable number of Gabonese students in France who have formed an organization called Mouvement Gabonais d'Action Populaire, which publishes the journal *La Cognée* (The Axe). In the country itself the party claims a certain backing in the southern areas of Gabon. M. Suzatte has visited Moscow and made several complimentary statements about the Soviet Union, but it appears that the mainspring of PUNGA's action is not so much Marxist ideology as the strong personal aversion its members have against M. Léon Mba, the President of Gabon, and his authoritarian and pro-French policy. In the political program which Suzatte published in the Dakar Roman Catholic weekly *L'Afrique Nouvelle*[17] there is nothing specifically Marxist. It is a pan-African program of economic advancement and liberal political reforms directed against arbitrary bureaucratic rule. Nevertheless, it deserves to be mentioned here since in the view of the PUNGA students their party is closer to the PAI than to any other political party of ex-French Africa.

Marxism in Former British Colonies

In the formerly British possessions in West Africa Marxist-Leninist influence is for the time being even less clearly crystallized than in the territories that had

[15] *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn.* Moscow, No. 2, 1961, p. 34.

[16] Ansprenger, *op. cit.*, pp. 211, 407.

[17] February 22, 1961.

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once belonged to the French Empire. There are two main reasons for this. The first has been mentioned before—the importance of the British Communist Party as compared with its French counterpart. The second reason is that the ex-British territories, unlike those formerly ruled by the French, had been relatively isolated during their colonial period from the mainstream of European ideological and political life. Every British colony lived a life of its own, and even the various regions of one and the same colony led a separate existence. No attempt was made to connect the colonies organically with the Parliament of Westminster or to export British political parties to Africa. The British possessions thus remained much more African and therefore also more immune to Marxist influences than the French.

Even so, the international Communist fronts catering to trade unions, women, youth and students, succeeded in getting their propaganda material into British Africa and even in capturing temporarily some small organizations and winning the cooperation of a few political personalities. The first modest headquarters of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party in Accra and Takoradi, for example, were decorated with posters supplied by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). Here and there the Communist label was used only because the authorities disapproved of it. This writer knows of a small town in Nigeria where around 1950 an ephemeral "Communist" party came into being even though its members had not the slightest idea what communism was about, and had no connection with the international Communist movement; their only aim in describing themselves as "Communist" was to annoy the British District Officer.

Without any doubt, groups of "like-minded Marxists" also exist in the ex-British territories today, but they are even more difficult to pinpoint than similar groups in the former French colonies. They will probably be found within the Convention People's Party of Ghana, especially in the extremist NASSO (National Association of Socialist Students Organizations), in the All-People's Congress (APC), the opposition party of Sierra Leone, and in the Gambian Workers Union.

In Nigeria, the largest country of Africa, the Marxist movement suffers from the same ills that plagued European socialism in its early days. It is divided into groups and factions which fight one another and do not seem to have any permanency. At present (September 1961) there exist three small Marxist groups in Nigeria. One is called the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), and is connected with some left-wing trade unionists of the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, a break-away organization which must not be confused with the TUC of Nigeria, an affiliate of the democratic International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The president of the Nigerian TUC is Mr. Michael Imodou, a self-confessed "Marxist socialist."[18] A leading figure of the NPP is Gogo Nzeribe, a trade-unionist who signed the preface to the famous anti-ICFTU forgery.

Whilst the NPP is based on Lagos, a body describing itself as the "Communist Party of Nigeria" seems to operate from Kano, but it has not yet received recognition from the international Communist movement. However, in imitation of Communist practice elsewhere it has already expelled several members for anti-party activities.[19] The third Marxist-inspired organization, which has existed since the beginning of 1961, is the Nigerian Youth Congress.

IT SHOULD BE borne in mind that even those African groups which may be described with some justification as "Marxist" or "Marxist-Leninist" may not have always finally opted for communism as an international ideology in the service of Moscow and Peking. For instance, many CPP members in Ghana call themselves Marxists without adhering in fact to Marxist doctrine. They are romantic nationalists who in Europe would belong to the extreme right, but who have made Marxism part of an eclectic philosophy. Even President Nkrumah, who considers himself a "Marxist socialist" and "non-denominational Christian," belongs to this category. Like Sékou Touré, he is an Afro-Marxist who in words lays greater stress than the Guinean president on Marxism, but who in actual fact is much less familiar with Marxist thinking.

Afro-Marxism is not the conciliation of African nationalism and Marxism; its incoherence and contradictions reflect the grave difficulties in adapting Marxism to African conditions. The Afro-Marxist, like the Buddhist Marxist of Burma, has no use for Marxism as a universal materialist ideology governing all aspects of life, as it has been usually understood in Europe. He confines the validity of Marxism to the sphere of economics and the problems of the state, and attempts to satisfy his spiritual needs by drawing from the storehouse of his own, indigenous culture. Marxism-Leninism as a system of power may therefore achieve a number of short-term political triumphs in Africa, but as an ideology it is likely to suffer disaster.

[18] *Sunday Times* (Lagos), June 18, 1961.
[19] *The West African Pilot,* July 7, 1961.

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Reforms in Yugoslavia

By Paul Landy

SINCE THE BEGINNING of 1961 the Yugoslav government has introduced extensive policy changes which are expected to give a powerful impetus to further economic and administrative decentralization and to accentuate the trend towards a "withering away of the state." The central purpose behind these changes is to bring the organizational structure and theoretical basis of the Yugoslav system more into line with free-market principles and the demands of economic rationality.

The projected reforms are still in process of gradual evolution, but it is already apparent that they are tantamount to a general overhaul of the economic system. Reduced to bare essentials, they involve a readjustment of the system to the world economy and a decisive shift of emphasis away from state administrative controls to the market mechanism, supplemented by appropriate measures of monetary and fiscal policy. Together with reforms in the area of foreign exchange and trade, steps are being taken to rationalize and reshape the price system; to reduce state administrative interference in the activities of organs of economic and local self-government; to cut down featherbedding in industrial enterprises; and to introduce a new system of income distribution providing effective incentives to stimulate productivity and reduce manpower waste.

Genesis and Scope of Reform

In the light of already established Yugoslav theories of decentralization, it would not be quite accurate, perhaps, to speak of these changes as representing a wholly "new economic policy." The reforms are, in fact, a continuation of the decentralization experiment that began in 1950 with the establishment of the Yugoslav workers' councils. Government leaders admit that this policy had to be interrupted halfway because of the lack of an adequate material base.[1] By 1961, however, changes in the country's economic structure (including a 13-percent average annual rate of industrial growth [2]), the inherent dynamism of the competitive forces unleashed by the 1950 experiment, and—last not least—the harmful distortions resulting from still remaining vestiges of Soviet-type overcentralized planning all combined to make an extension of workers' and local self-government and a revamping of the price and wage systems inevitable.

Before turning to a detailed analysis of the economic reforms, it should be pointed out that they will undoubtedly have an impact on fundamental aspects of the social and political system. Yugoslav official pronouncements have reflected growing realization that the changes in economic relations will necessitate adjustment of the socio-political "superstructure," involving the creation of "qualitatively new forms of political life." [3] Thus, the far-reaching implications and consequences of the reforms were underlined by Vice-President Kardelj last March in the following words:

If we wish to define the social and historical significance of the changes introduced by the new system of distribution [of income], we may say that they are as important as

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[1] *E.g.,* speech by Vice-President Mijalko Todorovic before the Federal People's Assembly, *Borba,* March 1, 1961.

[2] Yugoslavia's gross national product and per capita income in 1960 were, respectively, 60 percent and 55 percent higher than in 1956.

[3] Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Federal Committee of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), in *Politika,* March 21, 1961.

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the greatest revolutionary events of our social development, such as nationalization, the introduction of the workers' councils and of the principle of social self-management in general, and the establishment of the communal system. Perhaps today, amidst the difficulties of everyday experience, we cannot fully grasp all the consequences of these changes, but it is obvious that our whole social life in the next few years will be influenced by them.[4]

THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT initiated the legislative enactment of its reform program in January 1961, following extensive public discussion during the latter half of 1960. A decree revising the system of foreign exchange transactions was put into force on January 18, and the main measures of economic reform were approved by the Federal Executive Council on February 22, and ratified by the Federal Assembly one week later. Supplementary legislative measures enacted in June introduced additional fiscal and monetary reforms and further extended the system of workers' self-management (already extended in 1960 to the state railway and postal services) to the air transport and maritime services. It is understood that the government further contemplates a thorough general overhauling of the existing systems of both workers' self-management and territorial self-government in conjunction with the new constitution, scheduled to be submitted for public debate by the spring of 1962.

Although detailed implementation of some of the economic reforms is not yet complete at the time of writing (September 1961), the main lines of the new economic system and the scope of the socio-political program associated with it are sufficiently clear to provide the basis for a general analysis. At the same time, it has already become apparent that the problems inherent in an attempt to develop a system based on thorough economic decentralization, yet wedded to a totalitarian political system, are both numerous and extremely complex.

The economic changes instituted by the regime fall into two broad categories. The first category covers changes affecting (a) relationships within individual enterprises and (b) the relationships of the individual enterprise to the civil administrative unit (commune) in which it is geographically situated and to the economy as a whole. The second category embraces changes aimed at creating an optimal balance between the operation of a free market based on supply and demand on the one hand, and the requirements of the over-all national economic plan on the other.

[4] From Kardelj's speech at the Second Plenum, *Borba*, March 21, 1961.

One of the most crucial as well as controversial measures in the first category has been the introduction of a new organizational setup and system of income distribution for economic enterprises. The central purpose of the scheme is to promote maximum profitability of operations through a reinforcement of direct worker participation in enterprise management and the distribution of profits.

The New Order in Enterprises

The new organizational setup of enterprises involves the formation within individual enterprises of so called "economic units," each representing a workshop or production unit with 20-50 workers. Although the scope of their administrative authority is still somewhat vague (regulations defining their role, flexibly adapted to the individual enterprise, are now being worked out), the units are expected to enjoy a broad measure of operational autonomy within the framework of the overall production plan for the enterprise. To encourage competition and a direct interest on the part of the workers in production efficiency and the financial solvency of the enterprise, each unit is to have its own capital assets and working capital, and is to regulate its own internal relations, including employment and the distribution of its share of enterprise income among its members.

In enterprises where these changes have already been implemented, the new system of distributing enterprise income operates essentially as follows: (1) The workers' council of the enterprise determines the apportionment of total net income between workers' personal earnings and the various capital funds.[5] (2) The council also allocates shares of the total net income to the various departments and economic units of the enterprise, using profit-loss criteria as the basis of allocation. (3) Each economic unit independently determines the distribution of its share of total enterprise income between workers' earnings and its own capital funds. (4) Individual earnings of unit members are governed by a standard work quantum based on average profit per worker within the unit, average profitability (total value of capital funds divided by total number of workers), and other criteria fixed by the enterprise itself.

Thus, instead of being paid on the basis of piece-rate norms and a fixed wage scale, the Yugoslav worker

[5] For a detailed exposition of the new system of capital accumulation, see S. Blagojevic, "Some Economic and Social Aspects of the Investment System in Yugoslavia" (paper submitted by the Yugoslav Government to the Economic Commission for Europe).

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under the new system receives a share of enterprise profits based on the productivity and profitability of the whole enterprise and of his own particular unit. Each enterprise, moreover, distributes its net profits without any intervention by state administrative organs and according to standards independently fixed by itself.

Yugoslav Communist theoreticians maintain that this system of remuneration based on work—or, more correctly, on "complex output"—represents the operation of the Marxist law of value under conditions of public ownership of the means of production; that is, it means the distribution, according to the law of supply and demand, of the "surplus value" of goods in the form of direct social accumulation by the workers who produce the goods and also manage the enterprises.[6] This, the theorists claim, marks a return to the "pure" Marxist concept of "the distribution of the conditions of production themselves."[7] With its establishment, they contend, the basic contradiction inherent in the system of wages and wage labor, whether of a capitalistic or state-bureaucratic type, will gradually be eliminated through the substitution of a higher social-economic category of "income" directly distributed by the producers themselves in every enterprise.[8]

But whatever the theoretical advantages claimed for the new system, it has already given rise to a formidable array of practical problems and difficulties.[9] One of the economic problems it has posed is how to "equalize conditions" among the various economic units within an enterprise. Certain units, for example, may be more productive than others merely because they are equipped with more up-to-date machinery; or, again, units or departments manufacturing goods that are much in demand can easily achieve greater capital accumulation than less favorably situated units, without showing correspondingly higher productivity. How is proper balance to be maintained? It is evidently hoped that such disparities within an enterprise can be equalized by means of flexible interest rates and rents, in the same way that the planners propose to counter disparities in economic strength between different enterprises, industries, and geographic regions. This whole problem, in the last analysis, is related to price policy.

[6] On the system of worker remuneration, see Mika Spiljak, "Remuneration or Distribution According to Work," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), January 20, 1961. Also, *Borba*, March 21, April 2, April 30, May 2, 1961.

[7] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1958. Vol. II, p. 25.

[8] See speech by Milentije Popovic at the SAWPY Federal Committee Plenum, *Borba*, March 21, 1961.

[9] *E.g.*, see reports in *Borba*, April 2; *Ekonomska Politika*, June 24; *Kommunist* (Belgrade), July 13, 1961.

The most crucial questions, however, center around who will have preponderant influence over the distribution of income and what groups will benefit most from the increased independence of economic enterprises. These questions are now being openly aired and are threatening to precipitate sharp social-political conflicts between the workers and the managerial class. On the one hand, the managers accuse the workers of "syndicalist-anarchist" tendencies and of being interested solely in an increase of nominal earnings. On the other, party and trade union spokesmen charge the managers with trying to preserve the dead weight of administrative routine and obstructing real participation by the workers —the direct producers—in the actual running of economic enterprises.[10]

Enterprises and Government

The changes in relationships within economic enterprises must be viewed in the context of still broader changes affecting the enterprises' external relationships vis-à-vis the organs of state administration and of regional self-government. Previous administrative regulations, in particular the requirement that an enterprise turn over a standard minimum amount out of workers' personal earnings as a compulsory financial contribution to the commune in which it was situated, had the effect of discouraging enterprises from eliminating excess labor and increasing productivity. Moreover, under the former system of progressive taxation, highly developed enterprises had been obliged to pay up to 70 percent of their net profits in taxes to the federal state. These harmful fiscal measures have now been largely corrected through the substitution of a uniform tax rate of 15 percent on annual company profits not exceeding 6 percent of total assets, with the proviso, however, that earnings above that level shall be subject to a 25-percent excess profits tax.

Although the latter tax has been widely criticized by Yugoslav economists as discriminating against "growth industries" and detracting from the beneficial effects of the general tax concessions, the fact nevertheless remains that enterprises generally can now retain a much larger part of their profits for their own investment purposes. As a result of this and of other measures giving the communes fiscal autonomy, it is estimated that economic enterprises and the communes will be able to dispose of additional funds aggregating 600 billion dinars over the next five years. At the same time, higher federal taxes on fixed investments and

[10] *Kommunist*, July 13; *Borba*, July 21, 1961.

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changes in the credit mechanism are expected to keep investment expansion under control and to compel enterprises to use their reserves for working capital instead of resorting, as hitherto, to easy bank credits.

A thorough reorganization of the banking system is currently being carried out in order to make credit control a more effective instrument of economic policy and to establish tighter links between the organs of local self-government and the economic enterprises within their jurisdictional areas. The basic institutions in the reorganized system will be the banks of the communes (there are at present 800 communal subdivisions in the country). The number of these banks will be increased from 120 to between 700 and 800, and they will play a key role in the economic life of their respective localities. The communal bank will be the financial nerve center of the entire economy of the commune, utilizing the funds of its local clients as well as credits obtained from the specialized (foreign trade, agricultural, and investment) banks or from the National Bank.[11]

A MAJOR OBJECTIVE of the decentralization measures is to provide the communes, which were established in 1955, with an appropriate financial base. Each commune is to derive its own independent funds from several sources: *i.e.*, a levy on the gross incomes of workers employed in the commune, other local taxes, interest paid by certain communal services on their business funds, and compulsory contributions by enterprises situated in the commune from their business and joint consumption funds. Total non-federal contributions by enterprises will range up to 23 percent of net enterprise income allocated to these funds, with 11 percent going to the commune (*opstina*), 4 percent to the district (*srez*), and 8 percent to the appropriate republic. The communes are expected to acquire additional sources of financial revenue as a result of the extension of workers' self-management to the transport (railways, airways, and shipping) and postal services.

Thus, the communes are gradually becoming entirely self-managing units with their own local means of economic support, making it necessary in turn to adapt their legal and organizational structure to these new economic relationships. This is especially the case in regard to the delicate, often strained relations arising between the "people's committees"—the elected self-governing organs of the communes—and the workers' councils of enterprises within their jurisdiction. Not only are the people's committees empowered to dissolve an enterprise or suspend its workers' council, but they also appoint and dismiss the enterprise directors. The latter authority has become the main bone of contention on the ground that it tends to compel the director of an enterprise, in case of a dispute with the commune, to take the side of the communal committee rather than of the workers' council of the enterprise. Some trade union organs have accordingly advocated a qualified "democratization" of the appointment and dismissal procedures, transferring the initiative in both instances to the workers' councils but making their decisions subject to approval by the communal committee. The latter would also retain the right to dissolve the workers' council or dismiss the director of an enterprise in certain specified cases to be defined in new regulations.

[11] On the revisions of the banking system, see *Borba*, February 23, April 7, July 6, 1961.

Foreign Trade and Pricing

The picture of the newly-evolving economic pattern in Yugoslavia would not be complete without referring to the second broad category of changes, namely those designed to give greater scope, over the long run, to the operation of the free market mechanism, both internationally and domestically. These changes have to do specifically with foreign trade and price policies and aim at creating the necessary framework for the effective application of the principles of decentralization, freer competition, and economic rationality.

With the help of loans aggregating $275,000,000 from the International Monetary Fund, the United States, and several West European countries, Yugoslavia has revamped its whole system of foreign trade and exchange. The previous multiple exchange rates and import and export coefficients have been replaced by a single fixed clearing rate of 750 dinars to the dollar and a provisional General Customs Tariff. Some 50 percent of Yugoslavia's imports have been freed from administrative controls, the rest remaining subject to regulation by means of quotas and import licenses. Yugoslavia has thus become the only Communist country to allow a measure of currency convertibility and free trade.

As a corollary to the liberalization of foreign trade and exchange regulations, which necessarily makes the Yugoslav economy more susceptible to world market pressures, the regime has also initiated a gradual reform of the distorted pricing system under which domestic prices, both of producer and of consumer goods, often were drastically out of line with world market prices. The announced long-range objectives of the government's new price policy are the abandon-

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ment of direct administrative price-fixing by the state and the creation of "more harmonious" price relations through extended operation of the market mechanism.[12] Thus, the basic decree of last February stipulated that "price ceilings" and other forms of state-fixed prices—covering about one-fourth of total industrial production in terms of monetary value—would be gradually abolished over the next few years, to be supplanted by indirect economic methods of regulating prices—*i.e.*, through fiscal and monetary measures.[13]

Actually, some of the government's actions since the February decree have appeared to contradict the ultimate objectives of the new price policy. In April, June, and August, new price controls were instituted, in various forms, in virtually all sectors of the economy. The government, however, has insisted that these are merely provisional, "temporary" measures which had to be taken in order to check inflationary pressures stemming from the foreign trade and exchange reform and to prevent unjustified price increases and speculation during the period of transition to the new price system. At any rate, there has been as yet no marked dismantling of administrative price controls, although it remains to be seen what will develop after the difficulties of readjustment are overcome.

Nevertheless, within the framework of continued state intervention, actual price trends—as far as can be judged from presently available data—suggest at least an incipient tendency toward the formation of more rational, economic prices closer to world market levels. Statistics for the first seven months of 1961 indicate an average 10-percent rise in prices of agricultural products, and they further reveal that, while there was an average overall increase of 5 percent in industrial goods prices, the prices of some products of the ferrous-metallurgical, electrical equipment, and textile industries were lowered by about 3 percent. Transport tariffs have been raised by some 15 percent, and prices in the catering industry by 18-20 percent.

The upward revision of agricultural prices is particularly significant. Because of the defects of the old price structure, agricultural production—even though 60 percent above the prewar level—lagged behind industrial production in rate of growth. Now, however, it is estimated that the establishment of more rational prices for agricultural products will raise total farm income to a level 40 percent above that of 1959 (assuming the same level of productivity), and thus will provide the necessary incentive to accelerate the growth of agricultural output.

ALL IN ALL, it is still too early to judge the effectiveness of the current pricing experiments—and especially the extent to which free market principles will ultimately be allowed to operate. There is no question, however, that the policy of eliminating price distortions makes the achievement of higher efficiency and lower production costs one of the most crucial problems of the economy—especially in view of the country's large balance of payments deficit ($250 million in 1960) and the fact that the net inflow of foreign funds in the next few years will be considerably less than the cost of debt servicing.

The government evidently hopes that it will be able, by means of diversified and more subtle instruments of fiscal and monetary control, to keep inflationary pressures in check and realize the planned allocation of resources in both the consumption and investment sectors of the economy. Flexible interest rates and rents are to be used as instruments for controlling the "vertical distribution" of capital among the various economic

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When we speak about price control, some people pose the question: Is it not contrary to the proclaimed principles of the free formation of prices and the free market? I think not. Our free market is a conditional term. . . . One must understand that the free formation of prices under our conditions means forming them on the basis of supply and demand within the general proportions of the plan. This is the frame within which our free market will develop. In my opinion, the task of price control under such a system is not to prescribe prices, but, in general, to ensure appropriate conditions of equality under which prices will be formed in accordance with real economic necessity, i.e., *preventing any excesses, price speculation, unjustified profits, etc. Of course, this does not mean that we should renounce the fixing of prices when important interests of the community are at stake. I think that for this purpose we should build an appropriate organizational apparatus which would be sufficiently independent in its work. It seems to me that this is indispensable at least as a transitory measure, yet it might prove to be even more than a transitory measure.*

—From Kardelj's speech at the Second Plenum of the SAWPY Federal Committee, *Borba*, March 21, 1961.

[12] See *Borba*, February 14 and 23, 1961; *Ekonomska Politika*, February 11, 1961.

[13] On the subject of price fixing and price controls, see B. Kubovic and V. Trickovic, *National and regional economic planning in Yugoslavia*, Belgrade 1961.

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sectors, while price is to serve as the principal mechanism governing the "horizontal distribution" of total social product among individual enterprises.

The revision of the banking system is a key part of the program to arm the government with new regulatory weapons. Instead of functioning as both a central and clearing bank as formerly, the National Bank is to be exclusively a central bank which will control the money supply and monetary movements, issue bonds and treasury bills, and set the discount rate.[14] It will also hold on deposit the compulsory minimum reserves of the communal banks. Manipulation of federal market reserves and regulation of imports will provide other indirect means of maintaining the equilibrium of the market.

While hopeful that the new scheme of more flexible indirect controls will prove successful in integrating economic planning with the market mechanism, Yugoslav officials are keenly aware of the difficult problems of readjustment that remain to be overcome. Mr. K. Gligorov, head of the Economic Affairs Secretariat of the Federal Executive Council, expressed this awareness when he remarked to the present writer in the course of an interview:

To negate the market would be as useless as to negate the plan. We want to create an optimal balance between decentralized planning and the market mechanism. We have no dogmatic prejudices, none whatsoever . . .

The Threat of Inflation

One factor that seriously complicated the adjustment of the economy to the many changes of the reform program was a rapid rise in investment expenditures during the first half of 1961. Already before the enactment of the reforms, only about one-third of total capital investment was allocated from central government funds, with some 30 percent autonomously financed by economic enterprises and 35 percent by the communes and the six constituent republics. Anticipating the further decentralization called for by the reform program, many enterprises and local authorities in charge of public funds began making reckless investment commitments, causing serious divergences from the planned investment pattern. Thus, whereas the national economic plan for 1961 projected a 4.7 percent increase in investments, actual investment allocations from central funds in the first four months of the year rose by 8 percent, and those from the funds of enterprises, communes, and republics by no less than 40 percent.

[14] Kardelj and Todorovic speeches, previously cited.

Excessive demand, price speculation, competition for easy money, illegal credit arrangements,[15] and general nervousness—arising, in part, from the process of economic readjustment—all played a part in the investment boom. In order to curb it, the Federal People's Assembly last June enacted various restrictive measures requiring that the communes and republics set aside 10 percent of their budgetary revenues as reserves, that they allocate 35 (instead of only 25) percent of their investment funds to working capital rather than to fixed investments, and that the communal banks extend credits only to those enterprises reserving 50 percent of their business funds for working capital.[16]

Although it is not yet possible to gauge the full effect of these restrictions, there is no question that they had an immediate and sharp impact on the economy. The current volume of total investments at the beginning of September was almost 50 percent lower than at the end of April.[17] However, the sudden constriction of credits tended to accentuate uncertainty in the economy, to slow down production, and to cause serious problems of liquidity in certain industrial sectors. These adverse effects are already reflected in the fact that industrial production for the first eight months of 1961 rose only 8 percent as against the 12-percent rate of increase called for by the 1961 plan, while unsold stocks of agricultural machinery increased by nearly 100 percent over the same period, and of capital goods as a whole by 24 percent.[18] All this indicates that the problem of how to combat inflationary pressures without upsetting the economy and slowing down economic growth remains a major concern of the regime.

Lagging Labor Productivity

The early results of the economic reforms in the vital area of boosting productivity through the elimination of labor waste have likewise not been too encouraging. While workers' nominal earnings increased by an estimated 16 percent during the first seven months of 1961, productivity increased by a mere 3 percent. In the textile, shipbuilding, leather, and metallurgical industries, the volume of employment has admittedly expanded at a faster rate than has the amount of production.[19]

[15] On the growth of outstanding debts between enterprises, see *Borba,* June 10 and July 6, 1961.
[16] *Borba* May 22, June 10 and 21; *Kommunist,* June 15, 1961.
[17] *Borba,* September 27, 1961.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.,* August 17 and September 21, 1961; *Politika,* September 16, 1961.

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Some leading Yugoslav economists, in "off-the-record" statements to the author, estimated that 15 to 20 percent of total industrial employment in Yugoslavia (1.1 million) represents "surplus labor." The influential Croatian leader, Mr. Vladimir Bakaric, has advocated shifting such labor to road construction and other public works projects. On the other hand, the head of the Yugoslav Federation of Trade Unions, Svetozar Vukmanovic, has urged that enterprises, instead of dismissing unneeded workers, find productive use for them through new projects.[20]

The effect of these early difficulties was to evoke an upsurge of criticism against the reform measures. The critics, who included some old-line bureaucrats but were mainly from the middle and lower strata of the managerial class, assailed the reforms as paving the way for virtual economic anarchy and advocated at least a partial return to centralized planning and control. On the other hand, several prominent Yugoslav leaders, with the support of many of the country's economists, contended that the crux of the difficulty lay in the fact that the reforms were not being fully carried out. A notable exponent of the latter viewpoint is Mr. Bakaric, who declared last June:

The question is not whether we are going ahead too rapidly, but on the contrary whether we are not progressing too slowly. Many things are not very clear to us. Who knows whether all the measures will prove to have been correct? But the question is one of correcting their actual functioning in due time. If we let things appear uncertain, if it is not clear what is a legacy of the old system and what has emerged as a result of the new, then we are likely to encounter very serious difficulties.[21]

Social Issues of Economic Reform

The many problems of economic readjustment constitute simply one, albeit an extremely important, aspect of the overall socio-political issues confronting the regime. How far can and will the new economic system be carried without causing great inequalities? How can the proper lines of demarcation between the selfish interests of individuals or enterprises and the interests of the state, between sectional and federal interests, be drawn and safeguarded? How can real political meaning be injected into the present reforms without jeopardizing the monopoly of power held by the Communist Party?

The social and political impact of the economic reforms has been discussed in the press and among Yugoslav sociologists, politicians and intellectuals ever since they were announced early this year. Developments to date have tended to intensify initial fears that the competitive forces unleashed by the new system would inevitably breed the social "evils" said to be characteristic of an affluent capitalist society.

In his programmatic speech last March, Vice President Kardelj expressed firm opposition to the ideology of "abstract equality" and the "naive and shallow idealism" of young intellectuals who were alarmed that the new incentives woud lead to a "dehumanization of labor," to a "money fetish." Both he and Mr. Milentije Popovic, the chief speakers at the March plenum of the SAWPY Federal Committee, conceded that "here and there" some social conflicts and political differences might appear, and they appealed to various organizations, above all the League of Communists and the SAWPY, to stimulate "a very high degree of unselfishness, honesty, solidarity, and comradeship" among Yugoslav citizens.[22]

As far as the immediate effects of the new system of income distribution are concerned, it is generally agreed that the present atmosphere is dominated by a rush for personal gain. While there have been quite a few clashes between managers and workers on the issue of the correct division of income between business funds and personal earnings, enterprises on the whole have tended to adopt a policy of general wage and salary increases for all personnel. As a consequence, in some industries (*e.g.*, electrical goods, printing, oil, building), the nominal wages of workers have risen 24 to 30 percent.

What Mr. Bakaric has called the "fight for personal earnings" [23] is in turn tending to aggravate social inequalities and widen the gap between top salaries and minimum wages. The most recent statistics substantiate earlier worries that "the rich will become richer and the poor will be poorer." [24] In Belgrade the wage scale in 1960 ranged from 8,000-15,000 dinars in the lowest category, to 70,000 in the highest. By the end of June 1961, the highest salaries had soared to 110,000 dinars, while minimum earnings were boosted only slightly to a level of 10,000-15,000 dinars. One evidence of this trend was a report that in the district of Pancevo, factory directors received bonuses of up to 12,000 dinars while unskilled workers got only 500.

The increased autonomy given to enterprises and communes has also accentuated a trend toward local "monopolism" and other parochial tendencies, fre-

[20] *Borba,* April 2, May 2, 1961.
[21] *Ibid.,* June 19, 1961.
[22] Popovic speech, see fn. 8.
[23] See fn. 21.
[24] *Rad,* February 4, 1961.

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quently resulting in a clash between communal and federal interests. This tendency is particularly strong in the case of wholesale commercial enterprises. In a number of communes (Pancevo, Zenica, Priboj Sombot, Slavonsky Brod, *etc.*), the people's committees have been pressing the factories and agricultural cooperatives to agree to the establishment of new, and in most cases superfluous, "middlemen" in the marketing process, in the form of wholesale trade outlets through which products or basic materials and components are sold to retail traders and consumers. This practice has led to price increases, due to the mark-up fixed by the wholesale trading firm, and has channeled illegal profits into the hands of the commune authorities.[25] Paradoxically, such aberrations of the reform program are due to the new regulations themselves: while the system of contributions by enterprises to communal funds has eliminated the pressure hitherto put on firms by the people's committees for the employment of superfluous labor, it has also encouraged the communes to "double" their share in the earnings of enterprises by creating unnecessary new firms.

At the same time, the creation of numerous new communal funds under independent management (for investments, housing, health services, social insurance, communal projects, *etc.*), seems to contradict the simultaneous curtailment of the rights of administrative interference by the communal people's committees, spelling the possibility of trouble ahead. The new funds are run by more or less autonomous communal boards, which supposedly are to spend the funds on the basis of fixed criteria, though no decision has yet been taken as to who will define these criteria and how. Whatever the final form of these local organs, it seems clear that increased decentralization will provide fertile ground for illegal practices such as already described, for mismanagement of public funds, and for diverse actions motivated by sectional interests.

Viewed in the broader context of relations between the six federated republics and the central government, these problems inherent in the dynamics of decentralization may create serious tensions with wide ramifications. Though the Tito regime has gone far toward creating a Yugoslav nationalism, and though the birth of national unity is generally regarded as one of its major noncontroversial achievements, persisting inequalities between the underdeveloped regions and the rest of the country provide a constant stimulus to ideas of "national self-sufficiency" and even of "revived chauvinism" among some of the member nationalities.[26] The per capita product in such regions as Kosovo-Metohija and the republics of Montenegro and Macedonia is still only half the nationwide average and less than a third of the figure for the highly-developed Slovenian republic.[27]

A special fund has been established as the main instrument of long-term federal aid to the less-developed regions, and over the next five years it is expected to provide them with some 230 to 250 billion dinars for investment. Nonetheless—despite President Tito's insistence that a rapid rise in overall economic development will best help individual areas—the respective executive organs in the less-developed republics seem determined to pursue industrial growth and higher standards of living through their *own* actions as rapidly as possible. In the words of Mr. Bakavic, "Everyone wants to develop his own region, and that is the reason why each region considers that some factory, no matter what kind, must be built there." [28]

A New Superstructure?

The above problems, arising directly from the reforms of the economy, only begin to touch on the socio-political implications of the current Yugoslav course. In line with the principles of economic decentralization, the regime has proposed (and in some cases enacted) various measures aimed at a "democratization and decentralization" of other spheres of the national life—described, in theoretical terms, as an attempt to bring the superstructure" of society into line with the transformed "substructure," or economic base. Among these measures are cultural, political and constitutional reforms in various stages of planning and development.

In the sphere of culture, basic and highly controversial reforms are underway, affecting the educational system, the arts, publishing activities and other mass media. While Yugoslav educators, artists, and intellectuals acknowledge that the proposed cultural program may reduce administrative-bureaucratic interference, they have expressed strong fears that it might also bring about a "commercialization of spirit" and, in the long run, threaten the limited but real freedoms that now exist in culture and the arts.[29]

The educational reorganization serves as an example. Its announced aim is the conversion of the schools into

[25] For specific cases, see *Borba,* May 31, July 17 and 21, 1961.
[26] See *Borba,* April 30 and May 2, 1961.
[27] Kubovic and Trickovic, *op. cit.*
[28] See fn. 21; also Tito speech, in *Borba,* July 5, 1961.
[29] Kardelj and Popovic speeches, previously cited, and other statements made during the debate at the March plenum of the SAWPY Federal Committee. Similar doubts were privately expressed to the author by several Yugoslav intellectuals.

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free, independent institutions within the framework of "direct socialist democracy." Under a law adopted in December 1960, schools are to become "economic" organizations in their own right, financed by all bodies concerned with education, ranging from economic enterprises to the federal government. During the initial transition period, school budgets are to be financed from the communal school funds, but at a later date they are gradually to acquire "their own independent and regular revenues in accordance with their activities and the results they achieve." [30]

So far, only the basic principles of the educational reform have been announced, without any practical guide to action. However, bills are being prepared concerning the status of teachers and the distribution of income in schools, and it is reported that teachers' earnings will be made dependent to some extent on the general revenues and performance record of the individual schools. Apart from the personal financial worries involved, teachers and lecturers are concerned that the price to be paid for the promised curtailment of state-administrative intervention and for greater budgetary independence might be more stringent and direct political control by the local organs of the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance and by the various bodies of local self-government.

The same doubts arise over new regulations in other spheres of culture. Publishing firms, for instance, are supposed to become self-managing organizations with funds of their own. Distribution of income within these firms is generally to follow the same "complex output" formula as in economic enterprises. Subsidies will be granted to them, but only on a decentralized basis—that is, through local organs. What this means, in effect, is that the various political organizations or communal organs will have a direct voice in the choice of books for publication, financing those which they consider essential for "educational purposes." As it is officially explained, "under the new system the entire public of the commune will know who is getting these subsidies, what is their amount and why they are granted." [31]

IN THE AREA of political and constitutional reforms, the regime is moving cautiously toward concrete proposals. The new constitution, being drafted for presentation to the public next spring, is said to have as its basic principle the "recognition of men as human beings, as producers, and as managers." The self-governing communes will be proclaimed the "basic cells" of the new system of social organization, and the role of the state is to be reduced to that of a "coordinator." Some modifications of the parliamentary and electoral systems are also being considered.

In discussing the political structure, the regime has laid great stress on the role of the SAWPY—the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia—as the major instrumentality for directing political organization and activity. The six-million member Alliance, founded in 1953, is described as "neither a party, nor a political movement," but rather a "supra-party" mass organization that will become the "main instrument of direct democracy" in the decentralized structure of "self-government." Its primary task is defined as providing a forum "in which the policy of the organs of self-government will be discussed, formed and created." It is also assigned the job of guiding, influencing and educating the population, and in particular the members of the various organs of local self-government. Toward these ends, new sections and branches of the organization are to be set up, and its propaganda activities are to be increased.

It is of course manifest that Communists will continue to occupy the key positions in the Socialist Alliance and its affiliated organizations, and their job will be to transmit and to ensure compliance with party directives. While insisting that the Socialist Alliance is to be a "democratic tribunal," regime spokesman have made clear that it is not to be a "passive transmitter" of "alien political and ideological trends" and that "any reactionary viewpoints must definitely be suppressed." [32] The need for vigilance against extremes of opposition has been underscored by Kardelj as follows:

Remnants of the anti-socialist opposition are now trying to strengthen themselves on the basis of criticism starting from the position of humanism, liberalism, democracy. They are joined by the conservative defenders of the bureaucratic positions and outgrown concepts of state monopoly and administrative management.[33]

Such statements make it clear that "direct democracy" and "self-government" are to operate within well-guarded limits.

Some Tentative Observations

All of the foregoing discussion can best be summed up by certain basic questions: Will the reforms introduced by the Yugoslav regime really act as a brake

[30] Kardelj speech before the Federal Assembly, *Borba*, April 20, 1961.

[31] Popovic speech, see fn. 8.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Kardelj speech at SAWPY plenum, previously cited (fn. 4).

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against the bureaucratic-administrative intervention of the past? Or will they impel an even tighter political control over all activities in the guise of decentralization? What is the real meaning of slogans such as "the liberalization of the individual" and "progressive revolutionary changes in social and political life"?

Only time, of course, can supply the answers to these questions, as the scope, effects and ramifications of the reform program become clearer. Nevertheless, certain observations are in order. In the writer's view, it is obvious that the development of various forms of grass-roots "democracy" will be permitted only insofar as they remain compatible with the continued monopoly of political power in the hands of the League of Communists. Though the new reforms are likely to inject fresh air into political life and to stimulate social mobility, they will not be allowed to weaken the chain of top-to-bottom political command nor to alter the essential organizational structure of the totalitarian state. Through its control over the SAWPY and over the selection of candidates for the various existing and proposed organs of "self-government," the party will penetrate deep into the decentralized system of society and thereby preserve its authority.

To say this is in no way to doubt the sincerity of the Yugoslav regime's effort to reform communism from within, but only to point out the limits of the regime's definition of reform. Nor can one belittle various positive side-effects of the program to date. Without doubt it has created an atmosphere of political relaxation and tolerance in Yugoslavia unequalled elsewhere in Eastern Europe, with the possible exception of Poland. Many political prisoners (including Milovan Djilas) have been released, relations with the Church have improved, and a new freedom of intellectual expression has become evident. Among other tangible signs of the relaxed atmosphere are the removal of various irksome restrictions previously imposed on foreigners; a rapid increase in the number of Yugoslav tourists traveling abroad, mainly to the West; a reported total of one million convertible dollars in private banking accounts, and the appearance of a wide range of Western dailies and periodicals in the kiosks.

Whatever the limitations of the current program, it is also fair to give credit to the Yugoslav leadership for having expressed some recognition that social relations must become "more tolerant, more human and more democratic" (to quote the official language), and for having had sufficient dynamism to proceed by experiment and searching, by trial and error, toward a more rational and liberalized system based on economic and administrative decentralization. How the regime will contain its experiments within the limits of compatibility with the system of one-party rule—or whether, indeed, the reforms will ever reach those limits—is another of the questions that the future must answer.

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How Original is "Maoism"?

By Arthur A. Cohen

LIU SHAO-CH'I, heir apparent to Mao Tse-tung as head of the Chinese Communist Party, claimed in 1945 that Mao had formulated a "'theory" of the Chinese revolution which constituted a new "development" of Communist doctrine on the revolutionary conquest of power. Liu's tribute heralded the beginning of what has since proven to be an ambitious and persistent effort not only to exalt "the ideology of Mao" as the sole guide for the Chinese Communist Party and people, but also to propagate an image of the Chinese party leader as the foremost living theorist of the world Communist movement.[1] At least one Chinese party spokesman has credited Mao with more than fourteen major contributions to Communist doctrine.

The Chinese pretensions to Mao's ideological primacy have figured as a highly important and thorny issue in the still continuing conflict of views between Moscow and Peking. If only for that reason, a fresh attempt to evaluate those pretensions seems worthwhile —especially since the Chinese claims presumably will remain a factor in the Sino-Soviet relationship even after Mao's death, just as divergent Chinese and Soviet assessments of Stalin's contribution have played a part in that relationship since the death of the former Soviet dictator.

Mao as a Marxist Philosopher

The first area in which the Chinese Communists claim that Mao has made a major creative contribution is that of Marxist philosophy, in particular his elaboration of Marxian dialectical materialism. This claim has been based principally on two essays attributed to Mao—"On Practice" and "On Contradiction"—both alleged to have been originally written by him in 1937, but actually published in their present form only in 1950 and 1952, respectively.

Chinese Communist writers on theory credit Mao's "'On Practice" with novel theoretical formulations in two specific respects. Li Ta terms the essay "a development of the Marxist-Leninist theory of practice," [2] while others such as Ai Ssu-ch'i claim that it "clarifies and develops Engels' and Lenin's famous principle of absolute and relative truth." [3]

It is difficult to grant validity to either of these contentions. Li's claim appears without basis inasmuch as "On Practice" contains little more than paraphrased passages of Lenin's discussion of the theory of knowledge in his *Philosophical Notebooks* and *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. As for Ai Ssu-ch'i's thesis of a Maoist contribution to the Marxist theory of truth, a close reading of the relevant portions of Mao's essay similarly reveals the discussion to be merely a reiteration, rather than a creative development, of ideas already set forth in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and Engels' *Anti-Dühring*. Nor does "On Practice" have anything to add to the ideas of Engels and Lenin on appearance and essence, or to Marx's critical reformu-

Mr. Cohen is an American student of Chinese affairs. His article is drawn from a larger work now in progress.

[1] *E.g.*, an article in the *Honan Jih-pao* (Chengchow), January 14, 1960, declared: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the most outstanding representative of the proletariat in our country, and the greatest and most outstanding revolutionary leader, statesman, and theorist of Marxism-Leninism in the modern era."

[2] Li Ta, "'On Practice'—The Philosophical Foundation of Mao Tse-tung's Ideology," in *Selected Essays for the Study of "On Practice"* (2nd ed.), Chung-nan Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, Hankow, December 1951, p. 72.

[3] Ai Ssu-ch'i, "Comrade Mao Tse-tung Develops the Theory of Truth," *ibid.*, p. 56.

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lation of "the primacy of practice in knowledge" as elaborated in the writings of Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.

Thus, nowhere in "On Practice" does Mao introduce a genuinely novel idea or make a constructive contribution to dialectical materialist doctrine on practice. Indeed, in a rather unusual commentary on Mao's treatise, published in a Chinese Communist journal, Professor Feng Yu-lan, perhaps the greatest living historian of Chinese philosophical thought, acknowledges in effect that even pre-modern Chinese philosophers—particularly Mo Ti, Wang Ch'ung, and Wang Chuan-shan—had anticipated all of Mao's ideas on the role of practice in the knowing process.[4]

The Chinese case with respect to the second of Mao's philosophical essays, "On Contradiction," is similarly exaggerated, but perhaps a shade stronger. Ai Ssu-ch'i claims that in this work Mao "further developed Lenin's brilliant idea that 'the dialectic, briefly defined, is the theory of the unity of opposites' " and also "further defined the correct relationship between internal contradiction and external causation in the development of things." [5] Actually, the essay says nothing new on the unity of opposites or the "particularity" of contradiction, nor does it "further define" the laws of causation beyond the concept of the "necessary self-movement" of things as expounded in Hegel's *Logic* and subsequently in the writings of Engels and Lenin. Mao does indeed seem to have come up with one novel formulation, namely the contention that any contradiction has a "principal aspect" which is the determinant of qualitative change; but this rather suspect idea is the extent of his originality as a dialectical materialist and Marxist philosopher.

Quite apart from the question of the substantive value of "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" as a contribution to Marxist philosophy, there is also the question of whether the two essays were, in fact, written by Mao in substantially their present form in 1937, as the Chinese Communists claim. According to the Chinese Communist version, "On Practice" was written in July and "On Contradiction" in August of that year.[6] Introductory editors' notes accompanying the essays in Volumes I and II of Mao's *Selected Works* (published in October 1951 and April 1952, respectively) state that both were originally presented by Mao as lectures at Yenan in 1937, and only the note to "On Contradiction" indicates a revision of the original text prior to its inclusion in Volume II.

ACTUALLY, THERE IS considerable evidence casting doubt on this Chinese Communist version, and it may therefore be worthwhile to summarize the available facts. To begin with, as far as can be determined, "On Practice" was published in China for the first time in the central party organ *Jen-min jih-pao* on December 29, 1950 (it was also published in the Soviet journal *Bolsherik*, No. 23, December 1950, and commented on in *Pravda*, December 18, 1950); and "On Contradiction" first appeared in print in China, also in *Jen-min jih-pao*, on April 1, 1952. Although earlier collections of Mao's major writings to date had been published in the mid-1940's, they did not include either of these essays. Moreover, in a philosophical article published in May 1941, the Communist writer Hsiao Chou specifically discussed the theory of practice without making any reference to Mao's purported essay on the same subject.[7]

It is also curious that Volume I of Mao's *Selected Works*, as published in October 1951, included "On Practice" but not "On Contradiction," and that the latter appeared out of proper chronological sequence in Volume II, published in April 1952 just after the essay had come out for the first time in *Jen-min jih-pao*. A statement by the Committee on Publication of Mao's Works, appearing on the flyleaf of Volume II, offered no explanation of this curious fact, merely noting that "On Contradiction" "should have been in Volume I to accord with the author's chronology" and would be transferred there in a later reprinting of the volume. This would strongly suggest that "On Contradiction" had not been ready for publication even as late as October 1951 when Volume I appeared.

Still further reason for doubting the Chinese version is furnished by the sharp contrast in caliber of Marxist thinking between "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," as published in 1950 and 1952, and another example of philosophical writing by Mao dating back, in actual fact, to 1940. The latter—part of an essay on dialectical materialism printed in a Shanghai maga-

[4] Feng Yu-lan, "Mao Tse-tung's 'On Practice' and Chinese Philosophy," *People's China* (Peking), November 16, 1951. Feng, however, felt constrained to conclude his article by saying that Mao had "successfully solved a problem which has claimed the attention of so many brilliant minds through the centuries."

[5] Ai Ssu-ch'i, "Comprehend the Dialectic from the Aspect of 'On Contradiction'," in *Study "On Contradiction"* (1st ed.) Hsin-chien-she Ch'u-pan-she, Peking, September 25, 1952, pp. 5, 7.

[6] See editors' note accompanying the English translation of Mao's "On Contradiction," published in *People's China*, July 1, 1952.

[7] Hsiao Chou, "Study Theory and Practice," *Ch'un-chung* (The Masses), Vol. IV, No. 14, May 20, 1941, pp. 397-400.

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zine in March 1940 [8]—appears to be the only sample of Mao's writing on Marxist philosophy to have been actually published prior to 1950, and it sheds revealing light on the primitiveness of his philosophical ideas as of that period. In it Mao makes many mistakes—for example, his attribution to "idealists" of views which in fact were held by well-versed Marxists—and the entire fragment is a jumble of statements that are questionable as philosophy, Marxist or otherwise. Even Mao's lieutenants apparently regarded the essay as a catastrophe. According to General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the onetime warlord of Sinkiang Province, the Yenan Communist Fang Lin refused to show him the essay in 1940 with the remark, "You had better not read it. From the theoretical point of view, Chairman Mao's 'Dialectics' is full of errors." [9]

If this was the caliber of Mao's philosophical thinking in 1940, it is difficult to believe that any lectures he may have prepared and given at Yenan in 1937 on the Marxist theories of practice and contradiction could have been anything but equally primitive and unsophisticated. By contrast, however, "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" in the form in which they were first published in 1950 and 1952 clearly show the hand of a theorist who, if not original in his thinking, at least develops his arguments along well-schooled and correct Marxist-Leninist lines. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the published versions either were written at a much later date than the Chinese claim, or represent such drastic revisions of Mao's purported 1937 lectures as to be altogether different from them.

The Maoist "Theory" of Revolution

So much for Mao's pretensions to eminence as a "developer" of Marxist dialectical materialism. Is there any stronger foundation for the claim that he made an original and unique contribution to Communist doctrine concerning the fundamentals of the revolutionary process?

Chinese Communist writers, it is true, have conceded that Mao's general analysis of the problems of the Chinese revolution conformed essentially to the concepts of Lenin and Stalin. Chang Ju-hsin, for example, wrote in 1953 that during the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27) "Comrade Mao Tse-tung . . . , the faithful student and comrade-in-arms of Stalin, upheld the viewpoints of Lenin and Stalin in regard to the problems of the revolution in China." [10]

But the Chinese nevertheless insist that Mao's conclusions had an independent value of their own. That is to say, they derived from Mao's own analysis of Chinese conditions and were not just a direct appropriation of Leninist-Stalinist ideas. In the same article quoted above (which was, in fact, a tribute to Stalin published shortly after his death), Chang Ju-hsin went on to say that Mao arrived at "identical conclusions with those of Stalin regarding the fundamental problems of the Chinese revolution."

Another Chinese Communist writer, Shen Chih-yuan, takes a similar line in an article published early in 1952. Although acknowledging Mao's general debt to Lenin and Stalin, he qualifies this by saying that in the period 1924-27 the writings of Lenin and Stalin "had been disseminated in China only to a very small extent." "Yet," he adds, "Chairman Mao, already in this very period or even somewhat earlier, had finished his analysis of classes in Chinese society and his report on the peasant movement in Hunan . . . exercising independent powers of reflection." [11] But both Chang and Shen fail to mention an important historical fact, namely, that the policies actually followed by the Chinese Communists in the middle and latter 1920's, as well as the theoretical justifications for them, were laid down and sent to China in numerous Comintern directives initiated and approved by Stalin.

This has not deterred the Chinese from being quite specific in their claims on behalf of Mao. Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's chief eulogist, wrote in 1951 that Mao "consistently adhered to . . . the Lenin-Stalin theory on the leadership of the proletariat *and developed this theory in a concrete manner.*" [12] (Italics added) Ch'en was referring to the concept of proletarian rather than bourgeois leadership of the first stage of revolution directed at the overthrow of "feudalism and monarchy." But it is difficult to see in what way Mao "developed" or elaborated upon Lenin's thesis, set forth as early as 1905 in his "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," that the proletariat must be the

[8] Mao Tse-tung, "Dialectical Materialism, Part II," *Min-chu* (Democracy), Vol. I, No. 2, March 1940.

[9] Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang—Pawn or Pivot?,* Michigan State University Press, 1958, pp. 229-31.

[10] Chang Ju-hsin, "Stalin's Great Theoretical Contributions to the Chinese Revolution," *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking), April 3, 1953.

[11] Shen Chih-yuan, *"Study the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume I,* Hsin-chien-she Chu-pan-she, Peking, January 20, 1952, pp. 25-26.

[12] Ch'en Po-ta, "Mao Tse-tung's Theory of the Chinese Revolution is the Integration of Marxism-Leninism with the Practice of the Chinese Revolution," *Hsueh-hsi* (Peking), July 1, 1951.

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"leader," and not a subsidiary of the bourgeoisie, in carrying out the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Again, Chang Ju-hsin maintains that Mao was the first to propound the twofold thesis that revolutions in backward countries, such as China, are primarily peasant revolutions, and that the poor peasants constitute the most important force and the most reliable ally of the workers in these revolutions.[13] This claim, however, ignores the evidence in one of Lenin's early writings—"The Agrarian Program of Social Democracy" (1907)—attesting to his recognition, long before Mao, of the important role of the peasantry, and particularly the poor peasantry, in the early stage of the revolutionary process. Lenin wrote:

We must have a clear idea of the character and significance of precisely the peasant agrarian revolution as one of the varieties of bourgeois revolution. . . . A section of the Marxists, the Right Wing, persistently made shift with an abstract, stereotyped conception of the bourgeois revolution and failed to perceive the peculiar features of the present bourgeois revolution, which is precisely a peasant revolution.

In the same work Lenin spoke of the "rural proletariat" as the primary revolutionary force in the countryside, using this term in the same sense as Engels had given it in "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (1894)—that is, to designate poor farm workers as distinct from big and small rural landowners.

There is further evidence on this point in statements by Lenin's contemporaries. Speaking critically of Lenin's program for revolution, the Menshevik leader G. V. Plekhanov wrote (in his "The Working Class and the Social Democratic Intelligentsia"): "It is not Marxism that we find in Lenin's views, but—to use a term of ill repute—peasant insurrectionism, a new version of the theory of heroes leading the rabble." Again, in 1924, Zinoviev saw the very key to Leninism in the importance it attached to the agrarian question. "Leninism," he wrote, "is Marxism in the epoch of imperialist war and of the world revolution *which began directly in a country where the peasantry predominates.*"[14]

THUS, THERE WAS no departure from Leninism when P'eng P'ai, a member of the newborn Chinese Communist Party, went into the countryside of Kwangtung Province in 1921 to organize the peasants, or when Mao himself in 1927 went to inquire into the revolutionary peasant uprisings in Hunan Province. The product of Mao's inquiry was his March 1927 "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," perhaps the most striking thing he ever wrote. In it Mao gave an estimate of the total strength and revolutionary potential of the Hunan peasant movement, crediting the peasant associations with 70 percent of the revolutionary work in the province, and the urban population and military units with only 30 percent. There is every indication that Mao's findings were viewed at the time by his fellow Communists—and by the Comintern—simply as a useful and accurate estimate of the revolutionary potentialities of the Hunan peasantry, and not at all as the formulation of a heretical new "theory" of revolution. That this was the case is evidenced by the fact that the report was published in the Chinese party's official journal, as well as in Moscow. (So, also, were P'eng P'ai's reports of the same year on his experiences in organizing the first peasant soviet in China.)

It was only after 1950, when the Chinese Communists began laboring in earnest to build up Mao's prestige as an eminent "theorist," that his 1927 report was invested with a new aura of doctrinal originality. What had formerly been looked upon merely as a competent on-the-spot account of the Hunan peasant uprisings was now exalted as a brilliant Marxist-Leninist "theoretical" analysis of the Chinese revolution in general. (In keeping with this new treatment, Mao's original reference to the inconspicuous role of the urban population in the Hunan revolts was expunged from the report when it was republished in Volume I of his *Selected Works* in October 1951.) But, as pointed out above, even if the report could be construed as outlining a Maoist "theory" of revolution, its recognition of the peasantry as an important revolutionary force can hardly be regarded as any advance over the ideas formulated earlier by Lenin.

Maoist Strategy and Tactics

Mao's early writings, then, contain nothing to substantiate the claim of a creative development of Communist revolutionary doctrine. But the Chinese case for Mao does not stop there. It is a familiar Communist thesis that the leader who directs a Communist party in revolution contributes, by his formulations of actual strategy and tactics, to the "theory" of revolution itself. If the scope of "theory" is thus broadened, Mao can indeed be credited with two distinctive contributions—*i.e.*, the strategy of waging revolution from self-sustaining rural bases and the tactics of guerrilla warfare.

According to Ch'en Po-ta, Mao "worked out a series of complete conclusions . . . that it was possible for

[13] Chang Ju-hsin, *On Two Works of Comrade Mao Tse-tung during the First Revolutionary Civil War,* (pamphlet), Jen-min Chu-pan-she, Peking, September 1953, p. 6.

[14] "Bolshevism or Trotskyism," *Pravda,* November 20, 1924.

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the revolution to achieve victory first in the countryside, and that it was possible to establish long-term revolutionary bases there." [15] These conclusions were set forth by Mao in a report written in November 1928—"Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains"—in which he enumerated the prerequisites for establishing such bases and formulated a specific plan of organization. It can reasonably be argued that this Maoist strategy for waging the revolutionary struggle in China constituted a *practical* advance over Lenin's general idea of establishing peasant soviets in backward countries.

Ch'en also points to guerrilla warfare as another distinctive feature of the Maoist strategy of revolution. This likewise seems justified, although it is difficult to determine to what extent Mao's espousal of guerrilla tactics was actually inspired by Chu Te—described by a prewar American military observer of the Chinese Red Army as "pre-eminent" in this field [16]—and other Chinese Communist military leaders. The fact that Chinese Communist publications in recent years have made no mention of Chu's numerous writings on guerrilla warfare, the tactics of protracted war, and "quick-decision attack" suggests that Chu's light may well have been concealed in order that Mao's might shine more brightly.

What is most important, however, is that Mao's whole scheme of waging a prolonged revolutionary struggle from self-sustaining Communist bases in the countryside, utilizing tactics of guerrilla warfare, was conceived not as a general "theory" of revolution, but as a concrete, practical strategy for the conquest of power in the specific conditions that prevailed in China. It was, in fact, dictated by those conditions and represented perhaps the only strategy which could enable the Chinese Communists to carry on the revolutionary struggle. Mao's approach to the problem of gaining ruling power was consistently pragmatic, not theoretical; it was based on the key premise that it was necessary to win by whatever means offered themselves at the moment. Consequently, his writings contain sanction for a wide variety of actions appropriate to almost any set of circumstances.

MAO'S EULOGISTS have even attempted to give his pragmatic, common-sense approach the status of a new precept of Communist strategy. In a review hailing the appearance of Volume IV of Mao's *Selected Works* in November 1960, two Chinese Communist writers called Mao's "paper tiger" concept—defined as "slighting the enemy strategically and taking full account of him tactically"—"a new development of enormous significance in the theory of Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics." [17] It is nothing of the sort, it is just a platitude. Virtually every revolutionary leader, including many a non-Communist nationalist, has exercised caution in the face of superior enemy strength. Stalin himself was a pastmaster in showing contempt for the enemy "strategically" while exercising caution "tactically." After all, only a lunatic would fail to act cautiously if what he considered a "paper tiger" appeared for the moment to have the capacities of a real one.

A further point should be mentioned in connection with the Maoist strategy of revolution. Mao's writings of 1928, in which he formulated the idea of establishing rural revolutionary bases, carried the implication that this was a strategy specifically applicable to the peculiar political and geographical environment of China. After 1949, however, the Chinese Communists began taking the line that Mao's formula for revolution—now designated "the road of Mao Tse-tung"—furnished a model strategy for all backward countries. Thus, when one of Mao's original writings—"Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?" (October 1928)—was republished in the first volume of his *Selected Works* in 1951, a footnote was appended to it emphasizing the applicability of the Chinese revolutionary experience to other countries "of the East." The key passage in the footnote reads:

> **Thus, just as the Chinese people have done, all or at least some of the colonial peoples of the East can hold big or small base areas and maintain revolutionary regimes for an extended period, carry on a protracted revolutionary war to encircle the cities from the countryside, and proceed gradually to take over the cities and win nationwide victory in their respective countries.**[18]

This Chinese Communist line has been a thorn in Moscow's side ever since it was enunciated—and it is even more irritating now that the Peking regime is actively competing with the Russians for influence not only in the underdeveloped countries of Asia but also in Africa and Latin America. Peking can claim, if only by implication, that every leader of a rural-based nationalist revolutionary movement in the colonial and underdeveloped areas of the world is following "the road of

[15] Ch'en, *op. cit.*

[16] Major Evans F. Carlson, "The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency," in *Institute of Pacific Relations,* Vol. VII, Sec. 3, October 6, 1939, p. 20.

[17] Teng Li-ch'un and Wu Chiang, "Dialectics is the Algebra of Revolution: Read the *Selected Works* of Mao Tse-tung, Volume IV," *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), Nos. 20-21 (combined), November 1, 1960, p. 25.

[18] See English edition of Mao's *Selected Works,* Vol. I, International Publishers, New York, 1954, footnote 7 on p. 304.

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Mao Tse-tung," whether he ever heard of Mao or not. Here, Moscow is at a disadvantage, for it cannot cite Lenin and Stalin as architects of this special kind of revolutionary strategy.

People's Democratic Dictatorship

Besides his contribution to the practical strategy, if not the "theory," of revolution, Mao is claimed to have formulated a distinctly new concept of the type of transitional state to be instituted following the Communist acquisition of power. This Maoist concept goes under the name of "people's democratic dictatorship."

According to Marx, the overthrow of the bourgeois state by proletarian revolution was to be followed by the establishment of an interim state structure defined as a "dictatorship of the proletariat," which would rule during the period of transition toward the ultimate stateless and classless society of full communism. Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin all elaborated upon the concept of proletarian dictatorship in their writings.

What Marx originally envisioned was a state under the dictatorship of a single class, the workers. In his "Two Tactics," however, Lenin—over the objections of Trotsky—broadened Marx's concept of a one-class dictatorship, envisaging instead a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" as the provisional form to be assumed by a revolutionary government. Similarly, in 1926, Stalin predicted the establishment, specifically in China, of a revolutionary government which "will in general resemble in character the government we used to talk about in our country in 1905, that is, something in the nature of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry." [19] Although the new international Communist line decreed by the Comintern in 1935, which directed Communist collaboration with other leftist parties in forming "popular front" governments, could perhaps be regarded as containing the germ of a broader concept of the post-revolutionary state, there was no actual redefinition of ideological theory on this point, in terms of class structure, until Mao enunciated his concept of "people's democratic dictatorship."

The essential difference between the established Leninist-Stalinist concept of proletarian dictatorship and Mao's new concept of people's democratic dictatorship lay in the fact that the latter envisaged, instead of a two-class dictatorship, a "joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes." Mao first enunciated this idea of multi-class rulership in his *Chinese Revolution and the CCP,* written in 1939, and he further elaborated it in *On New Democracy* (1940) and *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship* (1949). The most notable feature of the Maoist concept, as developed in these writings, was its inclusion of the "revolutionary segment of the national bourgeoisie"—meaning, actually, the most cooperative elements of the capitalist class—among those who would share ruling power in the post-revolutionary state pending the transition to socialism, and thence to eventual communism.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS naturally have lost no opportunity to play up Mao's concept of people's democratic dictatorship—with some justification—as a "creative development of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat." [20] Moreover, much as in the case of the Maoist strategy of revolution, Peking spokesmen not merely insisted—at least, until 1954—that Chinese-style people's dictatorship differed distinctly from Soviet-type proletarian dictatorship, but also suggested that it was an especially appropriate model for Communist movements in the colonial and underdeveloped areas to adopt in the event of revolutionary success.

This too, of course, was galling to the Soviet leadership, and Soviet writers, in discussing Mao's concept of people's democratic dictatorship, generally glossed over its originality by equating it with Lenin's formula of two-class dictatorship. Then, in 1954, there were signs of a Chinese retreat. An article in the Chinese Communist theoretical review *Hsueh-hsi* (Study) acknowledged that there was no "essential" difference between "proletarian" and "people's democratic" dictatorship, and that the only difference was one of "form." [21] This Chinese compromise evidently satisfied Moscow and was formalized in 1956 at the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

If there *were* any actual differences between the Chinese Communist "people's democratic dictatorship" in its formative years and the Soviet totalitarian state, these have long since ceased to exist in fact, if not in theory. Despite the continued existence of so-called "democratic" (non-Communist) parties in China, power is monopolized as exclusively by the CPC as by the CPSU, and the Chinese Communist dictatorship has imposed its

[19] J. V. Stalin, "Prospects of the Revolution in China," *Works,* Vol. VIII, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, pp. 38-39.

[20] *E.g.,* Liu P'ing-lin, "Seriously Study Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Doctrine of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Ta-chung Jih-pao* (Tsinan), May 12, 1960.

[21] Ti Chao-pai, "State Capitalism in Our Transition Period," *Hsueh-hsi,* February 2, 1954.

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will on capitalists and non-capitalists alike, with a ruthlessness that has even been offensive to some other members of the Communist bloc.

Contradictions in Socialist Society

One of the more recent contributions to Communist theory that have been claimed for Mao concerns the ideas he formulated in 1957 on the subject of contradictions within socialist society. These ideas were enunciated by Mao in an address delivered at a meeting of the Supreme State Conference in February 1957—the speech that paved the way for the spectacular developments of the "hundred flowers" campaign. The text of the address was not made public at the time but eventually appeared in the Chinese Communist press—apparently in drastically revised form—under the title, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." [22]

In an article published in June 1960, a Chinese Communist writer on Marxist philosophy claimed that Mao's 1957 speech had "for the first time distinguished between two kinds of contradiction in society . . . antagonistic and non-antagonistic." [23] This is false, as such a distinction had been made as far back as 1939 by Soviet theoreticians M. Rozental and P. Yudin, and had subsequently been elaborated upon by Andrei Zhdanov in 1947, Yudin in 1948, and B. Kedrov in 1951. Even some Chinese Communist theorists had already written along the same line in 1956.

The fact of the matter is that the significance of Mao's discourse did not reside in the elaboration of any new theoretical concept, but lay rather—typically enough—in the realm of practical policy. In effect, the speech took the Marxist idea of "contradictions" (*i.e.*, conflicts) out of the context of philosophical theory and made it the basis—indeed, almost a slogan—for a nationwide campaign aimed at "rectifying" bureaucratic tendencies among party officials and regaining the support of disaffected intellectuals.

From the policy standpoint, however, Mao's February 1957 pronouncement did contain some significant departures from Soviet precedent. Whereas Stalin, in his *Problems of Leninism* (1926), had conceded merely the *possibility* of conflict between the Communist Party and the working class, Mao went beyond this to state that "a contradiction between leaders and led . . . *does exist* . . . under socialism." Again, whereas Soviet practice sanctioned criticism only when it was directed at derelictions on the part of individual party functionaries, Mao's pronouncement invited non-Communists to join in criticizing not only individual officials but the whole Communist Party. Mao further deviated from Soviet precedent in transferring certain contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie, defined as "antagonistic" in the USSR, to the "non-antagonistic" category in Communist China; and he also made the startling announcement that strikes—forbidden by the Soviet regime—would be tolerated by the Peking government provided they were "small in scale." Conflicts involving criticisms of official conduct, declared Mao, ought properly to be resolved in one of two ways: either those who voiced the criticisms should be satisfactorily shown that they were mistaken; or, if the criticisms were found justified, the offending officials should "rectify" their errors.

Some, if not most, of these Maoist innovations were looked upon by Moscow with strong distaste. In China itself, moreover, the outpouring of anti-party criticism during the climactic phase of the "hundred flowers" campaign brought a sharp shift away from the policies of liberalization which Mao's speech of February 1957 had seemed to foreshadow. Today, virtually the only aspect of this pronouncement which still seems to be an acceptable topic of discussion in Chinese Communist theoretical journals is the matter of "non-antagonistic" contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie.

The Transition to Communism

Originality has also been claimed for a number of Mao's ideas on the subject of China's transition to socialism and eventual communism. For the most part these claims have related to Maoist policies strictly in the realm of economics, an area outside this writer's competence, and will therefore not be discussed here. However, one claim of a more general nature which deserves attention concerns Mao's ideas regarding the transformation of the capitalist class. In a June 1955 article, a Chinese Communist theorist credited Mao with formulating the unprecedented principle that capitalists can be peacefully "reconstructed" or "reformed" (*kai-tsao*) into reliable members of socialist society, rather than being forcibly liquidated as a class. The article stated:

In a state where the proletariat has seized power under definite social and historical conditions, the establishment of the principle that capitalist elements can be basically

[22] Text published by New China News Agency, June 18, 1957.
[23] Wu Chiang, "The Victory of the Dialectical Law of History," *Che-hsueh Yen-chiu* (Philosophical Research), No. 6, June 10, 1960.

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reformed under socialist guidance is another brilliant contribution of Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism. This theory never before appeared in the classical works of Marxism-Leninism, and no country in the world [before China] has ever gone through this kind of experience.[24]

Actually, both Marx and Lenin had envisaged peaceful alternatives to the physical extermination of capitalists, although Mao certainly carried their ideas much farther. Lenin, in his "Unavoidable Catastrophe and Boundless Promises" (May 1917), stated that individual capitalists or "even the majority of capitalists" would not be deprived of everything, and that "the proletariat . . . intends to place them at useful, honorable tasks, subject to the control of the workers themselves." Again, in May 1918, Lenin cited Marx's own conjecture that capitalists might "come over to socialism peacefully." It remained for Mao, however, to formulate the idea that the capitalists, as a class, could be transformed *mentally* into workers in a socialist society. This was a novel concept indeed, and its implementation was aided by the development of the equally new Maoist technique of mass "thought remolding," or "brainwashing."

But it is above all the "people's communes" which Chinese Communist writers cite as blazing a new Maoist path towards the goal of full communism. They concede that Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin developed almost all of the general principles that will underlie the fully Communist society of the future, and they also admit that Stalin already had something to say about communes before Mao elaborated and actually implemented the idea in developing the Chinese commune system. However, Mao's great and decisive contribution, the Chinese claim, lay precisely in his fashioning of the people's communes—spontaneously "created by the Chinese masses"—so that they might serve as a concrete organizational instrumentality for effecting the transition from socialist "collective ownership" to communist "ownership by the whole people." Thus, one Chinese Communist theorist wrote in 1959:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's major contribution was his ability to see the significance of the people's communes in long-range historical perspective. Guided by Marxist-Leninist theories, he combined the lessons of the great classics and improved the communes so that they became the best form to be used in completing the building of socialism as well as the best organizational form for China's transition to a communist society.[25]

[24] Shu Wei-kuang, "The Gradual Leap in China's Transition Period," *ibid.*, No. 1, June 1955.

[25] Fan Hung, *Study Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the Theory of Communism* (pamphlet), Peking, April 1959, pp. 42-51.

Chinese Communist claims regarding the communes were most exaggerated in the early period of their existence in 1958, when they were exuberantly hailed as marking the start of China's transition from socialism to communism. This boast, signifying in effect that Communist China not only had progressed as far in one decade as the Soviet Union had in four, but also had discovered a short cut from socialism to communism which did not require a high degree of industrialization and technological development, aroused both anger and apprehension in Moscow. Soviet pressure was evidently brought to bear on Peking, with the result that Chinese Communist spokesmen began backtracking from the earlier line that China had already embarked on the building of full communism.[26] Moreover, despite continued lip service to the commune concept on the part of the Peking regime, the actual role and importance of the communes have gradually declined since 1959, with the production brigades and teams tending to become the real basic units of rural economic activity in China.

"Maoism" in Perspective

What conclusion, then, can be drawn regarding the validity of the Chinese Communist claims of a distinctive "ideology of Mao Tse-tung" or, as it has even been called, "Mao Tse-tung-ism"?[27] Can Mao justifiably be credited with having developed—as these designations are so obviously intended to suggest—a new and unique strain of Marxism-Leninism?

In the light of preceding analysis of the allegedly "original" elements in Mao's thought, there appears to be slight justification for attributing to him any really significant, new contribution to the basic philosophy and theory of communism. Mao, in fact, has been much less a philosopher and theorist than a talented and resourceful political leader. While he has indeed introduced a number of innovations in the course of his career, these have been primarily innovations of method inspired and shaped by practical considerations, rather than substantive modifications of theory or principle.

[26] Sripati Chandra-sekhar, an Indian visitor to Communist China in 1959, quoted officials in Peking as boasting to him that the Chiliyin Commune, near Chengchow, was "the latest development, where we have gone one step ahead of the Soviet Union." See Chandra-sekhar's article, "Mao's War with the Chinese Family," *New York Times Magazine*, May 17, 1959, p. 73.

[27] The latter term was used in an Editors' Introductory Note prefacing an earlier collection of Mao's writings, *Mao Tse-tung Hsuan Chi*, published in Dairen in November 1947.

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One of the Chinese Communists' most cherished slogans says that "politics takes command"—and if the words "over theory" are added, it fits Mao perfectly. For, in Mao's book, theory is primarily a tool to be manipulated for the purpose of rationalizing and legitimizing a policy deemed necessary on pragmatic grounds. Thus, his pronouncements are characteristically couched in a style keyed to the reasoning of the simplest Chinese peasant in order to assure that the policy he is expounding will be immediately comprehended and obeyed without question.

Mao can, in fact, be extraordinarily nimble in his use of dialectics for political ends. In his original, unpublished speech of February 1957 on contradictions, he was reliably reported to have said that the "antagonistic" contradiction between the Chinese Communist regime and Chiang Kai-shek would automatically become "non-antagonistic" if Chiang returned Taiwan to People's China! (This was one of the passages excised from the text as finally published in June 1957.) It may be said that Mao, in manipulating theory to fit political objectives, has acted as an apt disciple of Lenin and Stalin, but it would be hard to imagine Lenin and Stalin stretching theory quite so flagrantly as Mao sometimes has. And though he now attacks Khrushchev's departures from Marxist-Leninist othodoxy, Mao must labor to conceal his own practical deviations.

In sum, if one can speak at all of "an ideology of Mao" or "Maoism," and of a distinctive "Chinese" communism, they differ from Marxism-Leninism and from Soviet communism primarily in matters of method and form, and not of essential substance. The differences are no greater than those which distinguish the African elephant from his cousin in India. Yet, the Chinese Communists must go on asserting the individuality of "Maoism" and of the Chinese brand of communism, not only because Mao's personal ambition to be recognized as the world's foremost Communist thinker is every bit as intense as Stalin's was, but also because Communist China as a nation aspires to a position of world prestige and power no less imposing than that held by the Soviet Union.

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Lessons of the Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War,
By Hugh Thomas.
Harper, New York, 1961.

The Grand Camouflage,
By Burnett Bolloten.
F. A. Praeger, New York, 1961.

Reviewed by Victor Alba

TO WRITE ABOUT the Spanish civil war is one of the most perplexing tasks imaginable. If the writer has not himself experienced what he is trying to relate as history, he runs the risk of presenting many events which seem to be without motivation because the author has not detailed the political climate explaining them. On the other hand, if he *has* lived through these events, he rarely succeeds in avoiding the pitfall of taking a partisan attitude, for the Spanish civil war, by its very nature, did not and does not permit of impartiality. Yet, the perplexity of the subject has not deterred the accumulation of an overwhelming abundance of writings about that conflict—almost invariably partisan. No other event in the period between the two world wars so profoundly affected the lives, the political views, and the ideological evolution of men of the Western world. And none other caused so much blood to flow—or, eventually, so much ink.

Viewed in this light, the book by Hugh Thomas—who was only five years old when the struggle in Spain commenced, and who had to form his opinions chiefly on the basis of documents, supplemented by conversations with surviving participants—is as surprising as it is significant. Perhaps these are the indispensable prerequisites for writing a truly objective book about the Spanish war, for Thomas has produced possibly the only one to appear thus far. Not only that, but it is a miraculously well-written and stirring book, which can both be read with emotion and consulted with confidence. And the facts of the Spanish war still need recollection, for they are full of warnings and lessons that are relevant today.

Thomas' book is divided into seven parts, the first of which is devoted to the background of the civil war. Here, two lessons emerge that might well be pertinent to certain countries at the present time. The first is that the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, which had been preceded by a long period of *pro forma* democracy devoid of any real ideological content, left the nation without political experience, which in turn permitted the rapid spread of fascism among a section of Spanish youth. The second lesson, which has even greater relevance today, derives from the manner in which an initially weak Communist party successfully gained dominance over the embattled Spanish Republican government.

WHEN THE REPUBLIC was proclaimed in 1931, the numerical strength of the Spanish Communist Party was insignificant. According to the testimony of *Pravda's* own correspondent in Spain, the party then had a mere 800 members;[1] and Walter Krivitsky, who was also there as a Soviet NKVD agent, reports that even by 1936 the membership had reached only 3,000.[2] In part, this weakness stemmed from the splintering of the party in 1928, when those leaders who refused to submit to what they termed Moscow's "ideological colonialism" broke away from the party ranks. The leaders who took command thereafter—Bullejos, Trilla, and Adame, all of whom were later expelled—reluctantly bowed to the current Moscow line and called for "all power to the soviets"—this at a time when hardly anyone in Spain even knew what a soviet was, and when there was enormous popular enthusiasm for the newborn republic.

Mr. Alba, whose articles and reviews appear frequently in this journal, has written extensively on Spanish and Latin American affairs.

[1] Cited in David T. Cattell, *Communist Policy in Spain During the Spanish Civil War,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1956, p. 34.
[2] *In Stalin's Secret Service,* Harper, New York, 1939, p. 34.

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The result was the complete isolation of the party. The Communist-led "unified" labor unions were mere skeletal organizations; Communist newspapers had a negligible circulation; and in the Cortes [parliament] the party had only one supporter, who, at that, had been elected as a Republican but subsequently became a Communist. In the elections of 1933, which the rightists won, the Communists succeeded in electing only one deputy to the Cortes. They did better in the elections of 1936, when they managed to win 13 seats (in a chamber of 452 deputies), but this was possible only because of the electoral coalitions of leftist parties that were formed under the label of the Popular Front. In Spain at least, these coalitions were not forged through the initiative of the Communists, who in 1934—when the Alianza Obrera (Workers' Alliance) was organized to combat the political advance of the Right—still refused to enter into alliance with the Socialists and Anarcho-Syndicalists. The Communist Party, in this period, was controlled by the Argentine Vittorio Codovila (known as Medina), assisted by the Bulgarian, Stepanov.

ALTHOUGH THOMAS sketches the political background, he does not, in the reviewer's opinion, adequately bring out either how weak Communist influence in Spain actually was on the eve of the civil war, or how it was possible suddenly to transform this weakness into strength once the conflict had begun. There were two main factors which enabled the Communist Party to swell its popular following and, in the end, to influence the whole of Republican policy. The first was the party's adoption of a moderate position—nationalist and against revolution—which made it a rallying point for the Spanish middle class. (The Communists never penetrated the working class and the peasantry, where the Socialists and Anarcho-Syndicalists remained the only real forces.) The second was the fact that the Republic had to turn to the Soviet Union for arms because the democratic powers refused them.

Because all this is not sufficiently explained, the reader of Thomas' book finds the Communists suddenly coming to power without his being able to understand why. And this prevents him from learning the obvious lesson of these historical events—namely, that wherever there is a Communist party, however weak it may be and however numerous its past blunders, the danger always exists that it can capitalize on the emergence of a favorable combination of circumstances to make itself an influential force in the political life of the country. What created such a propitious set of circumstances in Spain was not so much the growth of fascism, nor the revolutionary climate in the country, nor even the civil war by itself; it was rather the fear of social change which gripped the Spanish middle classes, in conjuncture with the non-intervention policy adopted by the democratic powers vis-à-vis the Spanish conflict. The Communists in Spain knew how to take full advantage of the opportunity presented by these circumstances—and their success should warn against indifference to the same possibility elsewhere today.

IT IS NECESSARY, in this connection, to call attention to an important error in Thomas' treatment. Throughout his book, he pictures the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Workers' Party for Marxist Unification) or POUM, as Trotskyite, semi-Trotskyite (p. 9), or dominated by Trotskyites who, he says, composed the "central group" of the organization (p. 71). This is inaccurate. The POUM was formed in 1935 through the fusion of two predecessor organizations—the Bloque Obrero y Campesino (Workers' and Peasants' Bloc), headed by Joaquin Maurín, which had broken away from the Third International in 1928, and which had some 3,000 active members and many sympathizers in Catalonia; and the Izquierda Comunista (Communist Left), headed by Andreu Nin, which had no more than 50 members. Although it is true that Nin served as POUM secretary-general during the war (since the actual incumbent, Maurín, was a prisoner in the Franco zone), the former Trotskyites did not exercise any decisive influence in the party leadership at either the national or the local level.

In fact, the leadership had to devote no small share of its energies to combatting the maneuvers of a small group of genuine Trotskyites—the majority of whom were French and Italian—who sought to infiltrate the POUM. Trotsky, who had from the start opposed the merger of the Izquierda Comunista and the Bloque Obrero y Campesino, continued to attack the POUM vigorously throughout the civil war, accusing it of being petty-bourgeois and diversionist. And the Trotskyites were not among the foreign left-wing parties and groups which gave the POUM international support when it became the victim of Communist persecution. (This support came from the British Independent Labour Party, the French Parti Ouvrier et Paysan (under Marceau Pivert), the German Brandlerians, and other left-wing socialist fringe groups or Communist splinter groups opposed to the Fourth International.)

Thomas' erroneous picture of the POUM is the more regrettable in view of the fact that the importance

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of the part played by this organization in the Spanish war was out of all proportion to its small numbers. Indeed, the importance of its role can justly be cited as an example of the force that can be exerted by a courageous political stand in a time of ideological confusion. The Communists—backed by the republican parties and the right-wing Socialists—maintained that the only important objective was to win the war and defend the national independence, menaced by German and Italian aid to Franco, and not to carry out a social revolution. On the contrary, the POUM, the CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo—National Confederation of Labor), and the left-wing Socialists held firm to the position that the war could not possibly be won if it were fought solely to preserve a republic that had failed not only to carry out needed reform and prevent civil war at home, but also to gain the support of the outside democratic powers. To win the war, they affirmed, it was imperative to complete the social revolution.

NOTHING WHATEVER in the political declarations and literature issued by the POUM warrants labeling it as Trotskyite, and to do so is not only to do grave injustice to the hundreds of POUM members—among them Andreu Nin—who were assassinated and posthumously vilified by the Communists, but also to obscure from sight another valuable lesson of the Spanish civil war. The Communist persecution of the POUM was launched in 1937, shortly after the Moscow purge trials started. At that time the Trotskyite label was the most damning and minatory insult that could come from the lips of Stalin's adherents. The fact that the massive Communist propaganda campaign against the POUM actually succeeded in affixing this label so firmly that even today a serious historical writer can still represent this organization as Trotskyite provides yet another demonstration of how penetrating and lastingly pernicious the Communists' propaganda can be.

In a broader historical sense, the effect of this Communist deception is to reduce the significance of the fight waged by the POUM within the Spanish Republican camp to the level of a mere political squabble. At a time when the Republic was dependent on Soviet arms and when the popular front euphoria was at its peak, to dare denounce the true character of the Moscow trials and the real motivations behind Soviet aid, as did the POUM, was an act not of fanaticism but of foresight and political courage. After 1938, when the leaders of the party were tried as traitors, even to admit membership in the POUM could cost one's life. The case made against the POUM—which Thomas explains very well—offers a good example of the technique employed in the Moscow trials, and one cannot fail to read a warning in the fact that this technique was so successful.

IN THOMAS' TREATMENT of Juan Negrín one finds yet another instance where the author, not having lived through the civil war, fails to see things in correct perspective.[3] Thomas represents Negrín as independent of the Communists. This is a mistake in judgment which could lead to serious misunderstanding of the relationships between the Communists and the other political forces contending for power in Republican Spain.

Dr. Juan Negrín, a distinguished physiologist and right-wing Socialist, was appointed Prime Minister of the Republic in 1937 after Francisco Largo Caballero (left-wing Socialist) resigned from that office rather than submit to Soviet orders. The right-wing Socialists had supported Negrín as their candidate for the premiership in the hope of using the Communists (who themselves had suggested Negrín for the post) in their fight against Largo Caballero. Eventually, this maneuver boomeranged and the right-wing Socialists were removed from power, except for those who, like Negrín, gave in to the Communists and carried out their policy. While it would be mistaken to draw a parallel between Cuba in 1959-61 and Spain in 1936-39, the case of Negrín—from the standpoint of political psychology and the techniques of exploiting political allies—may help to-

[3] Other minor errors in Thomas' book deserve to be mentioned: David Rey was not executed, but died while out "on parole" (*libertad vigilada*) after having spent many years in prison under sentence of death, which was finally commuted to life imprisonment (p. 568). Moix, although he had been an Anarcho-Syndicalist, belonged to the Catalan Communist party (called the United Socialist Party of Catalonia) during the war (p. 595). General Miaja died not in New York, but in Mexico (p. 619). The exiles who tried to smuggle arms into Spain in 1945 were not simply Spaniards who had fought with the French *maquis* but Communists who were carrying out the "National Union" plan of the Communist Party; the *maquisards* of the other Spanish organizations did not participate in this venture, which they considered suicidal and criminal (p. 620). It is a mistake to refer to the Catalan or Valencian nationalists as separatists. The separatists constituted then, as they do now, only a very small minority within the nationalist movement in Catalonia and Valencia (pp. 192 and 551). Finally, one wonders on what Thomas based his opinion that Alcalá Zamora accepted the presidency of the Republic "attracted, no doubt, by the salary and the magnificence of the position" (p. 47). The "magnificence" may have attracted him, as it would any politician, but no one has ever suggested before that Alcalá Zamora showed any special interest in the money, which he did not need since he was a comparatively wealthy man.

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ward an understanding of Castro in contemporary Cuba. Thomas' error of judgment can perhaps be explained by the fact that he frequently consulted Negrín, who throughout his years of exile in London always denied that he had played the Communist game.

The great lesson taught by these aspects of the Spanish war is that Communist infiltration fails whenever it is attempted against an organization forged in a common struggle and equipped with political experience and a solid doctrinal base. In Spain the Communists could not muzzle the Anarcho-Syndicalist CNT, the Socialist left-wing, and the POUM, but they succeeded in causing confusion and hesitation in the republican parties, in dominating (with the help of the police) the unions of the Socialist UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) and in utilizing the right-wing Socialists. Spain is but one of the many instances showing that the Communists can take over with ease a large organization that lacks a firm ideology, but cannot suborn a small group devoted to a well-developed doctrine.

BOLLOTEN'S BOOK is a political history of the Republic during the first year of the Spanish war. It is almost entirely devoted to an exposition of the struggle waged by the Communist Party against the Anarcho-Syndicalist CNT and the Socialist left wing headed by Largo Caballero. The most interesting part of the work is the account of how the Communists, in their fight against Largo Caballero, made effective use of the young Socialists, who had once been his principal supporters. This they were able to do thanks to the merger consummated shortly before the outbreak of the war between the young Socialists and the much smaller Communist youth organization. The result was that the latter, with the help of some of the young Socialist leaders, came to dominate the new Socialist-Communist Youth. Santiago Carillo, a Socialist who became one of its most important leaders, is today Secretary-General of the Spanish Communist Party.

Soviet aid began reaching Spain in October 1936 (p. 99), and it was then that the Communists launched their offensive within the political parties and labor unions. Their efforts soon proved successful among the moderate socialist and republican groups, where they found allies and tools. Today a large part of the Spanish Communist Party in exile is composed of these former collaborators, while a majority of the old prewar Communists who were not expelled or did not abandon the party are now back in Spain working underground to organize Communist cadres for the future.

It has been said that the Germans, Italians and Russians used the Spanish war to test their weapons, airplanes and military tactics. It should be added that the Communists also used it to test propaganda methods on a worldwide scale, as well as to perfect the techniques of political infiltration and mass control which they later employed most successfully in the World War II resistance movements, in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, and in the cold war generally. These methods have also been put into practice more recently in Castro's Cuba. The Cuban Communists, with the help of Russians, Chinese, Czechs and, above all, exiled Spanish Communists, have made full use of them in conducting fanatical propaganda campaigns, organizing the Cuban masses, and winning control of the trade unions and other nationwide organizations.

Bolloten vividly shows—and this is his greatest contribution—that there were in Spain during the civil war individuals as well as groups who already at that early date understood the real nature and significance of Communist policies, who exposed them without fear and never let themselves be dominated. The political lessons of the conflict in Spain have not been exhausted, and therein lies the probable explanation why so many books on that tragic war continue to be written and read.[4]

[4] In addition to the two books reviewed here, there also appeared this year an excellent book by Arthur P. Whitaker, *Spain and the Defense of the West* (Harper, New York), as well as Stanley G. Payne's *Falange, A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford University Press), a first-rate study of an often forgotten aspect of the Spanish war. At least two more books on that war are in preparation in the United States.

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Aid, Trade, and Coexistence

Coexistence: Economic Challenge and Response,
by Henry C. Aubrey.
National Planning Association,
Washington, D. C., 1961.

Reviewed by Leon M. Herman

THE INCREASED FLEXIBILITY that has marked the world policy of the Soviet leadership since Stalin's death is due, above everything else, to the addition of certain new weapons to the arsenal of the Communist high command. Among these weapons, Soviet economic aid to foreign countries has been of paramount importance. The objectives of the Soviet foreign aid program are quite clear. It is designed, for the short run, to promote Soviet influence on the economic and political institutions of the recipient non-Communist countries, and ultimately to upset the world balance of power by gaining control of these countries from within through economic blandishments, rather than from without by the use of force.

True, the Soviet leaders were not the inventors of this particular instrumentality in international relations. On the contrary, it was the West which first began to employ economic aid in the late 1940's—with the adoption of the Marshall Plan and the "Point 4" program—and Soviet spokesmen reacted then with a flood of harsh words about these new forms of "economic and political enslavement," this "arrogant infringement of the rights of sovereignty of independent nations." All of which did not prevent the USSR, ten years later, from adopting this instrumentality itself—not to mention sanctifying it with all sorts of high-sounding ideological justifications. Unlike Stalin, who conceived of Soviet economic aid only within the framework of the Communist bloc, the new leadership realized that aid could be employed as a policy lever throughout the entire international arena. Accordingly, with the blessing of Lenin's resurrected formula about "an alliance between the revolutionary proletariat of Europe and the anti-imperialist forces of the colonial peoples," the Soviet economic offensive was put into high gear.

The Soviet foreign aid program, conceived as an instrument for forging this "alliance for revolution," has now been at work about eight years, and has become, by any criterion, a large and commanding phenomenon in the international affairs of our times. Some twenty nations that have won independence from colonial rule are at present receiving economic aid from the USSR and its allies; a half dozen of them have been receiving it over a period of several years. A number of conspicuous industrial plants and other installations have been erected in various underdeveloped countries with the aid of credits, capital equipment, and technical personnel furnished by the Soviet Union and other members of the Communist bloc. The aggregate financial commitment of the Communist countries in this enterprise now amounts to some five billion dollars.

INEVITABLY, the emergence of the Soviet Union, with its allies, as a supplier of industrial development capital—a role in which the West long enjoyed a monopoly—has visibly altered the world economic landscape and, above all, has dramatized the need for a more effective response on the part of the West to the problems of economic development around the globe. In the light of this challenge to Western statesmanship, it is fortunate that Henry C. Aubrey, a noted scholar in the field of international economic relations, has been engaged in studying the Soviet foreign aid venture almost from its inception. The volume under review represents the fruit of his efforts and offers the serious lay reader an illuminating survey of the whole panorama of facts and ideas bearing on the Soviet entry into worldwide economic competition with the West.

Mr. Aubrey's study rests on very broad foundations of scholarship, for it draws not only on the author's own research but also on several monographs written by competent scholars and dealing with various individual

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aspects of the problem. Both these preliminary studies and the present over-all survey were prepared as part of a research project sponsored by the National Planning Association. Because it is a distillation of the best information and analysis that have come out on the subject of East-West economic competition, Mr. Aubrey's study promises to serve as a prime source of facts and ideas in this field for some time to come.

The volume contains, first of all, a careful and detailed description of the flow of credits, capital equipment, and technical personnel from the Soviet bloc to the various underdeveloped countries. Wherever possible, the economic contribution from the Communist side is presented in comparison with the amounts and terms of aid furnished by the United States and other Western nations. In the process of sifting out the hard facts, Mr. Aubrey clears the air of a number of tiresome but persistent illusions. For example, while his research fully confirms that Soviet technicians sent out on foreign aid projects are thoroughly competent in their specialties, he finds no evidence to support the widely held notion that they go abroad already equipped with fluency in the native language and trained in the niceties of international diplomacy. By the same token, his analytical searchlight fails to reveal any substance in the popular fiction of the "ugly American" as a significant phenomenon in the United States program of economic aid.

IT IS IN THE REALM of ideas even more than of facts, however, that Mr. Aubrey makes his most valuable contribution to an understanding of both the current problems and long-term implications of competitive coexistence. He emphasises, in a number of telling ways, that the key factor in the foreign aid equation is the impact on the recipient nation. This impact is twofold: the direct economic effect and the indirect "political impact." Of the two, the author considers the latter by far the more important. For he points out that while the leaders of the new nations desperately need and want all the assistance they can get, they are at the same time painfully sensitive to any self-serving political motives that may underlie the donor nation's offer to support their economic development.

In this respect, Mr. Aubrey notes, the Communist governments enjoy a notable advantage. Their controlled press and disciplined spokesmen, both at home and abroad, are able to present and maintain a consistent image of Soviet aid, studiously blended to please the leadership of the recipient nation. Their own motives and intentions, of course, are always pictured as the very best; they are proffering assistance solely out of a humanitarian desire to help the newly independent nations speed up their economic development and raise their living standards. By contrast, Mr. Aubrey points out that in the West economic aid is all too often justified primarily on negative and selfish grounds, that is, as a means of deterring the spread of communism and thus bolstering Western defenses. Such justifications, he says, must strike the peoples of the developing nations, at best, as harshly selfish, and at worst, as an unwarranted intrusion in their domestic political affairs.

Nor, cautions Mr. Aubrey, should the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in this "battle of images" be underestimated. Viewed in the Western frame of reference, the Communists' many slogans and professions of disinterested humanitarianism may indeed appear transparently false and in open contradiction to reality. But in the less developed countries around the globe the frame of reference is quite different. Especially among the articulate elements of these societies, there is a lingering suspicion of some basic Western standards and institutions. Such experience as they have had with private enterprise in their own countries has left them suspicious, for example, of the profit motive as a dependable force on which to rely for the long-range development of their national economies. It should be remembered that one thing the people of these countries share with the Russians is the consciousness of a poor performance record by the only system of competitive private enterprise they ever knew at first hand. It is understandable, therefore, that the intellectuals in the underdeveloped countries should often tend to see in strong governmental direction of the economy the only hope of building large-scale industry and raising living standards in a hurry, and that the Western formula of reliance on the energy and resourcefulness of private enterprise should strike many of the new national leaders as unsatisfactory and unconvincing.

EVEN AGAINST this somber background, however, Mr. Aubrey does not surrender to pessimism. As he sees it, the decisive factor in the long-term competition between the West and the Communist world will be the comparative efficiency of the respective social systems, and it is his considered judgment that in the struggle time is working on the side of the democracies. If the competition up till now has tended to favor the Soviet camp, he contends, it is only because the West has been slow to recognize how much is at stake and has not effectively exploited its own assets and advantages. For the West, Mr. Aubrey reminds us, has at its dis-

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posal vastly superior resources that can be drawn upon to help the emergent countries attain their central goal, which is to achieve economic betterment, preferably without being drawn into coercive forms of economic organization and totalitarian methods of social management. Among the chief Western assets underlined by the author are the capacity to support a large and stable trade, which is especially vital to most developing countries, and the availability of abundant supplies of development capital from a variety of sources, whether for building a heavy industrial base or for meeting current consumption needs. He also points to a similarity of Western welfare aims with those of the new nations, and to the West's long experience with intermediate institutions for organizing economic activity.

Nor is the affinity of ideas and aspirations between the West and the newly emergent countries limited to the economic sphere. As Mr. Aubrey points out, there is also a kinship of views regarding the worth of the individual and a common respect for religious and ethical values, both of which might serve as strong mutual links "if only the West, and the United States in particular, would be less intent on flaunting its material rather than its spiritual achievements." By contrast, the gap between the peoples of the new nations and the protagonists of communism in the realm of spiritual and cultural values is so wide as to be well-nigh unbridgeable.

As an economist, however, Mr. Aubrey confines his specific recommendations to the area of practical economic policy. His own wide international experience as a consultant on economic development makes him thoroughly aware of the broad scope of governmental activity in the economic life of most modern nations, and his proposals are not inhibited by any doctrinaire preconceptions or illusions on that score. Though for the most part rather too technical to be discussed here, these proposals are uniformly practicable and to the point, and they will no doubt receive the careful attention they deserve from those charged with shaping Western economic aid policies.

In general, the author urges the necessity of more positive Western action to support the economic development of the struggling new nations on the ground that "inactivity is no longer feasible." He does not believe, however, that any crash program is called for; rather, what is needed most is greater consistency and a more convincing display of genuine altruism. It is noteworthy that at least two of Mr. Aubrey's recommendations—cited by him as among the most urgent—already have found their way into the new foreign aid policies proposed by the United States administration and sanctioned by the Congress. These are (1) the principle of entering into long-term commitments for economic aid, and (2) multilateral action to stabilize prices of key primary commodities exported by the less developed nations.

MR. AUBREY's deliberate emphasis on the shortcomings to date of the Western response to the worldwide challenge of economic development is quite clearly intended to drive home the necessity of correcting these deficiencies in the era of competitive coexistence. But while he performs this task admirably and with abundant documentation, one might have wished his study also had shed more light than it does on some aspects of Soviet foreign aid policy, in particular the ideas inspiring the Soviet leaders' willingness to divert some of their scarcest resources to the economic development of non-Communist countries.

Admittedly this is an elusive subject, but it is nevertheless possible to ferret out these ideas from the murky verbiage of benevolence in which they are habitually camouflaged in Soviet writings on foreign aid. Some scholars who have examined this literature in depth, among them Professor Robert C. Tucker of the University of Indiana, have come up with one very significant hypothesis: namely, that the Soviet leaders are basing their foreign aid activity on the assumption that the underdeveloped countries will ultimately prove incapable of evolving the viable "mixed" economy toward which their present efforts seem to be directed. Should this assumption prove wrong, as it well may, Soviet policy on economic aid could again be reversed in the opposite direction.

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Notes and Views

The "People's Friendship University"

HOUSED IN A BUILDING that formerly belonged to a Soviet military academy in Moscow, the People's Friendship University (recently renamed the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University) is now in its second academic year. Five hundred and forty-two foreign students, who devoted the past academic year mainly to learning the Russian language at a preparatory school, have now started a four-year course of study including physics and mathematics, natural sciences, engineering, agriculture, medicine, history, philology, economics and law.[1] Along with these foreign students, the University admitted sixty Soviet students who last year studied at the preparatory school. (Articles in the Soviet press do not indicate what they studied while the foreign students were mastering Russian.) This October 700 students enrolled in the preparatory school. Of these, 520 came from fifty countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The rest were either Soviet students or foreign students transferred from other Soviet institutions of higher education. By 1965 the number of students at the Friendship University is expected to reach three or four thousand.

An international institution for general higher education is a new venture not only in the USSR but also in the history of education in general. It is true that in the 1920's in Moscow there was in operation the University of the Toilers of the East. But that was an undisguised school for political activists. The Vatican has higher educational institutions with an international body of students, and in Bruges the "Collège d'Europe" has been operating for some years, but in contrast to the Lumumba University these institutions are concerned with rather specialized types of training. In addition, the Vatican has announced that it plans to found a similar institution of higher education for Africans. But the project has not gone beyond the planning stage. The Africans themselves, moreover, have not registered any enthusiasm for it. For some years now the question of founding a general European university in Florence has been kept on the agenda of the European Assembly in Strasbourg. But despite the formulation of detailed plans, this university has not yet been opened since there are serious disagreements among member nations about its tasks and functions. The Moscow Friendship University is thus the only undertaking of its kind.

A VENTURE so novel inevitably ran into difficulties of a purely technical nature. In an article written after the completion of the first academic year at the University, its rector, S. V. Rumyantsev, enumerates them frankly. The first of these is the language barrier which foreign students must expend enormous effort to surmount. Secondly, the varied character of the secondary education completed by students who come from different countries makes it almost impossible to combine large groups under a single curriculum. Thirdly, there exist few textbooks or other aids for foreign students, especially those who do not have full mastery of the Russian language. In addition to these difficulties enumerated by Rumyantsev, the Soviet Union does not have the personnel to teach adequately all of the subjects listed in the Friendship University's curriculum. What, for example, will students from countries with a tropical climate study at the school of agriculture, when the USSR has no specialists in tropical agronomy? And what future awaits a young man from Ghana who has finished a law school in Moscow, when among Soviet jurists there are not only no experts on Ghanaian laws, but few teachers (if any) who have a detailed knowledge of Anglo-Saxon law, which has been adopted in Ghana, or with French law which is common to many countries which have recently obtained their independence?

But one must not exaggerate the importance of these difficulties, serious though they may be. The main professional focus of Friendship University is on technology and the natural sciences, and in these fields Soviet education is strong. It is not by chance that an engineer was appointed as its rector. "In opening the Friendship University we desire only one thing and that is to help other countries in

[1] The figures and descriptive data are taken mainly from the article by S. V. Rumyantsev, Rector of the People's Friendship University, entitled "The People's Friendship University's First Academic Year," *Vestnik vyshshei shkoly,* No. 5, 1961, pp. 108-110.

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training highly qualified specialists," stated Khrushchev,[2] whose personal initiative was instrumental in founding this institution.[3]

IF THE GOAL of the Soviet Government were really limited *solely* to training engineers and scientists, then Lumumba University might well be called "Khrushchev's folly." For such a conventional goal there would be little reason to undertake a risky experiment in the field of education, accompanied by endless difficulties and enormous expense.[4] It would be simpler, cheaper, and more effective to enroll foreign students in already existing Soviet higher educational institutions. The difficulties cited by Rumyantsev are more easily overcome by the foreign student in such ordinary schools than in a special institution. Clearly, the foreigner who lives, works, and associates with Russians will master the language more quickly than one who associates mainly with his fellow countrymen or other foreigners who speak little Russian. Even the backward student with poor knowledge will, in a homogeneous and comparatively strong group, rise to the general level faster than if he is thrown together with equally backward students.

Moreover, if the basic aim of the Soviet leaders was to assist in training technical cadres, the most rational decision would hardly be to spend tens of millions of rubles in founding one more higher educational institution in Moscow or even in transporting students there from so far away. The dominant view in academic circles of economically backward countries holds that such large sums are most wisely spent on national universities and technical schools where specialists can be trained to meet the conditions of the given country. One of the main Soviet arguments in favor of the Friendship University is that it "permits training with a view to the needs of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." However, such an enumeration of continents is pure abstraction. In reality the mining of tin in Malaya and Bolivia, for example, is not at all the same and requires different kinds of specialized training which can hardly be obtained in Moscow. To sum up, from a purely technical standpoint the establishment of Friendship University is one of the worst methods of using those great material resources and skilled personnel which the Soviet Government has decided to assign to this project.

What, then, induced Khrushchev to found the People's Friendship University? The explanation offered most frequently is that he was motivated mainly by propaganda considerations. And in fact the gesture was grandiose and the propaganda noise was loud. But Khrushchev could not fail to realize that the propaganda effect was a transient gain, not worth tens of millions. The declining impact of the University is indicated by a comparison of two figures. Last year 43,531 applications were submitted from abroad.[5] This year there were only about 6,000, one-seventh as many.[6] In the second place, the propaganda hubbub inevitably led to intensified Western efforts in this field, which from the Communist standpoint was not at all desirable.

A CLUE TO the real reasons for creating a special university may be found in the earlier Soviet experience with students from economically backward countries. In the academic year 1959-60, before Friendship University was set up, there were 930 such students in the USSR.[7] A considerable number of them came to the Soviet Union with pro-Communist leanings, intense but rather confused, since they stemmed more from a reaction against Western colonialism and racial discrimination than from a real commitment to communism. The students envisioned the Soviet Union as a utopia, devoid of the social and racial inequalities of the non-Communist world. They expected a great deal from the USSR, "not only education but also the truth of life," in the words of one Nigerian. Such exaggerated expectations recur in the articles and documents written by former foreign students whose experience in Moscow disenchanted them with communism.[8]

Utopias generally stand up poorly in the light of reality. This is especially the case when one compares Soviet actuality with the myths of Soviet propaganda. Theophilus Okonkwo, a Nigerian student who lived in Moscow for two years and seven months and who openly admitted that he went there as a pro-Communist, said in an interview with the author of this article: "I realized that not everything was as I had imagined when Russian students began to ask me questions which showed their distorted conception of the outside world and their aspiration to find out facts which had clearly been inaccessible to them." The utopia was thus dispelled and replaced by a feeling of acute and bitter disappointment such as could never have been experienced by any who had come to Moscow either neutral or unfriendly towards communism. Talking with the

[2] *Pravda,* November 18, 1960.

[3] Rumyantsev, *loc. cit.*

[4] "They handed us a blank check. They gave us tens of millions of rubles and said 'spend them.' When we run out, they'll give us more," said Rumyantsev in an interview with Priscilla Johnson, an American journalist. (*Harper's Magazine,* December 1960, p. 91).

[5] Rumyantsev, *loc. cit.*

[6] *Komsomolskaia pravda,* May 23, 1961.

[7] Seymour M. Rosen, *The Preparation and Education of Foreign Students in the USSR,* US Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, Information on Education Around the World, No. 44, July 1960.

[8] See, for example, "An Open Letter to All African Governments," *Youth and Freedom,* Vol. 3, Nos. 5-6. Also, Everest Mulekezi, "I Was a Student at 'Moscow State,'" *Reader's Digest,* July 1961; interview with four Brazilian students, *Le Figaro* (Paris), January 31, 1961; and, Michel Ayih, "We Cannot Accept Force, Deceit, Subversion, or Terrorism," *The Student* (Leiden), Vol. 4, No. 11, December 1960.

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American journalist, Priscilla Johnson, Everest Mulekezi, a student from Uganda, said: "We have become so bitter, so prepossessed with our own situation, that we cannot study or talk about anything else."

JUDGING FROM THE materials available in the West, the reasons for this disappointment may be summarized as follows: forcible isolation of foreign students —an isolation which in certain cases was taken (though not necessarily correctly) as racial segregation; the absence of freedom of thought and speech, a fact which was noticed first of all in teaching, especially in classes on Marxism and Leninism, which were voluntarily attended by pro-Communists although they are optional for foreign students; lack of political freedom; the impossibility of organizing independent student unions even for students who are foreigners; the impossibility of expressing one's feelings even when they generally coincide with the Soviet policy but disagree in details, as happened, for instance, when the Soviet authorities forbade a demonstration by the Africans against the French atomic experiments in the Sahara solely because Khrushchev was about to go to Paris at that time; bureaucracy (the endless passes, certificates, and permits); the constant pressure on non-Communists which is exerted not so much for the purpose of converting them to the true faith as for the purpose of forcing them to behave *as though* they were converted; hypocrisy and falsehood; and, finally, the stupidity of some Soviet officials who declared, for instance, to the African students that they were imperialists because they speak imperialistic languages, English and French. All this led to an open conflict with the Soviet authorities, to the formation of an underground "Union of African Students in Moscow," and to the flight and dismissal of dozens of students. The deported organizers of the "Union of African Students in Moscow" sent a sharp anti-Communist "open letter" to the heads of the African governments which made a strong impression on university students in the African countries. (The almost open political conflict in the University of Moscow had a demoralizing influence on the Soviet students as well.)

The disappointed pro-Communists proved to be the most vociferous protestants. This does not mean, however, that the genuinely neutral students were left unaffected. Communist intolerance of ideological neutrality dismayed many of them. A student who returned from Moscow writes: "If they find that the student is really neutral, that he is unwilling to commit himself (politically), then he is regarded as a dangerous man and politically undesirable." [9] The specific reasons for the dissatisfaction of the neutrals were summarized in a letter addressed by seven students from Somalia to the Prime Minister of their country.[10] They complained of the bad living conditions, of racial discrimination (which they sometimes confused with the ordinary segregation of foreigners in Soviet society), of the disrespect for their religious ceremonies and customs, of the threats that followed any expression of dissatisfaction, of the censorship of correspondence, of political pressure, and of the suppression by Soviet authorities of the slightest indications of "political deviation." Thus, a paradoxical situation has been created among the foreign students from non-Communist countries in Moscow. The only ones who do not express open dissatisfaction are generally either Western and pro-Western students (such as the Indians) who from the start had a more or less clear picture of what was in store for them, or young Communists from such countries as Syria and Iraq who have tied themselves so closely to the party that to return home would mean their arrest. On the other hand, the neutrals and pro-Communists from Western countries are in most cases openly critical.

The Friendship University was intended at least in part to straighten out this situation which is fraught with international and internal complications. In a separate university the neutrals may be given more freedom to remain neutrals. In such a university much more freedom may be granted in discussions, without the fear that this will have an undesirable influence on the Soviet students. The contradiction between reality and propaganda will probably not be so evident to foreigners in the artificial atmosphere of this university, and carefully selected Soviet "students" will be able to maintain the proper optimistic tone which could by no means be created in an ordinary school of higher education with its oppositionists, philosophizing cynics, and wildly pro-Western *stiliagi.*

However, such a basic problem as isolation from normal life, of which foreigners complain, can only be aggravated in Friendship University. Not without reason has it been nicknamed "Apartheid U." [11] Nor does Friendship University solve the fundamental problem of teaching the humanities to students from the outside world in a Communist country.

If these subjects are to be taught with a Marxist interpretation but with free access to world literature and with an objective presentation of all pertinent facts and theories, then a considerable part of the Soviet orthodoxy loses its persuasiveness. How, for instance, is it possible to talk blithely about "unavoidable acute crises of capitalism" if one is simultaneously free to study Keynes' theories? Or how can one discuss the civil war in Russia without mentioning the actual part played by Trotsky? If one confines oneself to the official Soviet materials, then the inevitable taboos provoke dissatisfaction among the students. And even if a student should accept Soviet orthodoxy during his study in Moscow, he is sure to discover upon returning home that the restricted knowledge

[9] *US News and World Report,* Washington, D.C., August 1, 1960.

[10] *Youth and Freedom,* Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 15-16.

[11] *Harper's Magazine, loc. cit.*

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made available to him in the USSR does not equip him for work as, for example, a jurist or historian even in the most backward non-Communist country. As a result, the Soviet Union is likely to acquire enemies instead of friends.

OBVIOUSLY A NEW APPROACH was required if Friendship University was to serve successfully its basic purpose of training pro-Soviet technicians for the emerging states of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The direction of this new approach was frankly revealed by Rumyantsev in his previously-quoted article. "The new University," he wrote, "is intended in the main for those persons who, while having good abilities, nevertheless *cannot get education either in their own native land or in Western countries*" (italics added). What does this mean in practice?

At present foreign students wishing to go to a Soviet university are selected by academic organizations of their countries, by their governments, and by UNESCO. For Friendship University, however, the candidates will in the future be selected, according to Rumyantsev, "by social organizations and by public figures," which means by the local Communist parties under supervision of the Soviet embassies. Persons selected will be those who desire to go to university but "cannot do so" elsewhere. Rumyantsev is careful to say "cannot" rather than "have no opportunity," suggesting that he has in mind mainly persons from the indigent classes who, though intelligent, have not had sufficient academic preparation to qualify for higher education in the usual way. The USSR had experience with training personnel from youth of this type in the 1920's and 1930's. And it was clearly shown that, when unexpectedly presented with the opportunity of receiving higher education, such young people are usually too much absorbed by the process of acquiring knowledge—any kind of knowledge—to regard this knowledge critically.

It should be emphasized that this does not pertain to those young people (of whatever social class) who graduated from high school and went on to a university, but to the insufficiently trained youth from the most indigent classes who suddenly find themselves confronted with

Soviet Falsification—

A CASE HISTORY

In the summer of 1960 most of the African students at Moscow University joined in organizing an African Students' Union. The organization—like its predecessor, the Black African Students' Union—was refused recognition by the Soviet authorities. Two members of its Executive Committee who left the USSR in the autumn of 1960, along with another Negro student from former French Togoland who left Moscow about the same time, published an "Open Letter to African Governments" in various European newspapers and magazines (including *The Guardian,* Manchester; *Le Monde,* Paris; *Die Weltwoche,* Zürich). In it they set forth the story of the mistreatment of African students by the Soviet authorities.

The forged photograph (right), which had appeared in the Soviet weekly *New Times* (No. 33, August 12, 1960), is described in a portion of the "Open Letter" as follows:

"There are many cases we could cite of Communist deceitful exploitation of African students without their knowledge or consent. In early July [1960], Mr. Theophilus Okonkwo was exercising in the Moscow University gym, and a Russian student took a picture of him in a boxing pose. Perfectly innocent so far. But then, a few weeks later, a friend put the August 12 issue of *The New Times* in front of him and said: 'Look what they have done to you.' There, in a full-page picture, was Mr. Okonkwo in the boxing pose. But now, the Soviet propagandists had blatantly dubbed in broken chains on his wrists and a white man with a whip falling back in terror. Without Mr. Okonkwo's knowledge or consent, the Communists had spread this propaganda construction in a number of Communist magazines through the world. Mr. Okonkwo's protests to the Soviet authorities were, of course, to no avail."

The Soviets obviously could not deny the truthfulness of this incident. Instead, they published a smear attack on Mr. Okonkwo in *Trud* (Moscow, October 29, 1960), accusing him of being a spy and a drunkard—a standard Soviet technique, as standard as forged photographs.

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unexpected perspectives of social advancement. Such students are capable of being trained as technicians and scientists, while at the same time they are indoctrinated with the appropriate ideology. Few young people from such social surroundings have acquired the broader intellectual outlook possessed by those who have had more systematic schooling. The rest sense their inferiority and for that very reason cling tenaciously to one another and to their educators for support. Their uncritical acceptance of dogmas taught at school as the truth does not mean that they are incapable of playing the part of a "technical intelligentsia." The experience of the Soviet Union in its early years proves the contrary.

But the same experience has shown that youth of university age who have had only between four and seven years of schooling profit little from study in the usual higher educational institutions. They need a special system of training. In the first two decades of the Soviet state such a system was found in the "Rabfaks"—workers'-peasants' schools. The People's Friendship University is Khrushchev's "rabfak" for students from underdeveloped areas. Since Soviet higher educational institutions today follow standard curricula, they are not suitable for the education of youth "who cannot get education either in their own native land or in Western countries." The Soviet leaders do not intend to compete with the West in training African or Asian students to be intelligentsia of the traditional kind. The Communist leadership has decided to repeat on an international scale the experiment of educating an "intelligentsia of a new type" which for one generation at least may remain faithful to Soviet doctrine. Through this means it hopes to exert considerable influence on the life of countries which have recently become independent. The success of this experiment, however, is hardly guaranteed.

David Burg

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Recent Trends in Soviet Farm Incomes

WHILE THE PLANNED public sector of the Soviet economy has been diligently studied by students of Soviet affairs, the private sector has remained relatively neglected. The scarcity of relevant data and the decline of the private economy's share in total Soviet output of goods and services have probably been the factors most responsible for this lack of interest.

The most striking feature of the private economic sector in the Soviet Union is its vitality. In spite of decades of deprecation by Communist ideologists, private economic activity in the USSR still survives and affects the daily life of Soviet citizens much more than production figures might indicate. Its scope encompasses a broad variety of consumer goods and services which are, as a rule, low on the scale of priorities of the Soviet planners. In other words, private economic activity is strongest where the government monopoly is weakest, and it tends to adjust to the supply-demand conditions in that sector of the market over which the consumer has some degree of influence.

In this note we shall focus our attention on recent income trends in the most numerous social group permanently engaged in private economic activity—the collective farmers—leaving aside the various urban groups similarly active in fields such as housing, handicraft, repair and domestic service. The resulting conclusions should shed new light on the popular assumption that a policy of arresting or reducing peasant incomes is politically unfeasible in the Soviet Union.

FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS Soviet peasants have divided their time and effort between the socialized sector of the collective farms and their own household garden plots and livestock holdings. In order to gain some insight into the size and labor requirements of the private sector of Soviet agriculture, it is necessary to compare the labor input and total output data for the two sectors (socialized [1] and private) of the collective farmers' economy.

Soviet authorities estimate that in 1958 able-bodied members of collective farms [2] devoted between 28.5 and

[1] As used in this article, the term "socialized sector" refers to the collective farms (*kolkozy*), not to the state-operated farms (*sovkhozy*).

[2] The category of "able-bodied" collective farm members embraces males 16-59 years of age and females 16-54 years of age.

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32.9 percent of their total work time to their private plots.[3] Thus, roughly one-third of the collective farmers' labor goes into their private economy. What are the results of this labor compared to the production resulting from labor in the socialized sector?

In 1957 (a year for which detailed official information is available), the private sector's share in the collective farmers' total gross output of eleven major commodities was about 34.9 percent; [4] in livestock production the share of the private sector was 54.4 percent. The inclusion of other products would probably lower the contribution of the private plots to about 28-30 percent of the total gross output. In net output figures, however, the share of the private sector would be necessarily higher (since feed and seed, which are produced mainly in the socialized sector, are excluded from net output).

The above figures indicate that the productivity of labor (measured in terms of output per unit of labor input) in the collective and private sectors is about the same. It is evident that in spite of the substantial capital investments in the collectivized sector, labor productivity in that sector remains low. Soviet economists explain this by pointing out that while labor productivity has risen substantially in the production of grains, it is still very low in the production of other crops and livestock. Official data also indicate that, compared to the pre-1913 period, labor input in 1956 (on the collective farms) was lower by only 20 percent per hectare for sugar-beets and potatoes, by 22 percent for flax, and by 27 percent per cow.[5]

What were the returns for the labor inputs of the peasants in the private and socialized sectors, as reflected in the income of the peasants? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to compute the value of the gross output of the collective farmers' private plots and compare it with the income they derived from the collective farms as payment for their labor performed in the socialized sector.[6]

In 1957 the income of collective farmers from the socialized sector, which took two-thirds of their total labor input, amounted to about 37 percent of their total agricultural income, while the private economy, which absorbed only one-third of their total labor input, generated an income 1.7 times larger than the earnings they derived from the socialized sector. It is safe to assume that the farmers' attitude to the two institutions (collective farms and private plots) is shaped by the difference in these income-labor ratios.

LET US NOW TURN our attention to recent changes in the income of collective farmers. The best way to measure these trends is to consider the changes in the chief income-generating assets in the farmers' private economy, namely, land and livestock. Some bench-mark years have been chosen and the assets per household and per capita calculated from official Soviet data.

The average private landholding (sown area per capita) has decreased between 1953 and 1960 by 4.2 percent.[7] By 1961, however, it has most probably declined further as a result of the official drive in various parts of the country to reduce the size of private plots. As for crop distribution on the private plots, there was (between 1953 and 1956) a marked decline (by about one-fourth) in the area sown to grain and an increase in land sown to potatoes and feed crops. This change was induced in part by increased distributions of grain to the collective farmers in some years of the period, by the conversion of collective farms into state farms, and by a higher demand for feed. In any case, the increase in the privately-tilled potato area indicates a rise in labor intensity on the private plots since 1953.

The private livestock holdings of the collective farmers have undergone an interesting evolution during the last eight years.[8] In 1953, Soviet collective farmers owned

[3] *Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly, Ekonomicheskie nauki,* No. 1, 1961, pp. 45-47.

[4] Hay and silage, hemp, tobacco, tea, fruits and berries and other minor products are not included in the output calculation. The exclusion of hay and silage particularly tends to raise the output share of the private sector.

[5] *Sotsialisticheskii trud,* No. 1, 1961, p. 25. The experience of Soviet collective farms with mechanization of agriculture indicates that the economic advantage of mechanization in the Soviet case cannot be measured in terms of agricultural output, but rather in terms of substitution for and transfer of labor from agriculture to other branches of the economy.

[6] The computed *net* output of the households would be conceptually a more correct magnitude to compare with the income derived from the farms. Since such data are not available, it is assumed that by omitting the output of grain, fruit, berries and other crops from the calculation of the collective farmers' private production, one comes close to the magnitude of the households' net output. Retail prices of 1958 were used in the calculation of the household income, and the lowest prices for meat were assumed. In general, the method of computation used tends to undervalue rather than overstate the private output of the collective farmers.

[7] On a per household basis the private land holdings were 0.276 hectares in 1953, 0.292 hectares in 1958, and 0.287 hectares in 1959. *Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR,* Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR, Moscow, 1961, pp. 128-29.

[8] Private livestock holdings of collective farmers for selected years were as follows (head of livestock per collective farm household):

	1940	1953	1956	1958	1959/60
Cows	.693	.555	.610	.675	.562
Cattle	.440	.334	.480	.401	.249
Pigs	.504	.565	.644	.588	.556
Sheep	.848	.630	.987	1.172	1.053
Goats	.318	.386	.325	.235	.174

Source: *Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR,* TsSU SSSR, Moscow, 1960, pp. 56, 57, 266, 267. *Vestnik statistiki,* No. 5, 1961, pp. 92, 93. The data for livestock holdings of collective farmers given farther on in the text are also based upon the above-cited sources.

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about 15 percent less private livestock (per household) than in 1940. Prompted by Khrushchev's warnings about stagnation in Soviet agriculture, the government decided after Stalin's death to promote the expansion of both the socialized and the private livestock herds, and in consequence the private holdings increased by about 20 percent between 1953 and 1958. During this period, private livestock holdings were also the main source of the additions to the socialized herd, which swelled in size largely as a result of massive purchases of private livestock by the collective (and state) farms.

In 1958 government policy changed again, and a sharp distinction has been made since then between the socialized sector, where the herds are to continue growing, and the private sector, where livestock holdings are being curtailed. As a result, the private livestock holdings of collective farmers have fallen back (on a per household basis) to the 1953 level. On a per capita basis, they owned about 10 percent less livestock in 1960 than in 1953. Between 1958 and 1960, the decrease amounted to over 20 percent.

Thus, the period 1958-1960 witnessed a reduction both in the sown area and in the livestock herd held by collective farmers in the private sector. The resultant loss of income over the two years can be estimated at between 10 to 15 percent.[9] Because a ceiling on incomes received from the collective farms was established in 1958, the decrease in farmers' earnings from their private plots was not compensated by an income rise from the socialized sector. The correctness of this conclusion—at any rate for the year 1958—is supported by a study of a sample of collective farm households undertaken by the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics. Reporting on the study recently in *Voprosy ekonomiki*,[10] the Soviet agricultural economist A. Kraeva indicates that, in comparison with 1957, the total 1958 income of able-bodied collective farmers decreased by over 9 percent. The same figure may be applied to the decline in income per capita, since over the year the number of able-bodied farmers increased by no more than 2-3 percent, if at all. Interestingly enough, these estimates differ radically from the previously announced official figures, which claimed a 7 percent *increase* in farmers' incomes for the same period.[11]

THE EXPERIENCE of the last two years points to the ability of the Soviet authorities to reverse a rising trend in income without causing internal revolts or upheavals. A downward inflexibility of wages or incomes, at least with regard to collective farmers, does not appear to be a consideration which influences the policies of Soviet planners.

It seems further that the maintenance of an income differential between urban and rural labor is still a necessary requirement of Soviet economic policy (in spite of the declared intention to equalize the living standards of town and country). The planners evidently fear that increases in rural incomes would result in demands for higher industrial wages, which they are unwilling to grant. Indeed, they have served notice on the industrial labor force that increased incomes are not likely during the unfolding of the investment program of the Seven-Year Plan. The resultant prospect of stagnating urban and rural incomes should be taken into account by those who have pinned their hopes for an erosion of the Moscow dictatorship on continually rising living standards for the Soviet people.

There is, however, another aspect of the recent changes in collective farmers' income, namely, their impact upon income distribution. Because of the lack of detailed information, and perhaps because they have been misled by the egalitarian phraseology of official Soviet doctrine, students of the Soviet economy have paid little attention to this problem.

In the collective farm sector, the following general characteristics of income distribution can be observed. Basically, there are two economically privileged groups among collective farmers. One is made up of the farm officials and so-called mechanizers (tractor drivers, combine harvester operators, and truck drivers), who constitute about one-tenth of the labor force but receive about 20-25 percent of all payments in money and kind to collective farm labor. The other is comprised of members of particularly privileged farms which either produce high-priced crops (primarily industrial) or serve as model farms. Their labor payments are at least twice the earnings of average farmers. It would therefore appear that about 20 percent of the collective farm population absorbs 40-45 percent of the total labor remuneration distributed by the collective farms. There is strong evidence that incomes from private plots served as a compensating factor for the lower-earning groups of collective farmers and tended to equalize farm income. If this assumption is correct, we have to conclude that the policies designed to decrease the output of private plots tend to increase income inequality in the Soviet rural areas.

IN SUMMARY, the following general conclusions about recent Soviet policies affecting the collective farmers' income may be made:

(1) After a period (ending by 1958) of stimulating conditions under which income from both the socialized and private sectors was increasing, the Soviet authorities embarked upon a concerted effort to decrease the scope of the private economy, thus depressing the farmers' private earnings.

[9] The 1958-60 decline in collective farmers' cow holdings alone accounts for a decrease in the value of their private output by over 9.2 billion rubles (in 1958 retail prices). This by itself is sufficient to indicate a drop in their incomes.

[10] No. 8, 1961, p. 77.

[11] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu*, TsSU SSSR, Moscow, 1960, p. 84.

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(2) The professed intention to compensate for this income decline by an increase in income from the socialized sector has not materialized. The total income of collective farmers has consequently been decreasing since 1958.[12]

(3) The decline in farmers' private income, which constitutes a large share of their total earnings and affects in more than one way the socialized sector, has resulted in a new incentives crisis in Soviet agriculture. This crisis, which became apparent during 1960 (and perhaps already in 1959), better explains the failure of Soviet agriculture to meet the targets of the Seven-Year Plan than the reasons that are officially cited, *i.e.*, adverse weather conditions and disruptions in the channels of control.

(4) Finally, the prolonged struggle of the Soviet regime against its peasantry indicates that technological advancement and administrative reorganization alone are not sufficient to produce increases in agricultural output in the absence of appropriate social policies. Nor can the problems of Soviet agriculture be solved by occasional good harvests. There is in short no substitute for resolving the pressing question of peasant incomes.

Arcadius Kahan

(Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, Mr. Kahan last appeared in these pages with "Troubles in Soviet Agriculture," March-April 1961.)

[12] According to official figures, the peasants' total income from all sources was 0.5 percent higher in 1959 than in 1958. (*Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu*, p. 84.) However, not even this minute increase can be substantiated by any conceivable manipulation of the primary official data.



A SOURCE OF INCOME

—The store is closed?

—Very good!

—*From* Krokodil *(Moscow), July 30, 1961.*

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EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism*. Comments should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism*, U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington 25, D.C.

AN AUTHOR'S COMPLAINT

TO THE EDITORS: I would like to straighten out a misconception which follows from Mr. Ebon's review of my book and Conrad Kellen's book on the same subject, "The Rise of Khrushchev" (*Problems of Communism*, September-October (1961).

Mr. Ebon informed the readers that "Kellen's book was submitted to Pistrak for checking before publication." This statement leaves the readers with the impression that I was checking the accuracy or the interpretation of events in Mr. Kellen's book. This is not so. A version (and not the final one) of Kellen's manuscript was shown to me because it contained a large number of similarities if compared with my manscript. The truth is that Mr. Kellen was hired by the publisher to edit the first version of my book and, despite this fact, he decided to write a "journalistic" book about Khrushchev on his own based on the material made known to him as an editor. What I checked was not the substance of the book but these similarities, which were *partly* deleted from the last version of Kellen's manuscript. I must refrain from passing judgment on that book, but I must state that for understandable reasons I rejected the offer that my name be mentioned in the foreword of Kellen's book.

LAZAR PISTRAK
Washington, D. C.

COMMENT FROM NORWAY

TO THE EDITORS: I should like to inform you that, after having read *Problems of Communism* avidly for some years, it is my opinion that the magazine maintains a standard of excellence and erudition that would have been imposing in any political field, but is especially so in a field where propaganda on the lowest level is so frequent and rampant—and perhaps so tempting.

For my needs—as an editorial writer—*Problems of Communism* offers an invaluable source of information and analysis of a scope and quality far beyond other periodical literature on the same subject of which I know.

OLE GHERLØW
Editorial writer, *Morgenavisen*
Bergen, Norway

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